VZCZCXRO9869
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHLI #2407/01 2981609
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251609Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5296
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 002407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN AND NORTH KOREA 
 
REF: LISBON 1921 
 
Classified By: Deputy Pol/Econ Couns Cari Enav for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
 Summary 
----------- 
¶1. (SBU)  During a separate meeting in Lisbon on security and 
non-proliferation on the margins of the 21st Bilateral 
Commission, Portugal underscored the importance of a 
coordinated EU and US approach in the face of Iranian and 
North Korean efforts to upset the stability of the current 
worldwide nuclear regime.  Towards this end, Portuguese 
officials indicated that they planned to consult with the 
U.S. on a regular basis on these issues during Portugal's 
upcoming EU Presidency in the latter half of 2007.  MFA 
officials indicated that they were pessimistic that talks 
with Iran to halt uranium enrichment will succeed, inquired 
into China,s efforts to deal with North Korea, and expressed 
concerned that U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation will 
push Pakistan farther into the China camp.  The U.S. 
expressed disappointment at Iranian attempts to politicize 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both sides 
agreed that early ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) would give the agreement teeth. 
 
¶2. (U)  On October 3, International Security and 
Non-Proliferation Regional Affairs Director Robert Witajewski 
and MFA Director for Security and Non-Proliferation Joao 
Corte-Real met on the margins of the 21st Bilateral 
Commission between the U.S. and Portugal.  Deputy Pol/Econ 
Counselor Cari Enav and MFA officials Pedro Sousa Abreu and 
Philippe Rhamelier also attended. 
 
Iranian Nuclear Program 
------------------------------ 
¶3. (C)  Corte Real underscored the importance of a unified 
approach in dealing with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear 
threats and stressed the need for regular bilateral 
consultations with the U.S. when Portugal assumes the EU 
Presidency in the latter half of 2007.  He noted that some EU 
member states like Portugal wanted to take a tough approach 
with Iran while others like France and Germany favored 
further negotiations. Corte Real agreed with Witajewski that 
the EU-3 package was Iran,s best option and "exit strategy" 
out of the current impasse.  Corte Real commented that 
Portugal had reiterated this stance with its Iranian 
counterparts every month for the past six months, urging Iran 
to comply with all relevant UNSC resolutions and its IAEA 
commitments.  Most recently at the September UNGA meetings in 
NYC, Corte Real reported that FM Amado had told the Iranian 
FM that "there was a time for everything, and that now was 
the time for compliance."  Sousa Abreu commented that despite 
these and other international efforts, Portugal did not 
believe talks with Iran would agree to halt its uranium 
enrichment and that the imposition of sanctions was a likely 
outcome. 
 
DPRK Nuclear Program 
----------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Corte Real inquired into China,s role in dealing 
with the Democratic People,s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 
Witajewski reviewed the Chinese perspective on North Korea, 
highlighting probable Chinese concerns that North Korean 
actions could alter the strategic dynamics in the region to 
China's detriment.  He also explained to the Portuguese that 
it was likely that the DPRK would conduct a nuclear test with 
very little advance warning, despite Chinese efforts to use 
their relationship with North Korea to dissuade North Korean 
Leader Kim Jong-Il from pursuing its nuclear weapons program. 
 Witajewski also stressed the importance of strong 
enforcement of any sanctions regime and urged Portuguese 
officials to assist in preventing the export or transit of 
suspect or dual-use material to the DPRK.  He also requested 
that the MFA keep the Embassy advised of any Portuguese 
contacts with the North Koreans.   Corte Real agreed to do so. 
 
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶5. (SBU) Corte Real inquired into the status of the 
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. He noted that 
Portugal, among others, wanted a moratorium on fissile 
material and asked if the agreement would address India's 
membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and CTBT. 
Witajewski commented that it was our current best estimate 
that the U.S. Congress would likely pass the proposed 
legislation when it reconvened after elections. In reviewing 
the advantages of the proposed program, he underscored that 
India was the world's largest democracy, had a stable 
political system, had an excellent non-proliferation record, 
and could not be compared with either Iran or North Korea. 
Implementing the U.S.-India agreement would, he stressed, be 
 
LISBON 00002407  002 OF 002 
 
 
a net plus for non-proliferation efforts. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Witajewski told the Portuguese that the U.S. was 
encouraging New Delhi to send high level officials to the 
October Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting to explain the 
benefits of the Initiative, including placing India's civil 
entities under IAEA supervision.  Witajewski expressed  hope 
that the Indian delegation when they briefed in Vienna would 
be able to address many of Portugal,s concerns, including 
India,s willingness to abide by the NPT although not 
formally a member.   He stressed that the United States would 
not amend the NPT, would continue to uphold our NPT 
commitments, and not recognize India as a nuclear weapons 
state. 
 
¶7. (C) Corte Real responded that Portugal had concerns about 
Indian diversion of uranium to undeclared plants and feared 
that the U.S.-India Agreement would push Pakistan closer to 
China on both civilian and military nuclear cooperation..  He 
urged that pressure be placed on both India and Pakistan to 
end their nuclear weapons programs.  Witajewski agreed that 
mutual de-nuclearization would be a desirable end state, but 
commented that that this would be difficult to achieve absent 
a prior resolution of political disputes between the two 
countries including Kashmir and Afghanistan.  He argued that 
resolution of these other issues notwithstanding, support for 
the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear initiative was an important 
first step down this road. 
 
IAEA Consultations 
------------------------ 
¶8. (SBU) Witajewski, who had just come from IAEA 
consultations in Vienna, noted that it was important to 
recruit good technical experts to staff the agency and to 
improve the Agency's monitoring detection capabilities.  He 
commented that in an era of budget constraints the agency 
needed to direct its focus on areas of concern and expressed 
disappointment that the Iranians had tried to politicize 
recent IAEA elections.  Corte Real underscored Portugal's 
support for IAEA efforts to strengthen security of materials, 
adding that Portugal endorsed the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons efforts to promote national 
legislation and early entry into force of the CTBT. 
 
MTCR and Coast Guard Assessment 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶9. (SBU) Corte Real asked that the U.S. use its influence in 
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to weigh in with 
Turkey to persuade it to accept Cyprus, the only EU member 
not included in the regime.  He also asked that the U.S. 
provide Portuguese authorities with the latest Coast Guard 
security assessment of Portuguese ports so that Portuguese 
officials could act on any identified deficiencies. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
¶10. (C) The Portuguese officials were clearly concerned with 
the Iranian nuclear threat.  FM Amado had declared that Iran 
poses the greatest threat since WWII (reftel) in a discussion 
with Ambassador Hoffman on September 8.  Portugal considers 
itself in the hard-line camp and will go along with 
imposition of sanctions against Iran but is skeptical that 
such a move would force the Iranians to back down.   Corte 
Real also reiterated several times the need to present a 
united front and expressed the desire to coordinate closely 
with the United States. 
 
¶11.  (U) This cable has been cleared by PM/International 
Security and Non-Proliferation Regional Affairs Director 
Robert Witajewski. 
Hoffman