VZCZCXRO7703
PP RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0169/01 2760958
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 030958Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0290
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0562
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0328
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000169 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECPS KPAO TH
SUBJECT: COMMUNITY RADIO STATIONS RE-OPEN TO SELF-CENSORSHIP 
GUIDELINES 
 
REF: A) CHIANG MAI 159, B) BANGKOK 5848, C) BANGKOK 5937 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000169  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. Summary. Community radio stations have returned to the 
airwaves nearly two weeks after Third Army leaders ordered local 
stations to close. The temporary closure was aimed at stifling 
potential counter-coup organizers in former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra's northern power base.  Station owners 
eventually pushed back against the strict closure rules, but 
exchanged permission to re-open this week for strict 
self-censorship guidelines. End Summary. 
 
The CDR Killed the (Community) Radio Star 
---------- 
 
¶2. The morning after the Sept. 19 coup, Third Army commander Lt. 
Gen. Saprang Kalayanamitr moved quickly to control the northern 
region, requiring officials and media representatives to "report 
themselves" to military offices (ref A). Army officials also 
ordered nearly 600 community radio stations in northern Thailand 
off the air, claiming the move was necessary to maintain social 
order. In contrast, print media and television stations in the 
north did not attract the attention received by their 
counterparts in Bangkok (ref B, C). 
 
¶3. The closure order reportedly stemmed from Sept. 20 broadcasts 
by two community stations airing call-in segments that voiced 
anti-coup sentiments - the low wattage stations had the morning 
free to discuss the previous night's events while bigger 
broadcasters were disrupted from the outset. Fearing that 
community radio could foment anti-coup meetings and 
demonstrations, 3rd Army officials ordered them off the air. For 
the next 10 days, Chiang Mai radios picked up little more than 
static across all frequencies except for a few local larger 
stations, such as Chiang Mai University's FM 100, and those 
broadcasting news and entertainment feeds originating in 
Bangkok. 
 
¶4. In the largely unregulated world of Thai community radio, 
many of these small stations were considered Thai Rak Thai party 
(TRT) affiliates, with some allegedly instigating opposition to 
local rallies by anti-Thaksin groups over the past year. Based 
on this legacy, army officials feared these local radio stations 
could be used by TRT operatives to promulgate anti-coup 
sentiments. 
 
¶5. With many of these community stations dependant on 
advertising revenue for their operations and now facing 
significant business losses, station owners and managers 
complained to the 3rd Army over the shutdown. While some were 
supportive of the coup (one station owner told PolOff he was 
happy to suspend his operations), economic concerns led many 
owners to push 3rd Army officials and provincial public 
relations officers to allow them to re-open. Following a Sept. 
30 meeting, army officials agreed to lift the closure order in 
exchange for promises from station owners and employees to avoid 
political discussions that reflect negatively on the coup's 
Council for Democratic Reform. 
 
¶6. Under the Sept. 30 agreement, stations will be allowed back 
on the air after owners submit their biographical details and 
addresses to the military. Owners are also required to monitor 
their stations' content and ban employees from discussing 
political issues on the air, including during listener call-in 
segments. Responsibility for monitoring the broadcasts has been 
turned over to Provincial Public Relations Department offices. 
As of Oct. 3, only a few dozen stations remained off the air, 
but a 3rd Army representative attributed their continued closure 
to histories of broadcasting on non-standardized frequencies 
rather than to politics. 
 
¶7. Whether the military's ban on political discussions covers 
all discourse or is a targeted measure to counter TRT influence 
remains unclear. Based on conversations with station owners, 
many are interpreting the guidelines on their own. One 
well-known Thaksin opponent said he looked forward to "educating 
the audience" about Thaksin's alleged corruption. On the other 
hand, a pro-Thaksin station operator said he would leave 
political discussions behind and now focus only on entertainment 
programs. 
 
All We Heard Was Radio Ga Ga 
---------- 
 
¶8. Drafters of the 1997 constitution that opened the airwaves to 
public use envisioned villages, temples, schools, and other 
institutions taking advantage of the opportunity to build 
communities and social networks via radio. With support from 
district-level funding, local radio developed into a diverse 
patchwork of stations. Earlier this year, Embassy Bangkok's 
public affairs section recognized the democracy-building 
potential of these small operators and awarded small grants to 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000169  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
NGOs working with community radio. Businesspeople, local 
political bosses, and other "persons of influence" also saw 
opportunities and began operating their own stations. By 2006, 
more than 150 community stations were broadcasting from Chiang 
Mai province, and another 70 from Chiang Rai. 
 
¶9. Weaknesses and contradictions in the government's regulation 
of these new stations led to significant confusion across the 
airwaves with some station owners taking advantage of the lack 
of oversight. Many stations failed to register or pay for 
licenses, while others broadcast at higher wattages or put up 
higher antennas than allowed. The result was often a jumble of 
stations competing for limited bandwidth - a drive across town 
in Chiang Mai could find three or more stations fighting through 
the static on one frequency. This proliferation of community 
radio stations over the past few years magnified the perception 
of the post-coup clampdown on radio broadcasts in the north as 
the closure brought a temporary silence to what had been an 
unruly, overlapping melange of voices and music on the northern 
radio dial. 
 
¶10.  The unregulated nature of community radio likely 
contributed to station owners' willingness to close down on the 
military's orders. With fewer stations on the air, the ones that 
remained were more likely to get noticed and possibly hit up on 
violating any number of regulations rather than on more overt 
censorship grounds. Even some larger and medium-sized stations, 
such as Chiang Mai's all-English language station TITS 106.5, 
are known to skirt broadcast rules and took themselves off the 
air or reduced their programming hours in an effort to avoid 
attention during this time of increased scrutiny. 
 
¶11. COMMENT: The 3rd Army's move to suppress pro-Thaksin 
sentiment over the community radio airwaves seems to have 
achieved its goal, as pro-TRT station operators accept that 
their opinions should, for now, be kept to themselves. Economic 
pressures on those stations most reliant on advertising revenue, 
more than freedom of speech concerns, eventually mobilized 
owners to ask that the ban be lifted. The military's guidelines 
for self-censorship, while a sign of reduced independence of the 
media in the north, have not been a cause of much protest. Based 
on initial conversations, many station owners believe the 
guidelines are not intended to limit all political discussions, 
but only those in support of the former government. Many Thaksin 
foes see this temporary shut-down as the beginning of a renewed 
effort to pursue the now-defunct 1997 constitution's promise of 
greater community involvement in radio by weakening TRT 
influence over the media. End Comment. 
CAMP