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RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2335

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/3/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS KPKO ASEC UN TT
SUBJECT: PREVIEW OF UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT ON TIMOR CRISIS 
 
 
DILI 00000487  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Dili, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
¶1. (C) Summary.  According to one of its principal authors, the 
UN Special Commission of Inquiry report pulls no punches in 
naming the direct perpetrators and assessing responsibilities 
for the April-May crisis.  The report recommends prosecution of 
former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato and elements of the 
F-FDTL leadership (including General Taur Matan Ruak, Colonel 
Lere Anan and Major Maubuti) for illegal actions, as well as for 
more direct perpetrators of the violence, including Oan Kiak, 
Captain Alfredo Reinado, Abilio Mesquita, and Railos.  It does 
not recommend prosecution of former Prime Minister Alkatiri, 
however, only recommending 'further investigation', and alludes 
to the 'irresponsible' March 23 speech of President Gusmao.  The 
report finds no evidence of rumored mass killings by F-FDTL on 
April 28-29, and also dismisses conspiracy theories that 
Fretilin had a coordinated plan to destroy the political 
opposition.  There is serious concern regarding the potential 
for violent reactions once the report becomes public.  Prime 
Minister Ramos Horta would like the release to be delayed from 
the scheduled October 7 date until upcoming rotations of the 
Portuguese and Malaysian rapid reaction forces are completed and 
it now looks likely that the need to translate the document into 
Tetun will push the release off until late in the month.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) CDA met on October 1 with a UN official who is one of the 
primary authors of the UN Special Commission of Inquiry report 
on the April-May events.  He said the completed draft had been 
sent to Geneva for clearance, but did not anticipate that Geneva 
would make any major changes or "water down" the findings in any 
way.  He was adamant that the report pulled no punches in 
describing in some detail the various clashes and, to the 
maximum extent permitted by the evidence, "named the names" of 
those directly involved.  The major actors in this regard 
include dissident commander of the F-FDTL Military Police Major 
Alfredo Reinado, Abilio Mesquita of the National Police (PNTL), 
former Falintil fighter Oan Kiak, and Rai Los, the leader of the 
Liquica-based group allegedly armed by former Minister of 
Interior Lobato.  Thereport recommends that all be prosecuted. 
The report also fingers the F-FDTL leadership, including 
Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, Colonel Lere, and Major 
Maubuti, for illegal acts and recommends prosecutions.  As 
expected, illegal acts of former Interior Minister Rogerio 
Lobato feature prominently in the report, which recommends that 
he be prosecuted. 
 
¶3. (C) According to this source, the Commission encountered many 
claims that then Prime Minister Alkatiri may have been aware of 
if not behind certain illegal acts, but it seemed that Alkatiri 
had been quite adept at insuring that he was one step removed. 
There was nevertheless enough evidence for the report to 
recommend "further investigation" of the ex-Prime Minister.  The 
report also censures President Gusmao for his "irresponsible" 
speech of March 23.  The report attempts to put to rest widely 
circulating reports that F-FDTL carried out mass killings of 
dozens of  people on April 28-29 , concluding that there is no 
evidence to support this.  The report also dismisses conspiracy 
theories regarding purported coordinated plans by Fretilin to 
destroy the political opposition. 
 
¶4. (C) The UN official indicated that the report allocates much 
of the blame to Timorese institutions as a whole. The UN mission 
also does not come off unscathed, with one mention of "faulty 
management" by former SRSG Hasegawa during the height of the 
crisis. 
 
¶5. (C) There is serious concern among UN and senior GOET 
officials regarding potentially violent reactions once the 
report becomes public.  In a September 27 meeting with us Prime 
Minister Ramos Horta predicted that if the report exonerates 
Alkatiri while recommending prosecution of Lobato, "a strong 
negative reaction," including demonstrations and waves of arson, 
could be expected.  Embassy sources have also reported that 
significant numbers of people from the eastern districts are 
leaving Dili for their home districts in anticipation of a 
 
DILI 00000487  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
violent response by western opposition groups.  In light of the 
scheduled October 7 release date for the report, the Prime 
Minister expressed concern that both the Portuguese GNR and the 
Malaysian rapid reaction force are slated for rotation around 
October 6, with the replacement personnel not arriving for 
several more days.  He therefore urged that the report's release 
be delayed by two weeks or so.  Acting SRSG Finn Reske-Neilson 
indicated to us that such a delay is likely, due both to the 
concern regarding the security forces and the need to translate 
the report into Tetun. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment.  It is encouraging that, unlike previous UN 
investigations here, the Commission's report will apparently 
pull no punches (with the possible exception of the ex-Prime 
Minister's role).  A slight delay in the release to ensure that 
adequate security forces are on hand seems justified, but it is 
essential that the report be made public soon to move the 
process along.  We are not yet convinced that the GOET, UNMIT, 
and the JTF are fully prepared for the possible consequences of 
the report's release, and will be strongly encouraging them to 
be ready for all contingencies.  RSO and visiting DS analyst 
discussed these issues in meetings with local counterparts last 
week, who did not yet seem to have a good handle on where 
violent reactions may break out.  The Embassy will also be 
closely assessing the situation in regard to our own security 
concerns. End comment. 
GRAY