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Viewing cable 06MUMBAI1803, WILL FRANCE, RUSSIA REAP THE INITIAL COMMERCIAL BENEFITS OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MUMBAI1803 2006-10-08 08:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Mumbai
VZCZCXRO3260
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBI #1803/01 2810856
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 080856Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4656
INFO RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 9465
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5852
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1134
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1245
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0656
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0659
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0652
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0055
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0047
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0053
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0078
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0173
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MUMBAI 001803 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT. OF ENERGY FOR U/S GARMAN, S. JOHNSON, T. CUTLER, A. SCHEINEMAN 
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR U/S F. LAVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY PGOV ECON
BEXP, IN 
SUBJECT: WILL FRANCE, RUSSIA REAP THE INITIAL COMMERCIAL BENEFITS OF 
A U.S./INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT? 
 
REF: Mumbai 1375 
 
MUMBAI 00001803  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
1. (SBU) GE and Westinghouse fear that French and Russian 
companies may be the first to benefit from the commercial 
opportunities created by successful passage of the U.S./India 
civil nuclear initiative.  The Nuclear Power Corp. of India 
(NPCIL) confirmed to us that the GOI has approved two new sites 
for nuclear power plants, each of which will house two foreign 
reactors.  The four reactors will be the first in a series that 
the NPCIL hopes to import to meet its ambitious plan to create 
40 gigawatts (GW) of generation capacity by 2020.  NPCIL project 
director S.K. Agrawal told the visiting Commercial Counselor on 
September 29 that his company has yet to decide which foreign 
reactors to purchase for the two sites, yet we share the U.S. 
vendors' fears that France and Russia have a head start in the 
race for India's first two "nuclear parks" (reftel) housing 
modern foreign reactor technology.  The French Consul General 
confirmed reports that Areva has already performed, at NPCIL's 
request, initial studies for one of the two sites, located in 
Maharashtra.  The second site is immediately adjacent to the 
site in Tamil Nadu where two Russian VVER reactors are currently 
under construction.  Westinghouse's point man for India told us 
that the Tamil Nadu site was specifically approved for 
additional VVER reactors, and he doubted the NPCIL's claim that 
it would seriously contemplate the construction of differing 
reactor types at one site.  Whatever facts are now being created 
on the ground, we believe that the NPCIL remains strongly 
interested in U.S. reactor technology, and will welcome as 
substantial a dialog with U.S. companies as is possible under 
current U.S. laws and regulations.  At the same time, the NPCIL 
has an ambitious mandate and will take advantage of those 
commercial opportunities available to it.  The NPCIL is already 
preparing for the opportunities offered by successful passage of 
the civil nuclear initiative, and may soon make long term 
decisions even before an agreement is finalized.  The late 
November DOC trade mission will provide an opportunity to 
showcase U.S. civil nuclear technology to the NPCIL, and Mission 
India will work with Washington to ensure that the interaction 
remains well within current U.S. laws and regulations.  At the 
same time, we feel that the USG must move forward to enable our 
companies to compete in the next stage of India's nuclear 
future.  Otherwise we may have to watch bitterly as third 
countries become the first to benefit commercially from the 
environment that our diplomacy has created. End summary and 
comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
GOI Approves Sites for Four Foreign Reactors 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) S.K. Agrawal, director of projects at the Nuclear Power 
Corp. of India (NPCIL), told the visiting Commercial Counselor 
on September 29 that the GOI had recently approved two new sites 
for imported foreign reactors.  One site is at Kudankulam in 
 
MUMBAI 00001803  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
Tamil Nadu, where two Russian reactors are already under 
construction, and the other is at Jaitapur on the western Indian 
coast in southern Maharashtra.  Agrawal said the NPCIL hopes to 
build two 1 gigawatt (GW) reactors at each site, using foreign 
technology. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) Agrawal confirmed that the four reactors will be the 
first that NPCIL hopes to import in the coming years to meet its 
ambitious expansion plans.  The NPCIL needs six to eight foreign 
reactors to meet its older, pre-July 18 goal of 20 GW of nuclear 
generation capacity by 2020, Agrawal conceded.  In its planning, 
the NPCIL had always assumed that India would some day get 
access to foreign nuclear technology, he said.  The July 18, 
2005 joint statement by President Bush and PM Singh was hence a 
windfall for the company, he added.  A further expansion to 40 
GW by 2020, set out by Prime Minister Singh shortly after July 
18 apparently without in depth discussions with India's civil 
nuclear community, can only be met through the large scale 
import of more foreign reactors, Agrawal told us. 
 
 
 
No Decisions Made On What Types of Reactors? 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) Recalling NPCIL Chairman S.K. Jain's recent up-beat 
statement (reftel) that India hopes to establish several 
"nuclear parks," each using a different foreign technology, we 
asked Agrawal whether the NPCIL had already identified foreign 
reactors for the new sites.  Agrawal denied that this was the 
case.  No decision had been made regarding the technology at 
either site, he said.  "As an engineer," Agrawal added, he would 
prefer to have a uniform type of reactor at each site, as it 
would greatly ease construction and operation of the plants. 
Yet neither technical, economic nor other concerns prevented the 
NPCIL from selecting, say, American and French reactors at the 
same site, he emphasized. 
 
 
 
French Already Involved at Jaitapur... 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Despite Agrawal's remarks we have reason to believe 
that the NPCIL is already contemplating French and Russian 
technology at each of the sites.  In a discussion with the 
visiting Science Counselor and ConGen Mumbai, Pramod Joshi of GE 
Energy said that the French firm Areva was already present in 
Jaitapur and had done initial analysis on the site, a fact 
confirmed by Jean Charles Demarquis, the French Consul General, 
in a recent discussion with Pol/Econ chief.  Areva had engineers 
in both Jaitapur and Mumbai who had provided input for the 
NPCIL's feasibility studies for the site, Demarquis said. In 
fact, he conceded, it was the NPCIL's Agrawal who had initially 
asked Areva to perform the preliminary work. 
 
 
 
MUMBAI 00001803  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
...And Russian Technology Possibly Foreseen in Tamil Nadu 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Alexander V. Mantytsky, the Russian Consul General in 
Mumbai, told Pol/Econ chief on October 3 that the state-owned 
Russian reactor company Atomstroyexport, which has an office in 
Mumbai, was currently only involved in the construction of the 
two VVER reactors at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu.  Russia was not 
currently discussing further sales of reactors to India, he 
emphasized, and would not do so until the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group provided a new legal framework for doing so.  However, 
Seoul-based Westinghouse Vice President Timothy Collier, whose 
portfolio includes India, told us on October 4 that the 
Kudankulam site had been specifically approved for additional 
VVER reactors.  Collier doubted whether the NPCIL would 
seriously consider building generation blocks with U.S. or 
French reactors in immediate proximity to the two VVER reactors 
now under construction.  From an economic and operations 
perspective it made no sense for the NPCIL to do so, Collier 
argued. 
 
 
 
French, Russians Have a Head Start, U.S. Vendors Believe 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) In earlier discussions, the NPCIL had mentioned that it 
hopes to get GOI permission for a third site as well, yet we 
have no indication that approval is anytime near, nor are we 
aware of any in-depth dialog that NPCIL maybe having with a U.S. 
vendor along the lines of the apparent discussion with Areva. 
GE's Joshi and Westinghouse's Collier told us separately that 
the French and Russian nuclear suppliers had long cultivated 
relationships with India that U.S. companies had purposely 
avoided to ensure compliance with U.S. non-proliferation laws. 
(Note:  During Collier's last visit to Mumbai, the NPCIL gave 
him a car and driver as a courtesy so Collier could make a 
scheduled meeting at the U.S. Consulate.  The driver, upon 
hearing the word "Consulate" took Collier straight to the 
Russian Consulate and needed further guidance before he found 
the U.S. Consulate compound.  End note)  U.S. laws and 
regulations prevented them from conducting the types of 
substantive discussions that the French, and possibly the 
Russian, nuclear suppliers were currently having with the NPCIL, 
they both claimed.  Because of the long planning times involved 
in any nuclear project, the NPCIL was now moving forward with 
the Russian and French vendors to ensure that they could act as 
soon as the NSG creates an enabling environment, both Joshi and 
Collier told us. 
 
 
 
Liability and Commercial Risks 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
MUMBAI 00001803  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
8. (SBU) Both GE's Joshi and Westinghouse's Collier mentioned 
nuclear liability as the sine qua non that India needs to 
address before their companies could seriously contemplate 
entering the Indian market.  They felt that the French and 
Russian firms were comfortable that their respective governments 
were willing to shoulder at least some of the liability risks of 
their reactors if needed to secure a sale to India. (Note:  Jain 
told us earlier that India had assumed liability for the 
Kudankulam reactors now under construction in a bilateral 
agreement with Russia.  End note.) Collier also said that both 
the French and Russian governments were also ready to underwrite 
the major commercial risks associated with the sale of reactors 
to India, such as payment and delivery risks. 
 
 
 
NPCIL Eager to Meet DOC Delegation 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
9. (SBU) The NPCIL's Agrawal said his company was eager to meet 
with U.S. nuclear vendors during the DOC trade delegation in 
late November.  Commercial Counselor and Agrawal agreed that the 
U.S. companies would meet with the Department of Atomic Energy, 
the NPCIL and with selected Indian companies that supply the 
NPCIL's construction activities.  Commercial Counselor suggested 
that the Indian side brief the U.S. companies on the status of 
planned legislation that would limit the liability of foreign 
nuclear suppliers, and Agrawal said Indian companies would 
welcome a briefing on the current status of U.S. export 
licensing requirements towards India. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
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10. (SBU) It would be a bitter pill to swallow if French and 
Russian companies were the first to benefit from the enabling 
environment created by successful passage of our civil nuclear 
deal with India.  To date, the absence of an aggressive U.S. 
commercial strategy towards the Indian nuclear market 
strengthened the credibility of the U.S. in the eyes of many 
Indian actors involved in the domestic debate over the nuclear 
deal, as it showed that commercial considerations were not the 
primary U.S. reason for pursuing the deal.  Moving forward, 
however, the first fruits of a successful agreement may fall 
into the laps of third countries by default if the USG, acting 
in tandem with U.S. industry, fails to make clear to India that 
we expect U.S. companies to benefit from the first wave of 
opportunities created by our diplomatic initiatives, assuming of 
course that U.S. firms are interested and able to compete.  Our 
previous discussions with the NPCIL make us believe that the 
company is seriously interested in U.S. nuclear technology, and 
will welcome, at any time, as in-depth a discussion with our 
vendors as is possible under U.S. law and regulations.  However, 
the NPCIL has an ambitious target to meet by 2020, and is 
already taking advantage of those opportunities for dialog now 
available to it.  The NPCIL looks forward to interaction with 
U.S. companies during the upcoming DOC trade mission.  Mission 
 
MUMBAI 00001803  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
India will work with Washington to ensure that the interaction 
remains well within current U.S. laws and regulations.  At the 
same time, we highlight the opportunity costs we incur as long 
as the current framework prevents U.S. companies from engaging 
in the type of dialog that is necessary if they are to compete 
in the next phase of India's nuclear future.  End comment. 
 
 
 
11. (U) Embassy New Delhi cleared this cable. 
OWEN