VZCZCXRO2672
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #1842/01 3001648
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271648Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7122
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0660

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 001842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP TU EUN CY
SUBJECT: UN, FINNS OFFER UPDATES ON THEIR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 1758 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 1768 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 1812 
     ¶D. NICOSIA 959 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Top UNFICYP officials privately outlined for 
us the UN's latest plan to unblock the current deadlock in 
the Gambari Process.  A last-minute snag over procedure 
threatens to delay the start of work by the technical and 
substantive committees, however, and UN officials privately 
worry that a lack of goodwill from Papadopoulos could combine 
with a lack of buy-in from Ankara to hamper real progress 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators.  As for the 
Finnish ports/Varosha proposal, Turkey has played coy, the 
Turkish Cypriots have tabled a maximalist list of demands, 
and GOC negotiator Tzionis sounded a "surprisingly" flexible 
tone to the Finns.  Wary of Papadopoulos's proven skill at 
the "blame game," local Finnish Ambassador Piipponen said the 
Greek Cypriots nonetheless seemed truly interested in 
anything that would produce a positive public perception that 
there was movement on Varosha.  The immediate problem, he 
felt, was Turkey's strategy of last-minute brinkmanship, 
which could easily backfire.  The Finnish MFA DG will visit 
Turkey and Cyprus next week for further consultations, and 
will suggest discreet three-way proximity talks in an effort 
to produce a "yes" to the Finnish proposal. 
 
¶2. (C) COMMENT: The best approach in the critical weeks ahead 
will be unwavering U.S. public support for the separate but 
interlocking efforts of the Finns and the UN.  Any U.S. moves 
should avoid providing the parties with an excuse for 
indecision and inaction.  At the same time, we must weigh in 
discreetly but firmly with the Turks to get them to "yes" so 
that Papadopoulos might be cornered into "no," or into making 
some real, hard trade-offs.  Only by returning to their 
policy of being "one step ahead" on Cyprus will Turkey be 
able to wrong-foot the GOC, isolate Papadopoulos within the 
EU, and stave off December's looming train wreck.  END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
UN TRACK: BRIDGING PROPOSAL ALMOST READY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In a meeting with poloffs on October 24, UNFICYP DCM 
Wlodek Cibor outlined the UN's planned next steps to 
kick-start the deadlocked Gambari Process (refs a and b). 
After much shuttle diplomacy over the past month, he said, 
SRSG Moller had arrived at a bridging proposal that was 
agreeable in substance to both sides and could allow talks to 
resume "before the end of November."  The details of the UN 
proposal are as follows: 
 
-- First, the two communities' technical and substantive 
committees would meet intensively over a 7-day period. 
During this Phase I, the sides would work out agendas, common 
frames of reference, meeting procedures, etc. 
 
-- At the end of this first phase, the two leaders would meet 
and issue a joint statement blessing the committees' work so 
far and kicking off a second phase.  In this Phase II, the 
committees would begin technical talks in earnest, and would 
also start to tackle issues of substance.  The leaders would 
meet from time to time throughout, whenever they (both) felt 
it necessary to help move this process forward. 
 
-- At the end of the second phase, the two sides would have 
progressed as far as they could go without outside help, 
Cibor said (e.g., having agreed on some technical 
cooperation, put specific proposals on the table regarding a 
range of substantive topics, and perhaps even engaged in some 
preliminary negotiations).  The two leaders would then issue 
a joint appeal for the UNSYG to resume his Good Offices 
Mission and restart full-blown settlement talks. 
 
¶4. (C) The UN originally wanted Phase II to last no longer 
than three months, Cibor told us, but the Greek Cypriots 
balked at such an "asphyxiating time line."  The Turkish 
Cypriots predictably counter-balked at the idea the process 
could be open-ended, he said, so the UN settled on more 
ambiguous language calling for Phase II to be finished "in 
the first part of 2007." 
 
UN TRACK: WHERE THERE'S NO WILL, IS THERE A WAY? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. (C) On October 26, however, Moller told Ambassador 
Schlicher that the UN's plan had hit a snag thanks to a 
Turkish Cypriot demand that the bridging proposal be 
submitted to the sides in writing, not orally as insisted by 
the Greek Cypriots.  Moller said he planned to meet Pertev 
 
NICOSIA 00001842  002 OF 003 
 
 
and Tzionis together on October 30 to try to work out a 
compromise.  Even if this impasse can be overcome, however, 
the process itself faces real long-term hurdles.  By all 
accounts, the atmosphere between the two sides was very bad; 
Moller's October 30 meeting with Pertev and Tzionis will be 
their first three-way talks in at least a month. 
 
¶6. (C) UN officials therefore worry that the coming months 
offer no guarantee of success.  Moreover, they now note a 
negative mood and trends from the Greek Cypriots toward the 
UN and the settlement process.  Cibor privately pointed to a 
recent case in which the GOC "lied" to the UN regarding a 
cross-Green Line criminal case, the latest round of 
politically motivated witch-hunting over UNOPS funding prior 
to the 2004 Annan referendum (ref c), and the October 20 
"boycott" by ROC officials of UNFICYP's UN Day Reception. 
Furthermore, UN officials remain worried about the Turkish 
Cypriots, whose hatred of Moller and silly objections over 
protocol were the main stumbling block to progress through 
most of the summer.  Moller has reiterated his concerns that 
Turkey might not be willing to give Talat the leeway he 
needed to be flexible and strike a deal. 
 
¶7. (C) UN officials note that while it is too soon to tell 
what the UN's approach to Cyprus would be under Ban Ki-moon, 
the new SYG is unlikely to place Cyprus high on his agenda if 
the current deadlock continues.  Moller told the Ambassador 
he was considering preparing a transition report on Cyprus 
for the new UN administration that would highlight the 
ongoing gap between the parties' words and deeds -- and that 
absent any progress, such a report could have an impact on 
the SYG's recommendations regarding UNFICYP's mandate 
renewal.  Cibor, meanwhile, hinted that Moller (a career UN 
man who is "well respected" in New York but, thanks to his 
posting here, "not too close" to the outgoing crowd) might be 
plucked away to help the new SYG set up shop in headquarters. 
 Moller reportedly has little interest in sticking around if 
the current deadlock cannot be overcome. 
 
FINNISH TRACK: TURKS PLAY COY 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Meanwhile, in an October 26 meeting, local Finnish 
Ambassador Riisto Piipponen provided a readout of recent 
Finnish contacts with Cypriots and Turks to Ambassador 
Schlicher.  According to Piipponen, Turkish U/S Apakan had 
taken a positive tone in a recent meeting on the margins of 
the Luxembourg GAERC, but had not come close to "yes."  He 
had posed many questions and a few requests for amendments to 
the Finnish plan, including the desire for a permanent 
arrangement (rather than a temporary one) for trade through 
Famagusta, and a request for specifics on the role of the EU 
in the administration of the port.  According to Piipponen, 
the Finns noted their desire for the EU (working with the 
Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce) to have a role in 
controlling trade, but not in controlling the port itself. 
This "light touch" approach, the Finns believe, suited all 
sides' needs: the Turkish Cypriots would maintain the status 
quo for their port officials; the Turks could continue to use 
the port for their military needs; while the Greek Cypriots 
knew that pressing too much on port issues -- including the 
Turkish military's use of the port -- could endanger their 
prospects of getting something meaningful on Varosha. 
 
¶9. (C) Apakan nonetheless emitted some signals that 
could/could be used later to justify a "no" to the Finns.  He 
said that the Varosha issue "complicates" the Finnish 
proposal, suggested that Varosha's owners could use the 
recently-established "TRNC" property claims commission (ref 
d) to get their property back, and tried to press the 
argument that the obligations of the Additional Protocol were 
connected only to goods, not to ships and planes.  He also 
queried whether the EU sought a formal parliamentary 
ratification of the implementation of the Protocol, or 
whether de facto implementation would be sufficient. 
Overflight and landing rights were not included in the 
requirements of the Protocol, said Apakan; yes, they are, 
replied the Finns.  Apakan did not insist on inclusion of 
Ercan airport in the Finnish proposal, but said that Talat 
would so demand, adding that it was the Turkish Cypriots, not 
Ankara, who would have to agree to the deal.  The Finns 
reportedly pressed back on this point, telling Apakan that 
"we are not going to play stupid games.  We know who makes 
the decisions relevant to Varosha and Famagusta." 
 
FINNISH TRACK: GOOD CYPRIOTS, BAD CYPRIOTS, AND THE TURKS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶10. (C) "TRNC Presidential" U/S Pertev had visited Helsinki 
on Thursday, October 19, and presented a truly maximalist 
list of demands, including the addition of Ercan and the port 
of Kyrenia to the Finnish proposal, an end to "TRNC's social 
 
NICOSIA 00001842  003 OF 003 
 
 
and cultural isolation," two Turkish Cypriot seats in the 
European Parliament, and a Turkish Cypriot successor to EU 
Commissioner Kyprianou.  According to Piipponen, Pertev 
pressed for the wider concept of island-wide "free trade" and 
echoed Turkish desires for a permanent, not a temporary, 
arrangement.  The Finns reportedly listened politely, but 
stressed that their proposal helped address Turkish Cypriot 
isolation, while respecting the Turkish Cypriot Famagusta 
equities.  Ankara would in the end have to make the tough 
calls on Varosha and Famagusta, they stressed. 
 
¶11. (C) ROC Presidential Diplomatic Adviser Tzionis had 
visited Helsinki on October 20.  The Finns found him "ready 
to move if the Greek Cypriots can get some satisfaction on 
the question of access."  The Greek Cypriots still hoped for 
a "clear prospect of return" of owners to their properties, 
without fixing timelines.  They were open to partial or 
gradual implementation, according to Piipponen.  They, did, 
however, continue to draw a red line around the opening of 
Ercan.  Piipponen, known locally as very dubious of 
Papadopoulos's intentions, said he was surprised at how 
positive the Greek Cypriots had been.  While aware that 
Papadopoulos wants to prepare himself for a new round of the 
"blame game," Piipponen thinks that the Greek Cypriots also 
are seriously interested in anything that would produce a 
positive public perception that there is movement on Varosha. 
 
 
FINNISH NEXT STEPS: SUGGESTED DISCREET PROXIMITY TALKS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12. (C) Piipponen confirmed that Helsinki was holding firm on 
its proposal, fleshing out details with the parties, but 
telling them that any additions to the proposal must be 
negotiated between the parties.  They do not want 
"subtractions" from the proposal.  As a next step, Finnish 
U/S Halonen will visit Ankara, Nicosia, and Lefkosa next week 
to propose discreet proximity talks to all three.  The Finns 
would like to hold these proximity talks before the November 
8 progress-report deadline.  But Helsinki was promoting the 
idea that the November 8 report should be descriptive, not 
prescriptive, since this would be the best means of keeping 
hope for an agreement alive before the December Council 
meeting.  Asked when the Finns intend to commit their 
proposal to writing, Piipponen said that "we will begin to 
write it down when we know they are really negotiating a 
compromise."  His government had various drafts reflecting 
various permutations the negotiations might take.  Piipponen 
added, "The biggest problem right now is with Ankara.  They 
need to make their intentions known.  They will want to hold 
out until December and create a crisis, but this is a 
European bet that they easily could lose." 
 
OUR BEST APPROACH: DISCREET BUT FIRM 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) COMMENT: In the critical weeks leading up to the 
December European Council meeting, we can play a helpful role 
in staving off an accession trainwreck.  First, we must 
continue to back vigorously the UN's efforts to relieve 
pressure by relauching movement on the settlement track. 
Embassy Nicosia will keep supporting Gambari/Moller and 
pressing both communities to stop playing games and get down 
to business; Ambassador pressed this line with FM Lillikas on 
October 27, and will hit the message hard in his November 1 
meeting with Talat, and in subsequent contacts on both sides. 
 We must also support the Finnish initiative.  Here, our 
approach should be Hippocratic: First, do no harm.  The Finns 
here are concerned that any high-profile U.S. diplomacy could 
distract attention from their proposal and provide both 
Turkey and Papadopoulos with an excuse for indecision and 
inaction. 
 
¶14. (C) Our best approach at this delicate phase is, even as 
we press Papadopoulos and Lillikas, to weigh in discreetly 
but firmly where we have the most credibility -- with the 
Turks and Talat.  We must encourage them to seize back the 
initiative by saying "yes" to the EU.  Current Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot stonewalling tactics (in which Ankara plays 
coy about taking a tough decision and Talat rubbishes the 
Finnish initiative) have effectively shifted the mantle of 
intransigence away from the Greek Cypriot side.  Papadopoulos 
has been able to stick comfortably to his principled 
insistence on Turkey fulfilling it legal obligations, while 
Ankara tries to nickel-and-dime the Finns.  We think 
Papadopoulos needs to feel unified EU and international 
pressure, but this pressure cannot build in the absence of 
known Turkish positive intentions.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER