P 121842Z OCT 06
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 007287 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016 
TAGS: MCAP MNUC PGOV PREL IR
SUBJECT: ALL QUIET IN TEHRAN AS ARRESTED DISSIDENT 
AYATOLLAH AND FOLLOWERS REMAIN IN CUSTODY 
 
REF: EMBASSY-NEA/IR-S/S/O EMAILS OCT 7-8 
 
Classified By: Pol Minister-Counselor Maura Connelly for 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.   Foreign Office and London-based expat 
sources confirm media reports that hundreds of security 
personnel in central Tehran clashed violently on October 7 
and 8 with as many as a thousand supporters of dissident 
Ayatollah Boroujerdi.  Iranian security forces managed in the 
early hours of October 8 to arrest the cleric, along with 
hundreds of his followers; all arrestees remain in custody, 
with the area quiet and no subsequent disturbances reported. 
While neither Boroujerdi's independent base of support nor 
his critiques of the official religious establishment are 
unique among Shia clergy, his recent defiance of clerical 
officials has been unusual, and probably was a factor in the 
decision to arrest him at this time.  End summary. 
 
Security Forces' Assault 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Per ref, and as reported by Iranian and international 
media beginning October 9, hundreds of Tehran security forces 
on October 7 and 8 clashed violently with about a thousand 
followers of dissident cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Kazameini 
Boroujerdi.  Despite the efforts of the crowd to prevent 
Boroujerdi's arrest, security forces succeeded in arresting 
him early on October 8, along with hundreds of his 
supporters, many of whom were armed with knives, clubs and 
bottles.  These supporters had maintained a protective cordon 
around Boroujerdi's house since late August to prevent his 
arrest by clerical authorities. Throughout the weekend, both 
before and after the assault and arrest, hundreds of heavily 
armed police were widely reported to be on the streets around 
the Ayatollah's central Tehran house.  Boroujerdi remains in 
custody; and streets in the area have been normal since 
October 9.  In the wake of the violence there have been 
credible unconfirmed reports that the Tehran police chief has 
had to resign due to the extent of violence which accompanied 
the arrest. 
 
¶3.  (C) Although Iranian press coverage was short on details, 
according to eyewitnesses inside the Boroujerdi compound in 
touch with Embassy's expat contacts, the security personnel 
who led the assault, beginning the afternoon of October 8 and 
continuing into the early hours of October 9, were 
Revolutionary Guard and Basij, supported by armored cars and 
bulldozers, using tear gas, and armed with firearms.  Embassy 
contacts said that warning shots were fired and that 
fatalities were sustained among Boroujerdi's supporters, but 
neither Iranian press and official statements nor UK Embassy 
Tehran (protect) reports confirm these claims.   The UK 
Embassy reported hundreds of riot police in the streets 
October 8 and 9 but did not estimate the numbers of 
Boroujerdi supporters arrested.  Iranian newspapers reported 
extensive arrests without furnishing a specific estimate; 
these papers were silent on the subject of injuries but 
carried photos of Boroujerdi followers carrying swords and 
machetes.  The UK Embassy noted that a normally reliable 
reformist news website (Ruz Online) reported other followers 
arrived with Molotov cocktails and acid, though it did not 
report whether these weapons were used; an Agence France 
Presse account contained similar details, citing a regime 
security official, including the presence of these weapons. 
Expat contacts claimed there had been numerous injuries, but 
no casualties have been acknowledged, or numbers reported, by 
Iranian press or authorities. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The UK Embassy in Tehran, via the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), on October 8 confirmed the broad 
outlines of the assault, and has since then given us 
additional details.  The description of events and 
circumstances leading to the assault which follows below is 
based on accounts HMG sources and also London-based Iranian 
expats who are U.S. Embassy contacts. 
 
Supporters' Vigil Before the Assault 
------------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C)  As reported by Iranian and expatriate bloggers, 
Boroujerdi's followers for some two months preceding the 
October 7-8 assault had maintained a human cordon around the 
Ayatollah's house, to prevent his arrest.  Reliable 
eyewitnesses reported that several dozen supporters were 
arrested in a September 28 clash with police that went 
largely unnoticed.  (Embassy comment: The September 28 clash 
may have been a less determined attempt by authorities to 
arrest the Ayatollah following his defiance of a clerical 
court summons, issued September 7.  The summons demanded he 
appear and answer charges arising from his preaching.  A 
speech he had given in Tehran June 29 (see paragraph 8 
below) was a likely focus of the court's concern.  End 
comment). 
 
¶6.  (C) Boroujerdi had in recent weeks written to Kofi Annan, 
Javier Solana and the Pope asking for support and protection 
(Embassy note: Boroujerdi's staff told UK-based expatriates 
that Boroujerdi received no reply to any of these letters. 
End note). Boroujerdi had been at odds with clerics in the 
regime for more than a decade, and been incarcerated twice, 
due to his preaching against the involvement of clergy in 
politics.  (Embassy comment: The degree of popular support he 
has attracted may also be a factor in the regme's efforts to 
silence him.  End comment). 
 
Boroujerdi's supporters: numerous and loyal 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C) Although Boroujerdi appears given to self-promotion 
and exaggeration, he has built a large and loyal following 
over the last ten years.  He plausibly claims some 200,000 
followers nationwide. His preemption, fully in keeping with 
Shia tradition, of revenues from his own followers' pious 
donations, which would otherwise go into official coffers, 
has been one source of tension with the official clergy. 
Though not a direct descendant, Boroujerdi is related to, and 
bears the same surname as, an extremely prestigious and 
senior cleric (deceased 1961) who was at first a patron but 
later a public critic of the young Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, and of Khomeini's vision of an Iranian government 
headed by clerics.  Boroujerdi's father was also a cleric who 
had significant, longstanding friction with authorities over 
the role of religion, and whose 2002 death is alleged to have 
occurred under murky circumstances related to that friction. 
 
¶8. (C)  Boroujerdi gave a sermon to an audience of at least 
several thousand from all over Iran at Shahid Keshvari 
Stadium June 29, in which he condemned official pre-emption 
of religion and the participation of clergy in government. 
His theme was not unique but the size of the audience was; 
his sympathizers in the UK maintain the audience numbered 
over 30,000.  The clerical court summons which Boroujerdi had 
been defying for two months prior to his arrest was issued 
not long after his June 29 speech.  Expat sources in London 
stressed to us the depth of commitment Boroujerdi's 
supporters feel, in keeping with Shia traditions, to their 
spiritual leader -- when the October 7 police assault began, 
they say several hundred additional supporters, reinforcing 
the 1,000 already present, appeared quickly at the compound 
in response to appeals. 
 
No EU or UK response expected 
------------------------------ 
¶9.  (C) The FCO on October 11 told PolOff it is checking with 
EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana's office to determine whether 
the EU intends to answer Boroujerdi's letter, or to make any 
senior or working level statement.  FCO commented it does not 
now contemplate any independent advocacy on Boroujerdi's 
behalf, both because of the strong P5 1 focus on nuclear 
issues, as well as the violence used by Boroujerdi's 
followers in response to what the FCO said may have been a 
legal court summons. 
 
Possible Overconfidence by Boroujerdi 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment: Boroujerdi is not unusual among senior 
clerics, either in his disagreements with authorities over 
separation of church and state, or in having an independent 
base of spiritual and financial support.  He is, however, far 
more outspoken; other clerics with similar views and a 
similarly independent base have not been as confrontational. 
Although Boroujerdi has repeatedly denied his movement has 
any political element, and although he centers his sermons 
around the protection of traditional religious belief, the 
size of the audience at his June 29 rally would have drawn 
official attention.  The large turnout may have encouraged 
Boroujerdi to be more defiant with clerical and judicial 
authorities.  One FCO interlocutor suggested an entirely 
different explanation for the cleric's arrest, however, 
arguing that security and clerical officials are interested 
in gaining control of the real estate on which Boroujerdi's 
Noor Mosque sits, in an area reportedly slated for 
redevelopment. 
 
¶11. (C)  That authorities waited through two months of 
surveillance and confrontation before moving decisively may 
reflect one or more factors: respect for Boroujerdi's 
strength, internal jockeying among security institutions over 
planning and control of the arrest operation, hope that 
Boroujerdi might moderate his stance, or concern that the 
regime might have trouble controlling the flow of 
information until reformist Iranian media had been closed or 
brought to heel, as has been taking place over the last 
several months.  End comment. 
 
Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm 
 
 
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