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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 012782 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM ID PP
SUBJECT: THE TWO PAPUAS: A CONSUL GENERAL'S VIEW 
 
REF: JAKARTA 9861 
 
JAKARTA 00012782  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Marc L. Desjardins.  Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Papua New Guinea,s Consul General in 
Jayapura, Papua shared his views on the often prickly 
relations between Indonesia and his government in an October 
12 meeting.  He charged that the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(TNI) were involved in both illegal logging and drug 
smuggling in PNG.  He explained that illegal fishing by 
Indonesians in PNG waters was a major headache; PNG's 
capacity to enforce its maritime boundary was simply 
overwhelmed by the sheer number of incursions.  The problem 
was worsened by the sale of border crossing cards by corrupt 
GOI officials.  PNG was a sympathetic but reluctant host to 
refugees from Indonesian Papua; wherever possible, it dealt 
with the problem by simply turning a blind eye to them. 
Underlying suspicions between the two governments had been 
exposed by Jakarta's nervousness over Governor Suebu's 
September visit to Port Moresby and the cancellation of PM 
Somare,s July summit with President Yudhoyono.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  We met October 12 with Jeffrey Tolo'ube, Papua New 
Guinea,s Consul General in Jayapura, Papua, and his First 
Secretary Nasser Taniei.  Given Jakarta,s occasional 
 
SIPDIS 
suspicions about PNG's intentions towards Indonesia's 
troubled easternmost province, Tolo'ube occupies a sensitive 
post.  He shared his opinions freely during a one-hour 
conversation. 
 
A Sympathetic But Reluctant Host 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Tolo'ube noted that PNG's official position was to 
acknowledge the incorporation of Papua into the Republic of 
Indonesia without reservation.  Moreover, to avoid frictions 
with its giant neighbor, PNG appeased the GOI in other ways, 
such as ceasing to refer to Indonesian Papuans who had fled 
to PNG as "refugees."  To placate the GOI, Tolo'ube said, PNG 
had accepted Indonesia,s insistence on the term "illegal 
border crosser."  Despite this, Tolo'ube said, the people of 
PNG "cannot help but sympathize" with their counterparts west 
of the border.  Although the vast majority of two peoples did 
not share a common language, the cultural and ethnic kinship 
was obvious, and the people of PNG had taken note of the 
GOI's waves of oppression of its Papuans, especially in the 
70's and early 80's when thousands of Indonesian Papuans had 
crossed into PNG.  "Whether they are happy matters to us.  We 
notice and care when they are unhappy," he said.  PNG Papuans 
shared Indonesian Papuans' distress over the continual influx 
of non-Melanesians into the province, encroaching on 
indigenous ways of life.  "They have the same attachment to 
the land that we do," he noted. 
 
¶4. (C)  Tolo'ube commented on the longstanding problem of 
Indonesian Papuans seeking refuge in Papua New Guinea, which 
was an irritant to the GOI. (Note:  As the recent uproar over 
the 43 Papuan asylum seekers in Australia clearly shows, the 
GOI finds intolerable the very notion of Indonesian refugees 
or asylum seekers.)  Many of these Indonesian Papuans, who 
had fled earlier waves of repression, now lived in a 
semi-permanent settlement known as Nine Mile outside Port 
Moresby.  Others had settled in the East Awin refugee 
settlement across the border from Merauke.  The last major 
wave of refugees, Tolo'ube said, came in December 2001.  The 
PNG government, he said, had cooperated with GOI efforts to 
induce them to return to Indonesia.  Repatriations in 
December 2003 and 2005, negotiated by the regent of Merauke, 
had been somewhat successful.  One of these groups, he said, 
had initially settled near the town of Daru in southwest 
Papua New Guinea.  However, as Catholics, they had not been 
accepted by Protestant locals and had eventually become 
amenable to repatriation.  Tolo'ube said that in recent 
years, the PNG government's approach had been simply to avoid 
acknowledging the presence of Indonesian Papuans crossing the 
border, unless they had done so in large groups who 
identified themselves as refugees.  In these cases, Tolo'ube 
said, PNG would turn to the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees.  Tolo'ube noted, however, that the PNG government 
would continue to deflect the GOI's longstanding requests for 
an extradition treaty and a "hot pursuit" agreement.  These 
would only be used by the GOI to round up politically 
troublesome persons, he said. 
 
TNI Headaches 
------------- 
 
 
JAKARTA 00012782  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (C)  Tolo'ube commented on PNG's occasional headaches with 
the Armed Forces of Indonesia (TNI).  He claimed that the TNI 
was involved in illegal logging activities in Papua New 
Guinea, supporting two Indonesian firms ) Brilliant 
Investments and Shantri ) operating in northern PNG with the 
collusion of corrupt local officials in the city of Wewak. 
Tolo'ube said that on one occasion, a low-flying TNI Hercules 
aircraft had been tracked by observers from the border to 
Wewak.  It presumably had been carrying materiel and 
personnel for illegal logging operations, he said. 
 
¶6. (C) The CG went on to say that he had reason to believe 
the TNI was involved in smuggling marijuana into Indonesia. 
He claimed that TNI-issued weapons were turning up in the 
hands of drug smuggling networks in Papua New Guinea. 
Tolo'ube said he doubted that the marijuana was being sold in 
Indonesian Papua, but was instead destined for Java. 
 
Troubled Waters 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to border issues, Tolo'ube said illegal 
fishing continued to be a huge problem.  PNG's capacity both 
to monitor and enforce its maritime border off the north 
coast was overwhelmed by the sheer number of Indonesian 
vessels.  Most of these, he said, were not even from 
neighboring waters, but were from as far away as Serui, Biak, 
and South Sulawesi.  The problem was aggravated, he said, by 
the Indonesian authorities' sale of traditional border 
crossing cards to anyone who was prepared to pay the right 
price.  Although these cards were meant to meet the needs of 
longtime residents of border areas, GOI officials now sold 
them wholesale to people from all over Indonesia. 
 
¶8. (C) PNG's frustration over the illegal fishing situation, 
Tolo'ube said, had led to the accidental shooting in August 
of two Indonesian fishermen in PNG waters.  One of PNG's 
infrequent police boat patrols had given the vessel every 
signal to stop, he said, and the shots had been fired in an 
attempt to disable the Indonesian boat's engine.  The deaths, 
he said, had been accidental. 
 
Suspicious Minds 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Poloff asked the reason for the cancellation of PNG 
Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare's meeting with President 
Yudhoyono, originally scheduled for July (reftel) when the 
two leaders were supposed to have inaugurated a new border 
crossing.  The vague explanation Tolo'ube had heard in 
Jakarta was "technical reasons on PNG side."  The opening of 
the new crossing had been postponed in response to 
"intelligence reports" and political sensitivities.  It was 
technically possible to drive across the border now, but it 
was not officially permitted, he said.  Those crossing the 
border must do so on foot and hire a vehicle on the other 
side.  The new crossing would have permitted free passage of 
vehicle traffic.  However, Tolo'ube said, the idea had proved 
unpopular at home; PNG had always harbored suspicions that 
Indonesia nurtured designs on its territory, and local people 
were already referring to the crossing as "the invasion 
highway."  PNG, Tolo'ube said, could envision a scenario in 
which Indonesia, eyeing the country's abundance of natural 
resources and seeing that its neighbor was weak and "not 
doing as well as we ought to," annexed the other half of New 
Guinea the way it had East Timor. 
 
¶10. (C) Continuing in this vein, Tolo'ube commented on 
Jakarta's extreme mistrust of any display of Melanesian 
solidarity.  Certain parts of the GOI, he said, had been 
alarmed by Papuan Governor Bas Suebu's mid-September trip to 
Port Moresby, during which he had attended Papua New Guinea's 
National Day celebration.  During the trip, Suebu had been 
made a Companion of the Order of the Star of Melanesia.  For 
some elements of the GOI's security apparatus, this harmless 
honor could call into question Suebu's commitment to the 
integration of Papua into Indonesia.  On the same trip, 
Tolo'ube continued, Suebu had met with Indonesian Papuan 
exiles at Nine Mile.  Although Suebu had later said the 
purpose of the meeting had been to urge the refugees to 
return to Indonesia, the story had circulated that he had met 
with exiled separatists.  These rumors had been fueled by the 
fact that an Indonesian media team, hoping to film a news 
story about the event, had been chased out of the settlement 
by a hostile crowd. 
 
Comment 
 
JAKARTA 00012782  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
 
¶11. (C)  Consul Tolo'ube's comments on the GOI's nervousness 
about "Melanesian solidarity" ring true.  Still smarting from 
the East Timor trauma, many in the Indonesian ruling classes 
are fixated on the danger of efforts to internationalize the 
Papua problem, notably attempts by some outside critics to 
revisit the issue of Papua's annexation.  Although parts of 
the national security apparatus, accompanied by the public 
clamor of freelance "intelligence analysts," express the 
greatest worry about Australian and U.S. attitudes in this 
regard, they are also mindful that some of "their" Papuans 
are seeking support from Melanesian countries such as PNG. 
Although Governor Suebu's visit to Port Moresby was most 
likely undertaken for purely pragmatic reasons, it probably 
does not sit well with those in the GOI who already suspect 
him of pursuing a covert separatist agenda.  End comment. 
PASCOE