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Lucia A Keegan  10/18/2006 09:55:51 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Lucia A Keegan

Cable 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L        PARIS 06836

SIPDIS
cxparis:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   ODC STRASBOU DCM FCS SCI ORA UNESCO AGR PAO AMB
            DAO ECON

DISSEMINATION: POLOUT
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:CRSTAPLETON
DRAFTED: POL:KCKRHOUNEK
CLEARED: DCM: KHOFMANN, POL:JROSENBLATT, POL:BTURNER

VZCZCFRI225
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DE RUEHFR #6836/01 2901158
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171158Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2246
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 0343
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 0494
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0391

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012 
TAGS: PREL FR RU EU GG MD
SUBJECT: POLISH AMBASSADOR ON RUSSIA AND FRENCH/EU TIMIDITY 
 
REF: WARSAW 2188 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In an October 13 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Polish Ambassador to France Jan Tombinski 
expressed concern about the increasing concentration of power 
in the Kremlin and criticized President Chirac for French 
reluctance to confront the Russians over their increasingly 
negative policies (e.g., on energy and defense).  Poland had 
hoped for a stronger EU to balance Russian domination of 
Eastern Europe, but instead of coordinating with each other, 
each member-state is acting independently based on its own 
bilateral interests.  According to Tombinski, the Poles would 
like to see a review of the current EU policy of viewing 
Russia as a strategic partner in addressing global issues; 
they believe that this policy has not brought the desired 
benefit of integrating Russia more into the international 
community or improving Russian internal policies on democracy 
and human rights.  Finally, the recent Polish decision to be 
a part of the proposed missile defense system has met with 
immediate repercussions from Russia, which is now threatening 
to "reconsider" its own defense posture in response.  End 
summary. 
 
Russia as Autocratic Power 
-------------------------- 
¶2.  (C) Tombinski addressed a long list of concerns over 
growing Russian intransigence, beginning with Polish worries 
over the lack of transparency and the shift of 
decision-making authority from the Russian MFA to the Kremlin 
(and ultimately to Putin himself).  Putin had announced 
several negative decisions (e.g., on energy and gas reserves) 
shortly after his visit to France, leading the Poles to 
suspect that Chirac "gave him the green light" to proceed 
without worrying about French criticism.  Developments such 
as the massing of Russian troops in Abkhazia, the recent 
assassination of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, 
Russian plans to redirect oil and gas supplies and the 
current tension between Georgia and Russia were all troubling 
signs of an increasingly arbitrary and autocratic regime. 
Tombinski noted that Russia has all the accoutrements of a 
global power, but it did not understand how to act like one 
without operating as an empire.  According to him, Putin 
wanted to dominate neighboring countries as the easiest way 
to convey to the Russian public that their country was once 
again a superpower. 
 
A Divided EU 
------------ 
¶3.  (C) Tombinski said that Poland had hoped for a strong EU 
to balance Russian domination over Eastern Europe, noting 
that Poland and its neighbors were too weak to do so 
bilaterally, especially on energy and defense issues. 
Unfortunately, there had not been even a weak attempt to 
coordinate European positions on these critical issues.  A 
case in point: just a week before the regular GAERC meeting 
of EU Foreign Ministers, the Finnish presidency had yet to 
circulate any common positions for discussion.  Even worse, 
other European countries were all acting independently 
towards Russia, based on their own interests.  Germany, for 
example, was pursuing a purely bilateral course with Russia; 
he claimed that in the recent meetings between Putin and 
Merkel, there had been virtually no discussion of "Europe." 
 
¶4.  (C) Tombinski said that Poland was pushing France and 
other European member-states to review the EU's current 
policy of considering Russia as a strategic partner on global 
issues (e.g., Iran, North Korea, Middle East Peace).  Poland 
believed that the result of this policy had been much more 
favorable to Russia than to Europe.  In retrospect, Europe 
had not derived the benefits it expected from trying to 
integrate Russia; instead Russian interests were used to 
override global interests, there had been little to no change 
in internal Russian policies, progress on democratization in 
Russia had lagged or gone in reverse, and there has been no 
progress in resolving several "frozen conflicts" where Russia 
could play a major role.  The Poles wanted to help Russia to 
be a strong partner, but they did not share the assessment 
that involving Russia deeper in foreign policy issues would 
achieve this goal.  In response, Ambassador Stapleton noted 
that Russia had a necessary role to play in addressing global 
conflicts.  Many of these problems had ended in a referral to 
the United Nations Security Council where Russia is a 
permanent member with a right of veto; including the Russians 
in efforts to address these global issues was important. 
 
Repercussions on Missile Defense 
--------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C) Tombinski noted that the Polish President and PM had 
both visited Washington in September, during which a 
tentative decision had been reached to participate in the 
proposed missile defense system.  This announcement, although 
largely supported by the public in Poland, had had an 
immediate negative effect on Polish relations with Russia. 
The Russians were now threatening to "reconsider" their own 
defensive posture vis--vis their western border, claiming 
that Polish participation in missile defense would alter the 
balance of defensive interests in Europe. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶6.  (C) Tombinski was clearly disappointed by what he 
considered to be the failure of the EU -- and France -- to 
take a harder line on Russia.  Noteworthy was his suspicion 
of French complicity, active or passive, in Russian hardening. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON