VZCZCXRO5938
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRB #1975/01 2931524
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201524Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5006
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2274
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0618

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001975 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS KPKO MA WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO COMMANDER READY TO BEND BUT NOT BREAK 
 
REF: RABAT 1963 
 
Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) At a Polisario "base" east of the berm separating 
Moroccan and Polisario forces, a Polisario Political/Military 
commander told an Embassy team and MINURSO commander October 
12 that he and his comrades were flexible and prepared to 
talk, but could not compromise the Sahrawis' right to 
self-determination.  Polcouns cautioned Commandante Ibrahim 
Biyadillah that MINURSO's presence should not be taken for 
granted indefinitely and urged the Polisario to consider 
direct talks with the GOM.  For his part, Ibrahim asserted 
that the Polisario bore "no ill will toward Morocco," but 
warned that a MINURSO withdrawal could lead to a resumption 
of hostilities.  End summary. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
"Nothing Left but our Trousers" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On October 12, polcouns, poloff, and army attache were 
brought by MINURSO Commander Maj. Gen. Kurt Mosgaard 
(Denmark), and his team, to visit a Polisario base in Western 
Sahara, in the remote and desolate area outside the Berm. 
 
 
¶3. (C) In a meeting following a brief tour (below), 
Commandante Mohammed Ibrahim Biyadullah told us that the 
Polisario remained committed to a "democratic solution" to 
the conflict.  "We have made many concessions... we have 
nothing left but our trousers... but we cannot concede the 
right of our people to determine their own future," he 
stated.  Noting that the international community had 
successfully intervened against the will of the occupying 
power to resolve territorial disputes in Kuwait and East 
Timor, Ibrahim lamented that the UN,s Baker Plan had never 
been implemented, despite considerable international effort 
and support.  There had been no pressure exerted on Morocco 
to accept Baker's compromise, which the Polisario had 
endorsed. 
 
¶4. (C) Ibrahim affirmed that the Polisario "still have the 
patience to wait for a solution" but conceded that it was 
"difficult to convince my soldiers they have to wait 
forever."  "The ceasefire is helping the Moroccans continue 
their violations," he stated, repeating that a "democratic 
and transparent referendum" could resolve the conflict once 
and for all.  Ibrahim regretted Morocco's continued 
resistance to a referendum "even under terms favorable to 
Morocco."  He described tentative talk of a Moroccan autonomy 
plan as "a grave mistake," and a regression to proposals 
aired 30 years ago.  "Morocco can not just turn back the 
clock," he stated. 
 
---------------- 
Facing the Facts 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Thanking Ibrahim for his hospitality, Polcouns noted 
that the USG appreciated the Polisario's willingness to make 
compromises, and its patience and superb discipline in 
strictly adhering to the ceasefire.  For better or worse, 
Polcouns continued, the fact was that the Baker Plan has not 
been implemented.  He urged the Polisario look forward to 
find a solution rather than fixate on the past.  It was time 
to contemplate new solutions to end the stalemate that had 
kept his men and their families in camps and on the front 
line for a generation. 
 
¶6. (C) At the same time, the international environment has 
continued to evolve, Polcouns cautioned.  Given the urgency 
of crises elsewhere in the world, such as Lebanon, MINURSO 
should not be taken for granted as having an open-ended 
mandate.  At present, Western Sahara was again an item of 
growing importance on the international agenda.  Polcouns 
urged that the Polisario leadership think hard about a 
formula in which it might be willing to sit face to face with 
the GOM to work out a permanent solution.  The USG has been 
pressing the GOM hard to come up with a credible, meaningful 
and detailed autonomy plan -- a plan which could be an 
important stepping stone to a final resolution.  Direct 
dialogue between the GOM and the Polisario offers the best 
hope for a lasting solution, Polcouns affirmed, and noted 
that when the parties are ready, the USG was prepared to 
 
RABAT 00001975  002 OF 003 
 
 
facilitate such talks. 
 
------------- 
"No Ill Will" 
------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In response, Ibrahim repeatedly pointed to indications 
of Moroccan bad faith.  He asserted that Morocco had 
consistently gone back on compromises and agreements it made 
with the UN.  It has blocked the humanitarian exchanges of 
families, an agreed confidence building measure. (Note: Since 
the meeting Morocco has agreed to re-start the flights.)  He 
also expressed concern that the continuing Moroccan 
occupation has only led to oppression of the Sahrawis under 
their control.  Why can the international community not 
succeed in doing anything about this?  He pointed to the 
recently proposed trip to Layoune by a European Palriament 
delegation that had been blocked by the Moroccans. 
 
¶8. (C) Ibrahim said  "from the bottom of our hearts, we have 
no ill will toward the Moroccan people or the Moroccan 
throne... Our duty is to live together in mutual respect... 
but history shows that Western Sahara is not part of 
Morocco," adding that the Moroccan presence in Sahara "lacks 
legal legitimacy."  Turning to MINURSO Commander Gen. 
Mosgaard, Ibrahim lamented that the mission had never 
fulfilled its mandate to conduct a referendum but added that 
MINURSO "has at least provided protection to the Sahrawi 
people."  Asked by Army Attache what would happen if MINURSO 
departed the area, Ibrahim replied with a grave expression 
and without hesitation: "We would go back to war.  We know 
how to defend ourselves.  This is our fate." Polcouns briefly 
countered that no one knew better than the Commandante the 
impossibility of a favorable military solution.  Reverting to 
arms, even symbolically, would only worsen his people,s 
prospects. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
In the Desert:  The Polisario's Second Military District 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9. (C) The base, headquarters of the Polisario's "Second 
Military District" is located in Tifariti, approximately 
300km east of Layounne and about 15 km north of the 
Mauritanian border.   The base is approximately 3km from a 
MINURSO "team site," or forward observer base, manned by 14 
multinational personnel.  The MINURSO personnel at the site 
enjoy good relations with their Polisario neighbors.  A 
Polisario "liaison officer" is assigned to and often present 
at the UN team site. 
 
¶10. (C) The Polisario district headquarters is composed of a 
handful of small, spartan one story buildings on ascorched 
rocky rise in the midst of the desolate Saharan desert. 
After the formal welcome Commandante Mohammed Ibrahim 
Biyadillah (Note: Polisario fighters do not assume military 
ranks.  End note.) led visitors on a tour of the site.  An 
honor guard of roughly 50 mostly middle-aged Polisario 
fighters, carrying well-tended AK-47 rifles and wearing 
fairly new, clean and pressed battle fatigues, greeted the 
USG and UN visitors.  Aside from the honor guard, and several 
vehicles with Polisario insignias, no other military 
personnel or equipment were in evidence. 
 
¶11. (C) Prior to 1991, there was a small village and remnants 
of a Spanish district office at the site, which apparently 
has a source of water.  The Moroccans destroyed the village 
in a 1991 ground-air assault, in retaliation for a Polisario 
attack, one of the last hostile acts before the cease fire. 
The Sahrawis pointed out the Spanish dispensary, noting they 
had left it in its half rubble state as a memorial.  A short 
distance away lies the hulk of a destroyed Moroccan T-54 tank 
from 1991, another memorial. 
 
¶12. (C)  The adjacent Polisarion HQ "compound" has a 
"museum," a pupil-less school building and an adjacent small 
hospital building that had just been built with funds and 
technical assistance from Spanish Provincial governments and 
NGOs.  The museum's exhibit featured the remains of a 
Moroccan Air Force jet downed by the Polisario in the 1970s, 
a display of other modern and traditional weaponry, 
inspirational artwork by Polisario fighters and family 
members, and some testimonials of alleged human rights abuses 
of Sahrawis in Moroccan custody. There was no habitation 
visible.  We were told that the only civilians in the 
district were nomads, who rotated family members in from the 
Tindouf camps.  A few Polisario fighters" apparently stay the 
site and in outposts between the village and the berm. 
 
¶13. (C) After our meeting, following a break at the team 
site, we were brought back to the very same compound, this 
 
RABAT 00001975  003 OF 003 
 
 
time to meet an international Humanitarian Demining NGO, who 
were the real occupants of the "school" buildings, an in-kind 
contribution to their effort from the Polisario.  They were 
in the initial stages of a mine survey, and eventual 
clearance project for areas on the "Polisario" side of the 
berm. 
 
--------------- 
Leadership Note 
--------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Ibrahim told polcouns that he would report the 
content of our discussions directly to Mohammed Abdel Aziz, 
President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (RASD). 
Responding to questions about the Polisario's leadership 
structure, Ibrahim told us that in addition to President 
Abdel Aziz (who is also Secretary-General of the Polisario, 
the overall liberation movement, a position he has held since 
1976), the Polisario is guided by a 36 member National 
Secretariat, the supreme decision-making body elected by a 
 
SIPDIS 
larger General Popular Congress, which is convened every four 
years.  Ibrahim said he was a member of this Secretariat, but 
not part of the 4-5 person inner cabinet around Abdel Aziz. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) A field commander and a political figure in the 
Polisario Movement, Ibrahim appeared somewhat flexible, 
perhaps born of a visible weariness of the prospect of an 
entire lifetime in camp or in the desert.  MINURSO considers 
him a moderate, at least compared to his &hot head8 
colleagues in the southern districts.  Although he repeatedly 
spoke about a referendum, Ibrahim insisted only on 
self-determination.  He did not appear to condition his own 
readiness for talks with the Moroccans.  He made clear 
however his lack of confidence in the Kingdom, this will 
likely have to rise if talks were to go forward.  As a 
result, there is no reason to believe that he would accept a 
take-it-or leave it fait accompli. 
 
¶16. (C) Clearly a politician, Ibrahim did not appear to be 
looking at present to go back to war, and neither did his 
troops.  Their sharp dress but unthreatening overall mien 
suggests to our relatively untrained eyes that they may be 
being sustained (by Algeria) to keep up appearances, but not 
much more. (See reftel on MINURSO for additional military 
assessment.) 
 
 
****************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
****************************************** 
 
Riley