VZCZCXRO3831
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRB #2010/01 3031121
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301121Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5046
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2295
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0633

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 002010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 
TAGS: PBTS PINR PGOV MO AG KPKO WI
SUBJECT: (C-NE6-01369) POLISARIO COMMANDER READY TO BEND BUT NOT BREAK 
 
REF: A. RABAT 1963 B. STATE 171744 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Craig Karp for reasons 1.4(b) and 
(d) 
 
Corrected copy of Rabat 1975 to include reporting requirement code in 
reftel B. 
 
-------- 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) At a Polisario "base" East of the berm separating Moroccan and 
Polisario forces, a Polisario Political/Military commander told an 
Embassy team and MINURSO commander October 12 that he and his 
comrades were flexible and prepared to talk, but could not compromise 
the Sahrawis' right to self-determination.  Polcouns cautioned 
Commandante Ibrahim Biyadillah that MINURSO's presence should not be 
taken for granted indefinitely and urged the Polisario to consider 
direct talks with the GOM.  For his part, Ibrahim 
Asserted that the Polisario bore "no ill will toward Morocco," but 
warned that a MINURSO withdrawal could lead to a resumptionof 
hostilities.  End summary. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
"Nothing Left but our Trousers" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On October 12, polcouns, poloff, and army attach were brought 
by MINURSO Commander Maj. Gen. Kurt Mosgaard (Denmark), and his team, 
to visit a Polisario base in Western Sahara, in the remote and 
desolate area outside the Berm. 
 
¶3. (C) In a meeting following a brief tour (below), 
Commandante Mohammed Ibrahim Biyadullah told us that the Polisario 
remained committed to a "democratic solution" to the conflict.  "We 
have made many concessions... we have nothing left but our 
trousers... but we cannot concede the right of our people to 
determine their own future," he stated.  Noting that the 
international community had successfully intervened against the will 
of the occupying power to resolve territorial disputes in Kuwait and 
East Timor, Ibrahim lamented that the UN's Baker Plan had never been 
implemented, despite considerable international effort and support. 
There had been no pressure exerted on Morocco to accept Baker's 
compromise, which the Polisario had endorsed. 
 
¶4. (C) Ibrahim affirmed that the Polisario "still have the patience 
to wait for a solution" but conceded that it was "difficult to 
convince my soldiers they have to wait forever."  "The cease-fire is 
helping the Moroccans continue their violations," he stated, 
repeating that a "democratic and transparent referendum" could 
resolve the conflict once and for all.  Ibrahim regretted Morocco's 
continued resistance to a referendum "even under terms favorable to 
Morocco."  He described tentative talk of a Moroccan autonomy plan as 
"a grave mistake," and a regression to proposals aired 30 years ago. 
"Morocco can not just turn back the clock," he stated. 
 
---------------- 
Facing the Facts 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Thanking Ibrahim for his hospitality, Polcouns noted that the 
USG appreciated the Polisario's willingness to make compromises, and 
its patience and superb discipline in strictly adhering to the 
ceasefire.  For better or worse, Polcouns continued, the fact was 
that the Baker Plan has not been implemented.  He urged the Polisario 
look forward to 
find a solution rather than fixate on the past.  It was time to 
contemplate new solutions to end the stalemate that had kept his men 
and their families in camps and on the front line for a generation. 
 
¶6. (C) At the same time, the international environment has continued 
to evolve, Polcouns cautioned.  Given the urgency of crises elsewhere 
in the world, such as Lebanon, MINURSO should not be taken for 
granted as having an open-ended mandate.  At present, Western Sahara 
was again an item of growing importance on the international agenda. 
Polcouns urged that the Polisario leadership think hard about a 
formula in which it might be willing to sit face to face with 
the GOM to work out a permanent solution.  The USG has been pressing 
the GOM hard to come up with a credible, meaningful and detailed 
autonomy plan -- a plan which could be an important stepping stone to 
a final resolution.  Direct dialogue between the GOM and the 
Polisario offers the best hope for a lasting solution, Polcouns 
affirmed, and noted that when the parties are ready, the USG was 
prepared to facilitate such talks. 
 
------------- 
"No Ill Will" 
------------- 
 
 
RABAT 00002010  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶7. (C) In response, Ibrahim repeatedly pointed to indications of 
Moroccan bad faith.  He asserted that Morocco had consistently gone 
back on compromises and agreements it made with the UN.  It has 
blocked the humanitarian exchanges of families, an agreed confidence 
building measure. (Note: Since the meeting Morocco has agreed to 
re-start the flights.)  He 
also expressed concern that the continuing Moroccan 
occupation has only led to oppression of the Sahrawis under their 
control.  Why can the international community not succeed in doing 
anything about this?  He pointed to the recently proposed trip to 
Laayoune by a European Parliament delegation that had been blocked by 
the Moroccans. 
 
¶8. (C) Ibrahim said  "from the bottom of our hearts, we have no ill 
will toward the Moroccan people or the Moroccan throne... Our duty is 
to live together in mutual respect...but history shows that Western 
Sahara is not part of Morocco," adding that the Moroccan presence in 
Sahara "lacks legal legitimacy."  Turning to MINURSO Commander Gen. 
Mosgaard, Ibrahim lamented that the mission had never fulfilled its 
mandate to conduct a referendum but added that MINURSO "has at least 
provided protection to the Sahrawi people."  Asked by Army Attach 
what would happen if MINURSO 
departed the area, Ibrahim replied with a grave expression and 
without hesitation: "We would go back to war.  We know how to defend 
ourselves.  This is our fate." Polcouns briefly countered that no one 
knew better than the Commandante the impossibility of a favorable 
military solution.  Reverting to arms, even symbolically, would only 
worsen his people,s prospects. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
In the Desert:  The Polisario's Second Military District 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9. (C) The base, headquarters of the Polisario's "Second Military 
District" is located in Tifariti, approximately 300km east of 
Laayounne and about 15 km north of the Mauritanian border.   The base 
is approximately 3km from a MINURSO "team site," or forward observer 
base, manned by 14 multinational personnel.  The MINURSO personnel at 
the site enjoy good relations with their Polisario neighbors.  A 
Polisario "liaison officer" is assigned to and often present at the 
UN team site. 
 
¶10. (C) The Polisario district headquarters is composed of a handful 
of small, spartan one story buildings on a scorched rocky rise in the 
midst of the desolate Saharan desert.  After the formal welcome 
Commandante Mohammed Ibrahim Biyadillah (Note: Polisario fighters do 
not assume military ranks.  End note.) led visitors on a tour of the 
site.  An 
honor guard of roughly 50 mostly middle-aged Polisario 
fighters, carrying well-tended AK-47 rifles and wearing fairly new, 
clean and pressed battle fatigues, greeted the USG and UN visitors. 
Aside from the honor guard, and several vehicles with Polisario 
insignias, no other militarypersonnel or equipment were in evidence. 
 
¶11. (C) Prior to 1991, there was a small village and remnants of a 
Spanish district office at the site, which apparently has a source of 
water.  The Moroccans destroyed the village in a 1991 ground-air 
assault, in retaliation for a Polisario attack, one of the last 
hostile acts before the cease fire.  The Sahrawis pointed out the 
Spanish dispensary, noting they 
had left it in its half rubble state as a memorial.  A short distance 
away lies the hulk of a destroyed Moroccan T-54 tank from 1991, 
another memorial. 
 
¶12. (C) The adjacent Polisarion HQ "compound" has a 
"museum," a pupil-less school building and an adjacent small hospital 
building that had just been built with funds and technical assistance 
from Spanish Provincial governments and NGOs.  The museum's exhibit 
featured the remains of a Moroccan Air Force jet downed by the 
Polisario in the 1970s, a display of other modern and traditional 
weaponry, inspirational artwork by Polisario fighters and family 
members, and some testimonials of alleged human rights abuses of 
Sahrawis in Moroccan custody. There was no habitation 
visible.  We were told that the only civilians in the 
district were nomads, who rotated family members in from the Tindouf 
camps.  A few Polisario fighters" apparently stay the site and in 
outposts between the village and the berm. 
 
¶13. (C) After our meeting, following a break at the team site, we 
were brought back to the very same compound, this time to meet an 
international Humanitarian Demining NGO, who were the real occupants 
of the "school" buildings, an in-kind contribution to their effort 
from the Polisario.  They were in the initial stages of a mine 
survey, and eventual clearance project for areas on the "Polisario" 
side of the berm. 
 
--------------- 
Leadership Note 
--------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Ibrahim told polcouns that he would report the 
 
RABAT 00002010  003 OF 003 
 
 
content of our discussions directly to Mohammed Abdel Aziz, President 
of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (RASD).  Responding to 
questions about the Polisario's leadership structure, Ibrahim told us 
that in addition to President Abdel Aziz (who is also 
Secretary-General of the Polisario, the overall liberation movement, 
 
SIPDIS 
a position he has held since 
1976), the Polisario is guided by a 36 member National 
Secretariat, the supreme decision-making body elected by a larger 
 
SIPDIS 
General Popular Congress, which is convened every four years. 
Ibrahim said he was a member of this Secretariat, but not part of the 
4-5 person inner cabinet around Abdel Aziz. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) A field commander and a political figure in the Polisario 
Movement, Ibrahim appeared somewhat flexible, perhaps born of a 
visible weariness of the prospect of an entire lifetime in camp or in 
the desert.  MINURSO considers him a moderate, at least compared to 
his 'hot head' colleagues in the southern districts.  Although he 
repeatedly spoke about a referendum, Ibrahim insisted only on 
self-determination.  He did not appear to condition his own 
readiness for talks with the Moroccans.  He made clear 
however his lack of confidence in the Kingdom, this will likely have 
to rise if talks were to go forward.  As a result, there is no reason 
to believe that he would accept a take-it-or leave it fait accompli. 
 
¶16. (C) Clearly a politician, Ibrahim did not appear to be looking at 
present to go back to war, and neither did his troops.  Their sharp 
dress but unthreatening overall mien suggests to our relatively 
untrained eyes that they may be being sustained (by Algeria) to keep 
up appearances, but not much more. (See reftel on MINURSO for 
additional military 
assessment.) 
Riley