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UNCLAS OTTAWA 003010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER KGIC KNNP MCAP PINR PINS PTER CA
SUBJECT: CANADA'S TAKE ON GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT 
NUCLEAR TERRORISM KEY DOCUMENTS 
 
REF: STATE 155988 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) On October 4, Janice Fitchett (Senior Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Advisor at Foreign Affairs) provided POL 
M/C with initial Canada's comments on the GI draft documents, 
which she said had been widely cleared throught the 
Department.  She confirmed that these comments were also 
being shared with the action officer at the Russian Embassy 
here in Ottawa.  She noted the GoC's appreciation for being 
briefed and consulted at the early stages and expressed 
Canada's full support for the initiative.  Her comments 
follow: 
 
¶2. (SBU) General Points of Clarification: 
 
--If the group is to make decisions, then it will be 
necessary to clarify the decision-making rules, e.g. 
consensus vs. voting.  If not, then we recommend making this 
more explicit. 
--The Statement refers only specifically to "nuclear 
materials" and does not appear to deal with "devices" or 
"nuclear devices" or their parts or components.  Perhaps a 
broader wording should be considered to also encompass 
related equipment and technologies. 
--There are several places in the document(s) that mention 
the enhancement of security at civilian nuclear facilities. 
If it is your intention to exclude military facilities, we 
would suggest that this be more explicit. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Statement of Principles 
 
--Principle two: It may be useful to clarify what is included 
in the definition of "nuclear facilities" i.e., we assume not 
only nuclear power facilities but also other facilities that 
handle such materials such as schools, labs, etc. 
--Principle three: We believe this bullet should refer to 
"nuclear and other radioactive materials" rather than 
"nuclear materials and radiological substances." 
--Principle four: We would suggest "material" be replaced 
with "nuclear and other radioactive materials." We would also 
question whether "establish safe control over unlawfully held 
material" is broad enough wording. (i.e., what if it is in 
transit between persons, etc.) and does it adequately capture 
"used, disposed, altered, transferred" or should these be 
elaborated elsewhere such as under principle six? 
--Principle five: It would appear that all the words 
"response, mitigate and investigate" in cases of terrorist 
attacks involving the use of materials are post-event, yet 
the explanatory notes seem to indicate that this bullet also 
would target pre-strike capabilities (to stop imminent 
terrorist attacks).  Should other words like "prevent, deter, 
etc." be added? Also, should "prosecute" or "impose 
liability" be added since they also contemplate "just 
punishment" post-attack? 
--Principle seven: Grateful for clarification of &other 
liability" 
--Principle eight: Given the sensitivities of States with 
respect to the sharing of information on nuclear security 
activities, do you foresee agreements to enforce 
confidentiality among partner nations? 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Explanatory Notes to the Statement of Principles: 
 
Q 
--We assume there is a typographical error in the first 
paragraph, line 12: date reference should read "December 2006 
or January 2007." 
--With respect to references to international conventions 
(e.g. the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism), we would encourage the consistent 
use of the legal titles rather than abbreviations. 
--Principles one and two: We note that the revised Convention 
on the Physical Protection for Nuclear Material and 
Facilities (CPPNM) specifically addresses sabotage and would 
like clarification on whether sabotage, as well as theft, is 
 
considered as part of "unauthorized access."  We also note 
that INCIRC 225, Revision 4, and the Safeguards Agreements 
are two key international documents related to accountancy, 
and suggest that you may wish to list these in the 
authorities. 
--Principle six: We note that the standard for denying 
financial and economic resources to persons seeking to carry 
out terrorist attacks is "reasonable belief."  This standard 
mayor may not be sufficient depending on the mechanisms 
employed, e.g. it would not be sufficient for a criminal 
conviction.  We also note that there is reference to nations 
maintaining a "capability to identify all suspicious activity 
related to terrorist efforts...."  This should be reworded to 
reflect a standard that can more realistically be met - e.g. 
"...maintain a robust capability to identify all suspicious 
activity related to terrorist efforts..." 
--Principle seven: With respect to the reference to "swift 
extraditions", we note that in Canada the length of 
extradition procedures is mostly determined by the courts and 
may not be "swift", given the legal protections afforded by 
our system. Therefore, we suggest alternate wording such as 
"expeditious extraditions pursuant to law." 
--Principle eight: We believe that consistency with national 
law should encompass all of the information sharing, i.e. 
both the release and receipt of information.  Therefore, we 
suggest that the phrase "consistent with their national laws" 
should be inserted at the beginning of the sentence: 
"Consistent with their national laws, promote information 
sharing pertaining ..." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Terms of Reference: 
 
--In the Canadian context "shall" means mandatory and is 
reserved for legally binding documents 
only.  As the Statement of Principle does not use "shall", we 
would prefer that for the sake of consistency the Explanatory 
Notes also refrain from using "shall" and use the term "will" 
instead. 
--We suggest leading with the second bullet ("working to 
improve capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism") and moving 
the first bullet to the bottom. We also suggest that the 
bullet be revised to read "working to improve assistance to 
partner states where appropriate possible 
capability gaps" 
--The fifth bullet talks about national reporting but needs 
some clarification.  For example, to whom would reports be 
submitted and with what frequency?  Would states be compiling 
some kind of year end report for the IAG?  There should be 
something in the Terms of Reference or in the IAG function to 
talk about international reporting. It is critically 
important to have a political discussion, even in a general 
way, on an international basis by rolling up the national 
reporting to the international level.  This approach has been 
very helpful in the G8, after the national reporting has been 
completed. 
--We suggest revising the last bullet as follows: "Reviewing 
on a continuous basis and strengthening on a continuous basis 
Qon a continuous basis and strengthening on a continuous basis 
as necessary."  This is to reflect the fact that if a review 
finds that national authorities to already be strong, there 
may be no need for further strengthening at that point. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) 
 
--While membership of initial partner countries in the IAG 
seems automatic upon delivery of a diplomatic note, it is not 
clear how additional members might be integrated.  Will IAG 
participation automatically broaden with new memberships? 
What process of admission to IAG is foreseen for potential 
members that are not initially enumerated?  Could individual 
IAG representatives not also serve as points of contact? 
--For point one under function of the IAG, we suggest 
alternate wording as follows: &IAG participants will take 
concrete steps as appropriate to assist other states8.  This 
reflects that taking concrete steps to assist may not always 
be possible or feasible in every situation and measures will 
be dependent on acceptance of assistance by the receiving 
 
state. 
--Point four regarding participation needs further 
clarification as to who observes the training exercises and 
who actually does the exercises (i.e. observation of Global 
Initiative exercises by non-members of the initiative as 
opposed to members of the initiative observing exercises in 
other states). 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS