VZCZCXRO6019
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #4877/01 2841612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111612Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1973
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0228
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: SYRIA'S DAMASCUS DECLARATION GROUP PLANS TO GO MORE PUBLIC 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 4482 
 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 4797 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Damascus Declaration leader XXXXXXXXXXXX said 
in an October 3 meeting with A/DCM that the Damascus 
Declaration group turns a year old this month and plans to 
expand its activities from internal group organizing to 
public outreach.  The group is still waiting for a response 
about expanded Kurdish participation, and it is planning to 
discuss an offer for a possible coalition with the exiled 
National Salvation Front, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.  EU re-engagement 
efforts could represent a positive development, if, as the 
Germans are proposing, each step in the re-engagement process 
is conditioned to a SARG response, such as expanded rights to 
free speech and the release of political prisoners.  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
expressed a belief voiced by other Syrian government critics 
that the UNIIIC investigation represents the best chance for 
change in the Syrian regime, and expressed wishful thinking 
about the possibility of an internal coup if the next report 
provides evidence of SARG complicity in the assassination of 
former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri.  XXXXXXXXXXXX's comments are 
optimistic, particularly about the group's public profile in 
Syria, but to his credit, he is still functioning after a 
year.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) DAMASCUS DECLARATION TO START OUTREACH:  A/DCM and 
Poloff met October 3 with Damascus Declaration (DD) leader 
XXXXXXXXXXXX, who said the DD will celebrate its first 
anniversary on October 16 and will turn more of its attention 
from self-organizational activities to public outreach.  All 
22 members of the group's executive committee met secretly 
for a day in late September in Aleppo, where they agreed on 
next steps, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.  Up until now, the group has 
established a weak but decentralized network in Syrian cities 
such as Aleppo, Homs and Hamas, which could be mobilized and 
expanded, he said.  Starting this month, the group plans to 
publicize its activities via its yet-to-be unveiled website 
and through regional media. 
 
¶3.  (C) COURTING MORE KURDS, DISCUSSING THE MB:  The DD group 
is still waiting to hear whether the Kurdish Future Movement 
and Azadi and Yekiti parties will join the organization 
(reftel A), XXXXXXXXXXXX said.  Such an alliance would require the DD 
group to include in its manifesto a sentence about "the need 
to find a democratic solution for the Kurdish problem within 
the Syrian state," XXXXXXXXXXXX said.  (Comment:  XXXXXXXXXXXX would clearly 
like to have the Future Movement and Yekiti and Azadi parties 
join the DD, as demonstrated by XXXXXXXXXXXX's participation in an 
October 5 protest jointly organized by the three groups, 
reported in reftel B.)  Separately, the DD executive 
committee members still needed to discuss a September 25 
letter from Syria Muslim Brotherhood leader Ali Bayanouni, in 
the name of the National Salvation Front, offering to start a 
coalition, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. "I don't think we'll agree, but we 
probably won't saying anything against the NSF publicly 
either," said XXXXXXXXXXXX, noting general opposition to Islamist 
participation by the current Kurdish members and DD spokesman 
Hassan Abdulazeem, who also heads the Socialist Union Party. 
 
¶4.  (C) TO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE:  XXXXXXXXXXXX responded to a 
question about EU re-enagement efforts by saying, "If 
engagement means that the regime will stay, this is the worst 
option."  He said that he would, however, support a 
re-engagement process envisioned by Germany in which each 
step was linked to a precise condition, such as expanding 
free speech or releasing  political prisoners.  XXXXXXXXXXXX, who 
meets regularly with German officials, said that he has not 
had contact with Italians, Greeks or Spaniards here but noted 
that their lenient approach was "spoiling the regime." 
 
¶5.  (C) VALUE OF PUBLIC USG STATEMENT:  XXXXXXXXXXXX recommended 
against a USG statement on the situation in Syria, stating 
that "American credibility in the region is at ground zero." 
If the U.S. Administration said that it supports democracy in 
the region, people here will react by opposing the idea of 
democracy, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, citing a widespread belief here that 
the U.S. made fatal mistakes in Iraq and has failed to take 
needed action on a comprehensive Middle East settlement that 
would grant Palestinians just resolution of their claims. 
(Note:  In previous conversations, he has also emphasized the 
need to resolve the issue of the occupied Golan Heights.) 
 
 
DAMASCUS 00004877  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C) UNIIIC investigation:  XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed a belief voiced 
by other Syrian government critics that the UNIIIC 
investigation represents the best possible hope for change in 
the Syrian regime.  Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is 
seriously worried about the investigation, as seen by ongoing 
regime efforts, primarily through meddling in Lebanon, to 
prevent the establishment of an international tribunal, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said.  If the next UNIIIC report points to more evidence of 
high-level SARG complicity in the assassination of the former 
Lebanese PM, elements in the Syrian military might launch a 
coup, paving the way for a transitional government, XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  XXXXXXXXXXXX seemed overly optimistic, both about 
the DD group's ability to reach out to the Syria public, 
which is largely unaware of the organization, as well as 
about the prospects of a military coup, post-Brammertz 
report.  So far, the reality on the ground gives no sign that 
the regime is loosening its grip on unsanctioned activities 
here or growing any weaker.  Despite his optimism, XXXXXXXXXXXX and 
his opposition group have succeeded at meeting and organizing 
for a full year, which is in and of itself a rare 
accomplishment in Syria. 
CORBIN