VZCZCXRO6405
RR RUEHAG
DE RUEHHE #1003/01 2751125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021125Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2547
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0922

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 001003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN FI CY GR TU
SUBJECT: FINLAND: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH FM TUOMIOJA AND 
THE COMMISSION ON CYPRUS 
 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In Helsinki Sept. 27, DAS Bryza 
encouraged the Finnish Presidency to implement its plan 
for helping the EU and Turkey move forward on Cyprus, 
and stressed that all US efforts on this issue aim to 
support the Finnish EU Presidency's own initiative. 
Finnish FM Tuomioja welcomed the US suggestion that 
introducing incentives for both sides (such as Varosha 
or Ecran airport) would increase the Finnish plan's long 
term chances for success.  In the short term, Bryza and 
the GOF agreed that keeping "the package minimal for 
now" is the best strategy for helping the EU and Turkey 
avoid a train wreck on Nov. 8, when the Commission's 
progress report is due.  Bryza said the US role is to 
step back and allow the Finns to carry out their plan, 
but emphasized that we stand ready to weigh in as 
requested to move the parties toward a Famagusta-Varosha 
agreement.  Tuomioja thanked the US for its support and 
helpful input on the Finnish plan, and noted that the 
Finns would likely come back to seek support as the 
process proceeds.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) DAS Matthew Bryza held separate meetings 
September 27 in Helsinki with Foreign Minister Erkki 
Tuomioja, with MFA Director General for European Affairs 
Kari Halonen, and with Enlargement Commission Special 
Advisor Jaakko Bloomberg, aimed at helping the Finns 
move forward with their EU Presidency plan to help the 
EU and Turkey move forward on Cyprus by forging a 
compromise on the reciprocal opening of ports. 
 
Tweaking the Finnish Plan 
------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Tuomioja opened by noting that Finland is making 
a concerted effort to avoid an EU-Turkey train wreck 
over Cyprus on November 8, when the Commission is due to 
publish its report on Turkey's progress in the accession 
process.  He also expressed thanks for the fruitful 
meeting he had with A/S Dan Fried in New York regarding 
the Finnish Presidency's plan.  Finland has begun to 
"shuttle" among the parties, and is trying to keep "the 
package minimal for now" to increase the chances for 
buy-in from the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the run-up 
to Nov. 8, Tuomioja said.  Although Tuomioja said he 
"wouldn't rate the chances for success any greater than 
50 percent" over the long term, he viewed as very 
positive that fact that no one had said "no" to the 
proposals thus far. 
 
¶4. (C) Bryza encouraged the Finnish approach, noting 
that the US thinking closely matched the incentives the 
Finns have come up with.  The US began its effort on 
ports in July, just as Finland was beginning its own 
effort.  The US now sees its role as standing behind the 
EU Presidency effort, but stands ready to weigh in with 
any of the parties or offer whatever other support it 
can to help the process proceed.  Bryza did suggest that 
the Finnish plan's chances for success in the longer 
term may increase if it incorporates additional elements 
should an impasse emerge.  In particular, he suggested a 
moratorium on property sales in the north -- if not an 
eventual return of property -- as a carrot for the 
Cypriots, and the eventual opening of Ercan airport as a 
carrot for the Turks.  Bryza shared with the Finns the 
fact that the Greek Cypriots had told him they liked 
many of the ideas in the Finnish plan but that they 
wanted something more (which they left undefined) on 
Varosha. The Turkish side, meanwhile, had responded with 
less interest but was "studying" the package.  Tuomioja 
welcomed the US suggestions and called them "eminently 
reasonable," although he and Bryza agreed they represent 
potential "red lines" and would have to be addressed 
carefully, and only if the Finnish effort stalls. 
Tuomioja noted specifically that while all 25 EU MS 
supported the Finnish plan, the GOF may well need to 
seek US help to counter increasing "anti-Turkey" 
statements (particularly in France and Germany) as well 
as to press the Turks to show some kind of flexibility. 
 
Keeping Turkey on Track 
----------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) In separate meetings, Finnish MFA Director 
General for Europe Kari Halonen said that the Finnish 
Presidency remains steadfast in the view that the EU 
must keep its commitments to Turkey; i.e., that the 
European perspective remains open if Turkey engages in 
the necessary reforms.  Moving the goalposts or concepts 
like "privileged partnership" threaten to alienate the 
Turks and increase the danger of the GOT's "returning to 
thinking the EU is a Christian club."  Bryza emphasized 
 
HELSINKI 00001003  002 OF 002 
 
 
to Finnish officials that while the US supports eventual 
Turkish membership in the EU, its main interest is 
seeing a "reformed Turkey" bolster its democratic and 
market institutions and serve as an example to inspire 
other reformers in Muslim majority countries; Turkey is 
important to Europe and the West, but not so important 
that it can enter the EU without engaging in the 
necessary reforms. 
 
Commission Perspective 
---------------------- 
¶6. (C) Bryza also met separately with Jaakko Bloomberg, 
EU Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn's Special Advisor 
for Turkey and Cyprus.  While Brussels is fully 
supportive of the Finnish Presidency's efforts on 
Cyprus, Bloomberg said the Commission also emphasizes a 
three-track process:  the EU Presidency plan, the EU 
accession criteria for Turkey, and the UN Good Offices 
process on Turkey/Cyprus.  While these tracks are 
mutually reinforcing, the Commission believes that the 
standoff over the ports, in particular, cannot be 
resolved without UN involvement.  Bloomberg also noted 
that if the EU Presidency process "does not fail" and 
the UN process starts building space for compromise, it 
will become more difficult for the EU or skeptical 
member states to fabricate reasons to derail Turkey's 
accession process. 
 
¶7. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable. 
WARE