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INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6924
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 001069 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC; WHA/PD 
STATE PASS USTR FOR SULLIVAN/LEZNY 
NSC FOR FEARS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ETRD KPLS BR
SUBJECT: ALCKMIN AS PRESIDENT: THE END OF IDEOLOGY 
 
REFS: (A) Brasilia 2100; (B) Sao Paulo 810 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY.  In a friendly and candid discussion with the 
Ambassador, Joao Carlos Meirelles, a long-term advisor and the 
current campaign manager for PSDB presidential hopeful Geraldo 
Alckmin (Ref B), outlined the likely policies of an Alckmin 
government, as well as the strategy that the campaign will employ in 
the run-up to the October 29 runoff against President Lula (Ref A). 
Meirelles stressed that an Alckmin administration would shed the 
ideology that has driven Lula's foreign and trade policies. 
Instead, Alckmin would focus on Brazil's core national interests, 
which including regional integration and development through 
partnerships with the United States and other countries in the 
hemisphere.  He highlighted the importance of pursuing projects such 
as biofuel technologies, enhancing trade by restarting multilateral 
and bilateral negotiations, and assuming a more pragmatic leadership 
role in the region. Meirelles suggested that Alckmin would distance 
himself from Hugo Chavez by treating Venezuela as any other 
neighboring country while taking a stronger stand against Bolivia's 
Evo Morales.  Meirelles maintained that Alckmin can beat Lula in a 
face-to-face runoff because voters will be able to focus squarely on 
the stark differences between the two candidates.  In contrast to 
Lula's desire to focus the campaign debate on comparisons with past 
presidents, particularly former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
Alckmin intends to concentrate on concrete proposals while stressing 
his own proven managerial skills as former governor of Brazil's 
largest and most prosperous state.  Meirelles said the campaign will 
engage nationwide, and not focus on any particular region.  He 
opined that Lula and his PT party were stunned that Alckmin forced a 
run-off, and added that Lula's recent recruitment of Cabinet members 
into the campaign suggests signs of desperation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES: LIKE OIL AND WATER 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (SBU)    Joao Carlos Meirelles, the campaign manager for 
Brazil's presidential challenger Geraldo Alckmin (Ref B), outlined 
for the Ambassador and Consul General the strategies that the 
campaign will employ during the next three weeks to carry Alckmin to 
victory in the October 29th run-off election (Ref A).  He also 
discussed the likely policy positions of an Alckmin presidential 
administration.  When asked by the Ambassador how the foreign policy 
of Alckmin -- if he were to win -- would compare to that of 
President Lula, Meirelles immediately quipped, "Like oil and water." 
 Meirelles said that Alckmin would "pursue real national interests, 
not ideology," touching on a common complaint that, under direction 
of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry ("Itamaraty") under the Lula 
Administration, foreign relations and trade negotiations are often 
driven more by ideology than policy considerations. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Meirelles indicated that Alckmin is very aware of 
Brazil's role as one of the world's major exporters; he referred to 
export promotion and enhanced trading opportunities as top 
priorities several times.  In that context, he said that Alckmin's 
central thrust in foreign policy would be to look toward integration 
and development by working with the United States and other 
countries in the hemisphere.  For example, an Alckmin administration 
would strive to consolidate the economic benefits of MERCOSUR, but 
his camp views the trading bloc as important but secondary to their 
broader hemispheric policy approach. Recognizing that multilateral 
discussions take time, Meirelles said Alckmin is also interested in 
reaching bilateral accords with key developed countries. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Regarding the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 
Meirelles sounded a positive note, saying that Alckmin wanted to 
boost trade by whatever means possible. (Note:  Earlier in the week 
the Ambassador met with Rubens Barbosa, the former Brazilian 
Ambassador to the United States and current private consultant and 
one of several foreign policy advisors for Alckmin's Brazilian 
Social Democratic Party (PSDB).  As one of several voices in the 
PSDB on the issue of free trade, Barbosa essentially said that the 
FTAA, under its current guise, will never be taken up by any 
 
SAO PAULO 00001069  002 OF 004 
 
 
Brazilian government.  Barbosa even suggested that the name itself 
is a problem, although he conceded that a dual track formula such as 
the one that was agreed to at the Miami FTAA Ministerial meeting 
would be acceptable.  For his part, Meirelles said that Alckmin 
realizes Brazil's need to open new markets, "whatever the vehicle." 
End Note.)  Meirelles noted that Lula's penchant for pursuing trade 
deals with developing countries like South Africa and Mozambique 
offer little in terms of markets for Brazilian products, and that 
enhancing trade with large markets like the United States is a 
necessity. 
 
------------------------------------ 
IT'S ALL ABOUT RESULTS, NOT IDEOLOGY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Meirelles also signaled that an Alckmin presidency would 
seek stronger ties between Brazil and United States, particularly in 
regard to regional integration and development.  He said the U.S. 
and Brazil share the same goals in regard to stabilizing and 
assisting underdeveloped nations, and that we should be able to work 
together as partners toward this goal in the hemisphere.  He said, 
for example, that Alckmin would continue Brazil's involvement in the 
U.N. Mission to Haiti (contrary to the view voiced by Barbosa to the 
Ambassador earlier in the week).  He was also very receptive to a 
suggestion by the Ambassador that our two countries could use the 
expansion of biofuel markets as a development tool in the Caribbean, 
and in Africa. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Meirelles said that Alckmin would like Brazil to take a 
more "natural" leadership role in the region; one that is strategic 
and pragmatic, but not ideological like the Lula government.  In 
regard to Venezuela, he noted that Alckmin recognizes that Brazil 
must deal with Hugo Chavez because Venezuela is an important 
neighbor, and that many major Brazilian firms do business in 
Caracas.  According to Meirelles, however, Alckmin would treat Hugo 
Chavez as nothing more than the leader of a neighboring country. 
Meirelles said it was "foolish" for Lula to have allowed Chavez to 
elevate himself to a central role in South America, or to use him as 
a proxy in order to antagonize the United States.  Bolivia, on the 
other had, presents a more serious problem.   Meirelles said that 
Lula's handling of the nationalization of Bolivian petroleum 
facilities was "ridiculous," and that Alckmin would take a much 
stronger approach to the situation, which has serious implications 
for Brazilian national interests. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
FIRST THINGS FIRST: TRYING TO ORCHESTRATE VICTORY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Meirelles, an Alckmin insider for many years who served 
as state Secretary of Science, Technology and Economic Development 
and as Secretary of Agriculture during Alckmin's tenure as Sao Paulo 
state governor, displayed a quiet confidence in his candidate's 
chances of winning the second-round of elections.  He maintained 
that "Lula lost" in the October 1 first-round, leaving a stunned 
Lula with "nothing to say" to explain Alckmin's surprising showing 
at almost 42 percent of the votes cast.  Meirelles said that while 
Lula is not desperate yet, his campaign is clearly showing signs of 
stress, as reflected in the decision to recruit 17 Cabinet ministers 
into campaign duties.  According to Meirelles, the post-election 
partisan statements of Finance Minister Mantega disparaging Alckmin, 
statements given from his government office and during work hours, 
violated election rules. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Meirelles also said that voters will now have the chance 
to really get to know Alckmin, and they will see a stark difference 
between his vision for the future and Lula's fixation with the 
record of past presidents, particularly Fernando Henrique Cardoso. 
Meirelles repeatedly said that of the two candidates, only Alckmin 
offers "concrete proposals" to address Brazil's ills and move the 
country forward.  He said Alckmin will hammer home the message that 
it is impossible for Brazil to adequately grow without significant 
improvements to the country's infrastructure and education system, 
which must incorporate technological innovation.  According to 
Meirelles, voters will come to see that Alckmin has the better 
 
SAO PAULO 00001069  003 OF 004 
 
 
"capacity to manage" based on his years as Governor of a state with 
a larger population and greater GDP than Argentina.  But, Meirelles 
admitted that Lula can capitalize on the name recognition that comes 
with incumbency and the fact that this will be his seventh time on 
the presidential ballot.  Meirelles also admitted that "people don't 
know Alckmin yet," but offerred that "when they get to know him, 
they prefer him to Lula." 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ALCKMIN'S NATIONAL -- NOT REGIONAL -- STRATEGY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  When asked how the campaign plans to approach the 
run-off, Meirelles said that, contrary to popular pundit 
speculation, Alckmin will not focus attention on certain regions of 
Brazil, but rather, will "legitimize" his position in every state 
and work through state party campaigns to improve his overall 
standing.  According to Meirelles, the campaign will address the 
"political reality" in each state, and to that end, has identified 
states according to three categories: 1) states in which Alckmin's 
Social Democratic Party of Brazil (PSDB) was the clear winner in the 
first-round of balloting (he said there are 17 such states); 2) 
states in which both the PSDB and Lula's Worker's Party (PT) made 
equally strong showings; and 3) states which fielded weak or no PSDB 
candidates. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Meirelles stressed that there is a significant 
difference between first and second round voting, because in the 
first-round people tend to focus on state-level candidates, and in 
some instances, do not even know the candidates for federal office. 
The second-round will afford Alckmin time to improve his 
name-recognition and compare himself against Lula, and he will be 
able to take advantage of alliances with other parties, such as the 
People's Democratic Movement of Brazil (PMDB), where he may be able 
to fill a void for voters in areas where the PMDB lost seats in the 
first-round.  Meirelles shirked off the unsolicited endorsement 
Alckmin received from controversial former governor of Rio de 
Janeiro state Anthony Garatinho (PMDB), which led two other 
prominent politicians -- and dedicated rivals to Garatinho - to 
first declare that they intended to cast nullified ballots for 
president, and then reverse themselves and publicly state they will 
support Alckmin.  Rather than detracting from Alckmin's momentum, 
Meirelles insisted that this sort of rough-and-tumble politics in 
Rio is par for the course for a state that is notorious for its 
fickle and mercurial electorate and thus should not be taken too 
seriously.  Besides, he said, knowing that loyalties were destined 
to split among Rio's political elite, Alckmin did well by obtaining 
Garotinho's early backing, because his political supporters are the 
working class and poor who live in three different zones of Rio, 
giving Alckmin a better chance of expanding his base of support 
across the city and state many consider important in order to gain a 
victory.  "I am absolutely sure we will have very good performance 
in Rio," said Meirelles. 
 
----------------------------- 
AVOIDING NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Meirelles went out of his way to stress that Alckmin 
will focus his campaign message on the future, and on promoting his 
"concrete proposals."  He will not, said Meirelles, focus on the 
corruption scandals associated with Lula's PT party.  But he will 
highlight specific failures of the Lula Administration, such as the 
poor state of the country's infrastructure, in order to make a point 
of comparison with his own record as governor of Sao Paulo. 
Meirelles was also quick to point out that while Alckmin will not 
bring up ethics as a way to discredit Lula, if Lula's campaign 
challenges Alckmin's ethics or raises charges of corruption, Alckmin 
will, of course, bring up the myriad PT scandals.  This, he said, 
will be Alckmin's strategy in the October 8 televised debate as 
well.  Alckmin will outline specific proposals for Brazil's future 
on which he promises to deliver based on his past experience.  For 
example, voters will learn, said Meirelles, that Alckmin as vice 
governor and later governor inherited a large budget deficit but led 
Sao Paulo state to a record of 11 straight years of budget surpluses 
 
SAO PAULO 00001069  004 OF 004 
 
 
that allowed for major investments in highways and other 
infrastructure projects. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
BUT HOW DOES HE WARM UP TO THE VOTERS? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  COMMENT: Despite Alckmin's dramatic comeback from a 30 
point deficit in the pre-election polls, he still faces a steep 
slope in the October 29 runoff against Lula.  He suffers from a lack 
of name recognition outside of the south and southeastern states (in 
contrast to Lula whose name has been on the presidential ballot 
seven times), a lack of charisma, and the public perception of a 
policy wonk among voters who do know him.  Meirelles himself 
unwittingly played into that image during our conversation, by 
repeatedly referring to Alckmin as "solid," and having "concrete 
ideas," and being a "manager."  And even though Alckmin carries the 
momentum going into the October 8 televised debate, the election is 
still Lula's to lose.  But, Meirelles may be right that in the 
coming three weeks, enough people will get to know, and to like, 
Geraldo Alckmin's bland but solid style of leadership.  Meirelles' 
characterization of Alckmin is reminiscent of a comparison made 
between him and Lula, as passed down from a prominent businessman: 
When you meet Lula for the first time, he will charm you in five 
minutes, but when you meet Alckmin, he will persuade you in thirty. 
The question is whether Alckmin has the time to persuade enough 
Brazilians to carry him to victory on October 29.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13.  (U)  This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia and 
cleared by Ambassador Sobel. 
 
MCMULLEN