VZCZCXRO7282
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRB #1983/01 2961305
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231305Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5014
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2279
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0624

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV KPKO MA WI
SUBJECT: SAHRAWI ACTIVISTS OUTLINE GRIEVANCES AND POSSIBLE 
STEPS FORWARD 
 
 
Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp for Reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) During a mid-October visit to Western Sahara, Sahrawi 
human rights activists indicated profound alienation from 
Moroccan authorities and deep skepticism about any autonomy 
package the GOM might be preparing, charging that human 
rights practices in the region were getting worse.  They 
viewed CORCAS as an unrepresentative instrument of the 
"occupation."  They spoke of a Sahrawi "intifada," although 
their own account of the situation was less dramatic.  To 
reverse their lack of confidence in the Moroccan government, 
they demanded: 
 
-- Removal of the GUS, the national police tactical squad, 
deployed since 2005 and famed for cracking heads; 
 
-- Cessation of repression, torture, disappearances, and home 
invasions by security forces; 
 
-- Allow the Sahrawis freedom of expression, even if that 
means a few Polisario flags; 
 
-- Liberate 33 remaining political prisoners; and 
 
-- Officially recognize/register human rights and civil 
society groups. 
 
¶2. (C) Separately, the leader of a pro-GOM Sahrawi NGO 
offered a diametrically opposite (and relatively less 
representative) view, claiming that the Polisario were 
"Algerian Sahrawi" pretenders with no credible claim to the 
former Spanish Sahara.  Claiming to be Tekla Sahrawis, a 
coastal tribe, versus the mostly Raguibat Polisario, they 
reminded us of the tribal aspect of the conflict.  Both 
sides, however, indicated distrust of MINURSO, and both 
offered either sparse or no recent data on instances of 
political violence or abuses.  Both sides told us that any 
autonomy plan had to include Sahrawization of the police. 
End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Sahrawi Activists Paint a Bleak Picture 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) During their mid-October visit to Western Sahara, 
poloffs were invited to share an Iftar (the meal which breaks 
the daily Ramadan fast) with a group of seven Sahrawi human 
rights activists sympathetic to the Polisario liberation 
movement.  Most had spent at least some time in Moroccan 
jails.  One attendee had spent more than four years in prison 
in Morocco in the 1970s, in what he described as extremely 
inhumane conditions. 
 
¶4. (C) Key points emerging from the meeting included: 
 
-- A sense of profound alienation from the Moroccan 
authorities, perceived as occupiers thwarting native 
Sahrawis' right to self-determination; 
 
-- The low credibility of CORCAS, the Royal Commission formed 
by the GOM ostensibly to represent Sahrawi views in the 
policy process.  The activists claimed recent CORCAS 
"consultations" in the region were actually occasions to 
threaten locals with retaliation if they did not submit to 
Moroccan control; 
 
-- Given the perceived hegemonic agenda and brutal 
track-record of the GOM, the Sahrawis dismissed talk of an 
autonomy plan as empty propaganda; 
 
-- A contention that Moroccan human rights practices in the 
region have deteriorated in the past year after a slight 
improvement in the initial period following the death of 
Hassan II and the succession of King Mohammed VI (though they 
could offer few recent examples since the crackdown after the 
May 2005 demonstrations to support the claim); 
 
-- Two cases - the death of Sahrawi activist Hamdi Lembarki 
at a Layoune pro-independence demonstration in October 2005, 
and the overnight detention and rough handling of a 
pro-independence teenager in February 2006, were cited as 
examples of ongoing excessive force; 
 
-- Also cited was the 2005-06 arrest and detention of our 
host, Sahrawi activist Brahim Dahane (strictly protect), who 
 
RABAT 00001983  002 OF 003 
 
 
was detained in late October 2005 and released mid-April. 
Dahane implied that his arrest had been prompted either by 
his meeting with U.S. Emboffs during their October 2005 visit 
to Layoune, his role in publicizing internationally the 
Lembarki case, or both; 
 
-- Two other members of their circle, activists Saber Brahim 
and Subai Ahmed, are currently languishing in a Moroccan 
jail, the activists added; 
 
-- Further allegations that Moroccan security forces 
routinely order Sahrawi "trouble-makers" to emigrate from the 
territory or face death; 
 
-- A vague (and seemingly paradoxical) story offered in the 
same breath about a boatload of a dozen Sahrawis which 
recently disappeared in an Atlantic fog as they tried to make 
their way to the Canary Islands, speculating that the boat 
had been seized by Moroccan authorities and the passengers 
were being held incommunicado; 
 
-- Complaints of the lack of good educational, vocational, 
and economic opportunities for native youth in the territory. 
 The stagnant environment was causing a drain of native 
Sahrawis from the area, the activists claimed, leaving behind 
in Layoune a growing majority of transplanted Moroccans; 
 
-- Frustration and even disdain voiced toward MINURSO, which 
they believed "had accomplished nothing" for the cause of 
Sahrawi self-determination and did not even employ any local 
Sahrawis at their Layoune headquarters, they claimed; 
 
--Repeated references to a Sahrawi "intifada" and predictions 
that if MINURSO was withdrawn there would be war in the 
territory -- not on the berm, but in the streets of Layoune; 
 
and 
 
--Dismay that their efforts to work the Moroccan legal system 
had been rebuffed and that their efforts to register as a 
legal NGO denied. 
 
¶5. (C) Also present at the Iftar were two Spanish lawyers 
from Barcelona, visiting Layoune as international human 
rights observers of a trial the next day of a Sahrawi 
dissident.  They anticipated no problems, although the 
Sahrawis maintained they themselves would be barred from the 
courthouse.  When asked how their presence squared with the 
refusal to allow the visit of a European parliament 
delegations, the attorneys replied that lawyers, with a 
reputation for impartiality, are generally permitted to come 
in and observe, even when journalists and politicians were 
not. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Visit to a Pro-Moroccan Sahrawi NGO 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) At the other end of the Sahrawi political spectrum, 
poloffs visited on October 13 the Layoune offices of the 
Sahrawi Association for Victims of Polisario.  Chairman Dahia 
Aguai showed off the groups' premises, which featured large 
murals on the office walls depicting alleged Polisario 
atrocities, each labeled "Torture methods practiced by the 
Polisario."  The crude paintings portrayed several torture 
scenes, including one of a man being drawn-and-quartered in 
the desert by four camels, at the direction of men wearing 
olive fatigues, their faces shrouded in sinisterblack 
turbans.  Aguai and other interlocutors idntified themselves 
as members of the Tekla tribeof Sahrawis, traditionally 
resident in coastal aeas, and a tribe with longstanding ties 
to the Moroccan throne. 
 
¶7. (C) With an otherwise silent prticipant by his side 
taking copious notes of hi own presentation, Aguai offered a 
drawn-out accunt of the position of pro-Moroccan Sahrawis: 
 
- The Polisario, based in Tindouf, Algeria, are actually 
Algerian Sahrawis of the Raguibat tribe with no credible 
claim to the former Spanish Sahara.  (Note: The Raguibat's 
traditional territory does extend from the northeast of the 
former Spanish Sahara well into western Algeria end note.); 
 
-- Algeria is cynically supporting the Tindouf Sahrawis' 
claim to Spanish Sahara to preempt any Sahrawi separatism 
within its own borders; 
 
-- MINURSO, and the UN as a whole, has no credibility - they 
have been consistently biased toward the Polisario and 
unfairly hostile to Morocco; 
 
RABAT 00001983  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
-- The recent report of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights is proof of the UN's bias - they disregarded all of 
the information Aguai's group had provided regarding 
Polisario atrocities; 
 
-- Several attendees told us they had been prisoners of the 
Polisario during the 1970s and 80s.  One showed us his badly 
scarred back, which he said was the result of torture by the 
Polisario; 
-- The group offered no details of any recent cases of abuse 
by the Polisario, but claimed to regularly receive 
information from sympathetic contacts inside the 
Polisario-controlled refugee camps in Algeria; 
 
-- Unexpectedly asked what they thought would be essential 
elements of a prospective autonomy plan, they replied that 
the police and other security forces should be Sahrawi. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Of the two groups, we judge the dissidents who offered 
us Iftar the more credible and representative of Sahrawi 
views and attitudes.  The "Victims of the Polisario" NGO was 
an unsophisticated showpiece, obviously sponsored by the GOM, 
to counter the information put out to the world by 
Polisario-leaning human rights activists.  It was noteworthy 
that both groups, from their opposing perspectives, 
criticized MINURSO, which suggests that the UN Mission is 
fairly successfully refraining from playing favorites, and 
both sides thought the Security forces needed a Sahrawi 
character. 
 
¶9. (C) It was particularly significant that neither the 
fervently pro-independence activists, nor their pro-GOM 
adversaries, could offer much data or detail on recent 
instances of political violence or human rights violations. 
While local grievances are real and deeply felt, the 
intensity and magnitude of this conflict pales in comparison 
to other trouble spots on the African continent or elsewhere 
in the world.  Indeed, while the heavy police presence on 
Layoune's streets was clearly incongruent with the city's low 
crime rate, the territorial capital did not feel like a "city 
under siege."  Each evening during our visit, crowds of 
native Sahrawis, Moroccan migrants, and the occasional 
foreigner, jammed the city's sidewalks and squares to enjoy 
the festive Ramadan atmosphere.  End comment. 
 
 
****************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
****************************************** 
 
Riley