VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #1617/01 2921511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191511Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4995
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1126

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001617 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C MADEEHA ASHRAF 
INR/AA FOR JENNIFER PEKKINEN 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS GREG D'ELIA, BOB KANEDA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUMCF ASEC AU CF
SUBJECT: BRAZZAVILLE/CONGO: PASTOR NTUMI JOINS THE PARTY 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 00041 
     ¶B. KINSHASA 00932 
 
Classified By: CDA MARK BIEDLINGMAIER, REASONS 1.4(B)(D) 
 
¶1.  (C)   Papal Nuncio Msgr. Andres Carrascoso-Coso contacted 
Charge d'affaires on October 15 with an urgent request to 
meet for an update on developments in the Pool region.  Msgr. 
Carrascoso has been a key contact point with former Ninja 
rebel leader Pastor Ntumi for western group members of the 
Brazzaville diplomatic corps through his in-country emissary, 
Bishop Portella, of Kinkala.  The Nuncio stated that Ntumi 
planned to launch a new political party, the CNR (Conseille 
Nationale des Republicans), National Council of Republicans, 
by late November and wished to "sound out" representatives of 
the European Union, U.S. Embassy, and UNDP for their reaction 
and possible support.  Ntumi's representatives, Dr. Joseph 
Mbizi and Mr. Mabounda Ntsiomo, met with Carrascoso on 
October 14 and asked him to facilitate appointments with the 
U.S. Charge d'affaires and EU Ambassador, Mme. Dominique 
Pavard. The Nuncio strongly encouraged this initiative and 
noted that, in his opinion, there could be no more productive 
develo 
pment in the Pool region in recent years than to have a 
former guerrilla organization, the Ninjas, lay down its arms 
and take up constructive political activism and dialogue to 
bridge the chasm between north and south.  He believed that 
it would attract Sassou-Nguesso's interest as well, coming 
months before the 2007 legislative elections and lead-up to a 
2009 presidential campaign. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Charge d'affaires received Mbizi and Ntsiomo for a 
two-hour meeting on October 17 at which time they presented a 
comprehensive document which included the CNR's statutes, 
organizational rules and action plan under the party banner 
"Unity, Justice and Peace."  CDA was unable to retain a copy 
of the document, as Ntsiomo stated that they would need to 
seek Patsteur Ntumi's permission before turning over the 
draft.  Dr. Mbizi, a member of the High Commission for the 
Reinsertion of Ex-Combattants and nephew of former President 
Pascal Lissouba, stated that Ntumi was "fatigued" by the 
protracted negotiations with President Sassou-Nguesso which 
he likened to a "cat and mouse, carrot and stick approach 
yielding no results after nearly four years of false promises 
and insincere gestures."  When asked to comment on rumors 
rife in Brazzaville that Ntumi had received large sums of 
money from Sassou-Nguesso prior to the August 15 Dolisie 
National Day reception as a "peace offering", Mbizi 
acknowledged that some "i 
nfrastructure development assistance" in the amount of USD 
$20 million (a fact later confirmed by EU Ambassador Pavard) 
had been provided by the government; however, he added that 
vastly larger amounts would be needed to fully rehabilitate 
the decimated Pool region.  He added that this gesture should 
not be interpreted as a payoff intended for Ntumbi, but 
rather, as an investment in the future of the Pool region to 
provide adequate health care, sanitation and infrastructure, 
and above all, education, to those left behind in the 
post-conflict harmonization program.  He noted that a major 
stumbling block to achieving a fruitful agreement in the Pool 
had been Sassou-Nguesso's continued insistence to handle this 
"internal matter" himself, without "interference" from the 
international community - a contradiction to the philosophy 
apparently espoused by Ntumi. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Charge encouraged Mbizi and Ntsiomo to have 
Ntumi press forward with the arms collection and destruction 
campaign financed by the European Union and World Bank which 
has languished in recent months.  Mbizi stated that Ntumi 
whole heartedly supported this action, but wanted to engage 
the western embassies and international organizations to 
serve as an "honest broker and recipient of the arms," rather 
than place additional weapons under the control of 
Sassou-Nguesso or the Congolese military, leaving no 
assurances that the arms would actually be destroyed or 
disabled.  As a side note, Ntsiomo stated that Sassou-Nguesso 
and the Government of Congo had been intentionally 
under-reporting the number of arms in circulation, not 
necessarily in the Pool, but in other parts of the country 
(north and east) which could be easily mobilized to their 
advantage in the event of a future armed conflict.  Charge 
d'affaires noted that members of the diplomatic corps in 
Brazzaville were discouraged by reports of an a 
lleged attack on a weapons arsenal near Nkiaye days before 
the August 15 National Day in nearby Dolisie; however, Mbizi 
dismissed this report as highly exaggerated by Sassou-Nguesso 
loyalists and claimed that it was in no manner associated 
with Pastor Ntumi or the former Ninja rebels and instead, a 
wanton criminal act. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Mbizi and Ntsiomo stated that they had been 
instructed by Ntumi to search for a small office set-up in 
downtown Brazzaville, and to request a vote of confidence for 
his CNR party initiative from the UNDP, EU and U.S. embassy, 
so that CNR's entry into the political arena would be seen as 
having the tacit support of the western group.  He added that 
this nod of approval would also provide "protection" to the 
CNR staff assigned to Brazzaville.  Charge d'affaires agreed 
to relay the substantive of this conversation to Ambassador 
Weisberg and to Washington officials for review, with mention 
that the Ambassador might be available to meet with them for 
any follow-up discussion necessary upon his return to post 
on/about October 23. 
 
¶5.  (C)  On October 18, Charge met with EU Ambassador 
Dominique Pavard following her appointment with Mbizi and 
Ntsiomo earlier in the day.  In general, she viewed the 
creation of the CNR political party as a positive 
development, but stipulated to the gentlemen that no 
financial support of any kind could be provided by the 
European Union.  Pavard cautioned that the Nunciature, EU and 
U.S. Embassy should proceed cautiously and not be seen as 
pawns in the murky waters of a Sassou-Ntumi entente, cordial 
or otherwise.  Her immediate interest was to pursue closure 
of the EU's arms collection activities, and naturally, 
welcomed news that DoD specialists had recently visited 
Brazzaville to discuss potential cooperation on Light 
Arms/Small Weapons with officials from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  Pavard opined that, in Sassou-Nguesso's 
eyes, the international diplomatic corps were "bit players" 
in Brazzaville; therefore, any attempt to meddle in an issue 
which he considered an internal matter might precipitate a 
n uncomfortable backlash. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Following is a brief assessment provided later that 
day by former Canadian intelligence officer, Philip Lancaster 
(please protect), who has been in frequent contact with Ntumi 
and his associates in the Pool region on visits there as a 
member of a World Bank Mission survey team, most recently in 
mid-September.  Quote:  I see this as a very positive 
development in that it's a step around the blockage presented 
by Ntumi's insistence on having his own status considered as 
a precondition for anything else.  I'm also happy that the 
CNR wants to make the transition to a political party and am 
even happier that they might constitute a real opposition in 
a country suffering from too little real debate.  So, it's a 
good thing - up to a point.  I have some reservation about 
encouraging a political development that leans so heavily on 
outside interference.  In this case, it may seem the only way 
but it may also set in motion a defense mechanism from the 
present elite that might actually aggravate tensions.  This 
 will be a matter of very fine judgment about the present 
balance of power and the embassy will be better placed than 
me to make that call.  My second concern, very ambivalent, is 
over the possible directions such an initiative will take 
when the French wake up to it.  I think the key here is to 
strive for EU participation right from the beginning.  As I 
have frequently argued, the French have played a slightly 
malignant role in Congolese politics and thus, I see no harm 
in weakening their influence if it can be done without 
provoking the kind of dirty play that could harm both U.S. 
and Congolese interests.  Go softly, but go forward.  End 
Quote. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Post will report further developments as received. 
For INR:  Bio data:  Dr. Joseph MBIZI, DOB: 20 February 1955, 
current: Commissioner, High Commission for the Reinsertion of 
Ex-Combattants, Brazzaville;  Mr. Mabounda-Ntsiomo, DOB: 07 
January 1956, POB: Kolo, Republic of Congo, Address: 68 rue 
Franceville, Moungali 
 
BIEDLINGMAIER 
 
 
MEECE