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Viewing cable 06MANAMA1828, CROWN PRINCE OUTLINES REGIONAL CHALLENGES WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAMA1828 2006-10-24 11:33 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO8298
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1828/01 2971133
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241133Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5830
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 001828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS MASS BA IR IZ REGION BILAT
OFFICIALS 
SUBJECT: CROWN PRINCE OUTLINES REGIONAL CHALLENGES WITH 
GENERAL ABIZAID 
 
Classified By: DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid October 11 met with 
Crown Prince Shaikh Salman and discussed Iraq, Iran, the war 
of ideas in the Middle East, and Bahrain's upcoming 
elections.  On Iraq, the CP said that the United States 
should adopt a "less forward-leaning position" and allow 
Iraqi forces to take the front lines.  This could have 
several beneficial effects, including shoring up support in 
the United States for continued military engagement in Iraq. 
Turning to Iran, the CP recommended there be a robust 
demonstration of resolve, capability, and duty by the U.S. 
and its allies in the region.  He suggested the U.S. and GCC 
hold an exercise like Bright Star to send a message to Iran. 
Stressing that the diplomatic track was by far preferable, 
the CP said that if it comes to war with Iran, the goal must 
be to defeat them and force the government to surrender. 
There should be no talk of liberating the people or 
nation-building.  The biggest long-term challenge facing the 
region is a war of ideas, with the forces of moderation 
confronting extremism.  He offered his broad policy 
prescriptions for winning this struggle.  The CP said that 
good things were happening in Bahrain in the run-up to 
parliamentary and municipal elections in November.  End 
Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Put Iraqis on the Front Lines 
----------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid and delegation 
October 11 met with Crown Prince Shaikh Salman bin Hamad Al 
Khalifa over a Ramadan iftar and discussed Iraq, Iran, the 
war of ideas in the Middle East, and Bahraini elections. 
Defense Minister General Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa 
participated in the meeting.  The CP said that he had seen 
Iraqi President Talibani and Ambassador Khalilzad at an Aspen 
Institute event he had attended in September.  He said it was 
clear that Talbani's mission had been to present reasons to 
ensure that American forces remain in Iraq. 
 
3.  (C) In the CP's view, however, the United States should 
pull back to a "less forward-leaning position" in Iraq.  This 
would have multiple benefits:  it could result in (a) shoring 
up public support in the United States for continued military 
engagement in Iraq; (b) forcing the Iraqis to take more 
responsibility for their own security; and (c) putting the 
GOI into the position of having to request assistance from 
its Arab neighbors - not Iran - something it had not yet 
done.  In this regard, he recommended that PM Maliki visit 
key regional Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, to develop relationships with their leaders.  It could 
be useful for Ambassador Khalilzad to accompany Maliki on 
these visits.  GEN Abizaid stated that the level of violence 
between various groups and militias in Iraq is high.  The CP 
agreed, saying that the primary challenges facing the Iraq 
government are security, federalism, oil, and external 
relations. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Military Exercise to Send Signal to Iran 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Turning to Iran, Shaikh Salman said that Iranian 
leaders believe they have a mission "greater than 
themselves."  They are arrogant in their perception of the 
country's civilization, culture, and history.  There should 
be a "robust demonstration of resolve, capability, and duty" 
by the U.S. and its allies in the region to deter, contain, 
and prevent Iran.  Iran may believe that the U.S. is mired in 
Iraq, but regional unity and cooperation can persuade Iran 
otherwise.  The CP suggested that the United States consider 
holding an exercise like Bright Star with the GCC in the 
Gulf.  He understands that Saudi Arabia may be interested in 
participating in something like this.  A Bright Star-type 
exercise would send the right signal to Iran.  Even if the 
entire GCC does not sign on, Bahrain would participate. 
NAVCENT VADM Walsh suggested that a maritime exercise could 
be the best way to begin and noted that NAVCENT and Bahraini 
naval officers would meet soon to discuss the nature of 
Bahraini participation in Combined Task Force-150 and 152. 
The CP commented that if Bahrain joins one of the task 
forces, other GCC countries would be interested in 
participating also. 
 
MANAMA 00001828  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
5.  (C) The Crown Prince recommended that the United States 
sit down with Iran, even as an observer at multi-party talks. 
 However, if diplomatic efforts did not succeed and there is 
to be war, the goal must be to defeat Iran.  Do not say you 
are coming to "liberate" the people, he advised, or engage in 
nation-building.  Rather, the goal must be to defeat them and 
force the government to surrender.  It would be dangerous to 
assume that Iran would change its behavior in reaction to a 
limited strike.  Looking closer to home, Shaikh Salman said 
that Bahrain would be on the front lines in the case of war 
with Iran.  The GOB needs to understand better the possible 
impact of a conflict with Iran on Bahraini society.  While 
military planning is important, there needs to be a wider 
ranging assessment, considering such issues as possible 
nuclear contamination of Gulf waters. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Prescriptions for The War of Ideas 
---------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Shaikh Salman said that the biggest long-term 
challenge in the region is ideological.  The region is facing 
a struggle of ideas.  One idea, religious extremism, is 
linked to religion and the after-life.  The other, democracy, 
is "dirty, earthy, and secular."  Given this dynamic, is it 
easy to see why the forces of moderation are under pressure. 
The Israel-Palestinian conflict, "the meta-banner over the 
battlefield," provides fodder for the extremists.  The CP 
expressed his view that Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin 
Ahmed Al Khalifa's presentation to the UN Security Council on 
the Arab initiative on the Palestinian conflict had gone 
well.  Noting that Shaikh Khalid had recently visited 
Palestinian President Abbas, Shaikh Salman said "we are 
leaning forward with the Israelis while others lean back." 
 
7.  (C) The Crown Prince offered his "broad prescriptions" 
for winning the war of ideas in the region.  First, he 
recommended that the U.S. softn some of its political reform 
agenda.  This woul be viewed favorably by key regional 
actors - Sadi Arabia and Egypt - and generate support for 
US. diplomatic efforts addressing other issues.  Th larger 
issue of democracy will survive in he long term.  Second, he 
said that all parties must recognize that Iraq is not a model 
for democracy in the Middle East.  It was critical that the 
U.S. pull it forces back from the front lines while the 
Iraqis step up.  This transition period could be violent and 
unstable, but it is necessary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Focus on Moderates vs. Extremists 
--------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) The CP's third prescription is that the territorial 
integrity of Iraq must be preserved.  This is the main thing, 
he said.  He recalled that Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad had 
told him a year ago that it was in Iran's interest that there 
be a weak government in Iraq.  Ahmadi-Nejad, the CP said, is 
an "enemy of progress" in Iraq.  Finally, he said that if 
moderates cannot deliver peace and prosperity, they will be 
viewed as U.S. or Western collaborators without credibility. 
The extremists would benefit from this perception.  Many 
people are now focusing on sectarian violence.  This is a 
terrible phenomenon, but "it could end in minutes."  Sunni 
and Shia can cooperate when it is in their interest to do so, 
citing Hamas and Hizballah as an example.  The real issue is 
ideological, the moderates versus the extremists, and this is 
where the U.S. should focus its attention. 
 
9.  (C) Tactically, the Crown Prince said, we may be winning 
the fight against extremists, but we are losing the strategic 
war of ideologies.  "We need a better idea" to present to 
people, he stated.  In terms of fighting terrorists, he 
thought that Saudi Arabia was now doing a better job.  "On 
9-11, Saudi Arabia was asleep.  With the May (2004) attacks 
(in Khobar), it woke up.  This past year, it is now starting 
to get out of bed," he said. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Broad Support for Political Reform 
---------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) In response to GEN Abizaid's question, the CP said 
that good things were happening in Bahrain in the run-up to 
the November parliamentary and municipal elections.  There 
had been a general expectation that sectarian tensions in 
Iraq could spill over into Bahrain during the election 
period.  But so far things were going well and he is 
 
MANAMA 00001828  003 OF 003 
 
 
confident of a decent election.  He noted that King Hamad had 
met with both Sunni and Shia clerics about the elections. 
All are very supportive of the political reform process in 
the country, and the CP pledged that it will continue. 
 
11.  (U) GEN Abizaid cleared this cable. 
 
 
********************************************* ******** 
Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
********************************************* ******** 
MONROE