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DE RUEHFR #7102/01 3030912
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O 300912Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2661
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER FR TU PINS XT
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA AND MOI DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR DISCUSS 
MUSLIM INTEGRATION 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for Reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In an October 24 meeting with EUR DAS Matt 
Bryza, Minister of Interior Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor, 
David Martinon, expressed interest in U.S. thinking on Muslim 
integration in Europe and highlighted the various ways in 
which the GOF has approached the problem in recent years. 
Sarkozy, he stressed, had made much progress in fostering 
dialogue with and among the rather fractious Muslim 
organizations in France.  That said, Martinon noted that 
French principles of secular government limited how large a 
role the GOF could comfortably and legally play.  On imam 
training specifically, Martinon insisted any project would 
have to be executed through a "sub-contract," and, if it was 
to be effective, carried out on French soil.  He was 
particularly receptive, however, to engaging with the U.S. on 
the best way to address imam training while expressing some 
skepticism about the applicability of the Turkish model of 
such training to France.  Martinon also took the opportunity 
to emphasize to Bryza that Sarkozy,s position against EU 
membership for Turkey "would not change in the coming months. 
END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (S) Visiting EUR DAS Matt Bryza met October 24 with 
Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor, 
David Martinon, to discuss Muslim integration in France (and 
Europe) and ideas for improving the training of imams.  Bryza 
explained that the U.S. was examining its efforts to engage 
with Muslim leaders with a focus not on engaging only for the 
sake of engagement, but to support Muslims embracing their 
own traditions of tolerant faith and scientific learning as 
they struggle against narrow and extreme proponents of Islam. 
 The U.S. and European allies all had a strong interest in 
the long-run outcome of the ongoing battle for hearts and 
minds within Islam.  The key was to empower Muslims who, 
(though perhaps not pro-American), seek to counter extremism 
and who enjoy authority and credibility among fellow Muslims. 
 A crucial task was to help Europe,s Muslim communities 
acquaint themselves with their own tolerant traditions, so 
they could resist extremist recruiters. Bryza and Martinon 
agreed that second- and third-generation Muslims in Europe 
were often unfamiliar with their families, own traditions, 
since the first generation often focused on blending into 
their adopted societies and making ends meet.  This left 
second- and third-generation European Muslims with a vague 
sense that they were Muslim, but without an understanding of 
what this meant in practice.  This "spiritual vacuum," 
coupled with a sense of secular alienation (as evidenced in 
the October 2005 riots among non-Muslim and Mulsim immigrants 
in France) provided prime targets for extremist recruiters. 
Governments could counter extremist recruiters by helping 
second- and third-generation Muslims in Europe reacquaint 
themselves with their own traditions.  Governments could also 
encourage integration of Muslim communities into mainstream 
European society in a way that allowed them to be proud of 
both their French citizenship and their 
Algerian/Moroccan/Turkish Muslim traditions as well. 
 
¶3. (S) Martinon highlighted the various initiatives taken by 
Interior Minister Sarkozy to work more closely with the 
Muslim communities in France.  "Sarkozy has done for the 
Muslims what Napoleon did for the Jews two centuries ago" he 
said.  Sarkozy,s most successful venture, Martinon noted, 
was the creation of "official Islam," in the form of the 
French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), whose director is 
appointed by the MOI and is currently Dalil Boubakeur, a 
religious leader of Algerian origin with ties to the Algerian 
government.  He stressed, however, that there were at least 
seven divergent schools of Islamic thought in France and that 
this was the first time the government had succeeded in 
bringing many of them to the table, including the Union of 
Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), often considered as 
one of the more extreme Muslim groups in the country and 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood "movement." 
 
¶4. (S) Sarkozy, Martinon explained, believed that while it 
was difficult to talk to some extremist elements, and while 
it was important for moderate forces to prevail, it was vital 
to bring even those Muslims with extreme views into the 
dialogue: "An identity that is marginalized is radicalized," 
he said.  Martinon stressed the importance of "an Islam of 
France," and not "an Islam in France."  Political Islam, he 
said, had to be engaged in some way in order to avoid further 
radicalization.  While he excluded the Salafists as political 
partners, he said that political Islam could no longer be 
ignored.  "Every year we dismantle between two and four major 
terrorist operations, both home grown and from outside, 
 
PARIS 00007102  002 OF 002 
 
 
mostly due to our excellent cooperation with North African 
security services," he said.  He added that the GOF carefully 
watched mosques, as a security imperative, but that clearly 
this was not sufficient. A great deal of discussion was 
taking place in French circles, Martinon said, and while the 
French were on the verge of a policy shift, they "had not yet 
found their voice." 
 
¶5. (S) Martinon noted the French Government,s goal of 
training a cadre of imams in France who could preach "French 
Islam."  Imam training by the government, Martinon lamented, 
was not possible given the 1905 law that prohibits the state 
from financing any religion.  That said, the CFCM and GOF 
officials had begun to discuss the issue, so far with no 
concrete results.  Martinon dismissed the idea of training 
imams outside France, and said that any training would have 
to be done in France with the aim of avoiding outside 
influence.  It was worrisome enough, he added, that many 
mosques were financed from abroad.  Bryza noted the problem 
of identifying "reliable" imams-- e.g., those who were not 
masking extremist sentiment by using liberal-sounding 
rhetoric in conversations with government officials.  Bryza 
described an emerging and quiet effort he was working on in 
conjunction with Turkey,s Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet) to identify promising imams from the countries from 
which Europe,s Muslims emigrate, who could begin the process 
of training "home-grown" imams in Europe.  Bryza said the 
effort aimed to draw on the Diyanet,s decades of experience 
in training imams for service in Europe administering to 
Turkish emigrant communities.  To succeed, such an effort 
would need to mitigate the Diyanet,s negative tendency to 
exert political control from Ankara over Turkish emigrants in 
Europe, thereby hampering their integration into European 
mainstream societies.  This nascent effort was beginning to 
take shape in the Netherlands, where progressive imams visit 
from Turkey to familiarize themselves with Dutch-Moroccan 
Muslim communities and with Dutch community leaders/police. 
The Turkish imams then travel to Morocco to explore how to 
prepare the first generation of imams who might travel to the 
Netherlands to begin training of "home grown" imams in 
Europe.  Martinon shared Bryza,s criticism of the Turkish 
model for creating Turkish communities abroad that failed to 
integrate.  He expressed enthusiasm, however, for working 
with the U.S. and others on coming up with ideas for imam 
training and encouraged Bryza and other U.S. officials to 
engage with Muslim religious leaders in France. He pointed 
Bryza towards the director of the CFCM and Paris Grand 
Mosque, but cautioned him that this should only be a first 
contact, as the director was "not representative of French 
Muslims," and perhaps "not even a real Muslim."  He added 
that the subject was extremely sensitive and that 
negotiations over the establishment of the CFCM with the 
Algerian and Moroccan governments had been painstakingly 
difficult. 
 
¶6. (S) Martinon took the opportunity to restate Sarkozy,s 
opposition to EU membership for Turkey and emphasized that 
there would be no change in this position for at least the 
next several months, through the end of the Chirac 
presidency.  He said there was some confusion among some GOF 
officials about the American position on Turkey,s EU 
membership.  On the one hand, he said, the United States 
exerted a great deal of pressure on the EU to accept Turkey 
and an additional 70 million Muslims, while on the other hand 
expressing concern over the integration of Muslims in Europe. 
 Bryza responded that the U.S. objective was not so much 
whether Turkey eventually joined the EU, since such a 
decision was a matter for EU members states.  The U.S. 
objective was for the prospect of EU membership to remain 
alive in Turkey to provide an incentive for Turkish political 
leaders and society to take tough reform decisions that would 
strengthen Turkey,s secular democracy and prosperity with 
its Muslim majority population.  Martinon agreed on the 
importance of Turkey continuing this modernization process, 
but reiterated that for Sarkozy, the membership of 70 million 
relatively poor Turks into the EU was still a bridge too far. 
 
¶7. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
HOFMANN