VZCZCXRO0289
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHCI #0463/01 2891308
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161308Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1208
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0260
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1077
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 0425
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 0425
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0260
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0177
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0199
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0094
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1477

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CALCUTTA 000463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PBTS ECON IN BG NP PTER
SUBJECT: DHAKA POL/ECON COUNSELOR DUNDAS MCCULLOUGH INTERACTS WITH 
INDIAN OFFICIALS IN CALCUTTA 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  On October 5, Embassy Dhaka Pol/Econ Counselor 
Dundas McCullough visited Calcutta to assess Indian perspectives 
on security and infiltration of terrorists from Bangladesh into 
India and for an overview of India's economic relationship with 
Bangladesh.  The prevailing sentiment in meetings with Indian 
interlocutors was that cooperation and information sharing 
between the GOI and GOB on security matters is negligible at 
best, even though infiltration was on the rise.  Foreign 
diplomats and private sector representatives cited a lack of 
trust between the two governments as the primary barrier to 
improving economic relations.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Dhaka Pol/Econ Counselor, Calcutta CG, and Calcutta 
Poloff met with Government of West Bengal (GOWB) Home Secretary 
P.R. Ray.  Ray identified illegal migration from Bangladesh as a 
historical problem with possible growing links to terrorism, and 
cited the failure of GOB officials to recognize and act upon 
shared GOI intelligence as a major stumbling block for bilateral 
cooperation on matters of security.  Ray acknowledged that India 
itself had "only just woken up to the true gravity of the 
situation," and that there had been scant progress on properly 
identifying immigrants, either through an ID card system or land 
records.  In addition, obtaining "actionable intelligence" was 
generally proving difficult.  However, Ray claimed that the GOI 
had plenty of evidence that insurgent groups were training in 
Bangladesh and had provided the GOB with the same, with no 
result.  (Note:  This theme was a recurring one, with Indian 
interlocutors stressing that the GOI had provided the GOB with 
lists with names and addresses of terrorists taking refuge in 
Bangladesh, but that the GOB had not followed up.  When we asked 
for a copy of the lists, we were referred to New Delhi.  End 
note.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Coming out of recent Home Secretaries meetings in 
Dhaka, Ray was not optimistic that there would be much 
improvement of bilateral relations in the near future.  Ray 
opined that the Bangladeshi attitude on issues such as 
extradition and consular access rights in fact had hardened in 
the past two years.  This lack of cooperation was apparent in 
the ongoing Indian effort to establish a border fence between 
the two nations.  Repatriation was a difficult task, with 
Bangladesh authorities being unwilling to accept those being 
"pushed back" by India's Border Security Forces (BSF).  Ray felt 
there was little interest from the Central Indian government to 
tackle the problem of determining migrants' citizenship and 
identity, but it was also because many Bangladeshis had taken up 
residence in major Indian cities and were contributing to the 
economy that the political will was lacking. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Deputy Inspector General of Police - (Criminal 
Investigation Department) Soumen Mitra shared Ray's view that 
the 4,095-kilometer border between India and Bangladesh is too 
"porous."  Mitra felt that given the ease with which banned or 
suspected terrorist organizations could change their names, it 
was probable that some had already set up operations in W. 
Bengal.  To curb criminal activities in India and border-states, 
Mitra highlighted the need for an extradition treaty between 
India and Bangladesh, but acknowledged that little was being 
done to make this a reality.  He also added that smuggling of 
arms through Burma and the Chittagong hill tracts to criminals 
and insurgents in Northeast India was a persistent problem. 
When asked about the growing number of madrassas in W. Bengal's 
border areas, Mitra identified the Middle East, particularly 
Saudi Arabia, as the madrassas' primary source of funding. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  While West Bengal's State Congress Party General 
Secretary Dr. Nuruzzaman (Note: the Congress party is a member 
 
SIPDIS 
of the opposition in West Bengal, and Dr. Nuruzzaman is a 
Muslim) shared the view that Indian states near the Bangladesh 
border have become more vulnerable since the creation of 
Bangladesh, he believed that all madrassas at the border areas 
should not be treated as terrorist training grounds.  He was 
aware that the madrassas received money from abroad, but 
believed that is was mainly for their own infrastructure 
development. Nurazzaman also blamed the BSF for not doing enough 
if there really as a problem with infiltrations. Commenting on 
the upcoming Bangladesh elections, he said, "We all know that 
Jamat-e-Islami, which is supporting the present Khaleda Zia 
government, is a fundamentalist party. We have no problems with 
Sheikh Hasina Wajed's Awami League." 
 
 
CALCUTTA 00000463  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (U) In later meetings with academics, businessmen, and 
diplomats, views on the Indo-Bangladesh relationship remained 
negative.  The Bangladeshi Deputy High Commissioner (BDHC) and 
Nepali Deputy Consul General pointed out the extreme trade 
imbalance between their countries and India, and explained that 
there was little they could do about increasing Indian 
cooperation.  Non-tariff barriers at the border effectively 
slowed trade, and there was little sign that India was prepared 
to make a serious effort to reduce onerous bureaucratic 
requirements on goods coming into India.  Dialogue to address 
these concerns was non-existent.  "The trust just isn't there," 
said the BDHC. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Comment:  With the media highlighting suspected 
terrorists' use of Bangladesh as an entry point into India to 
carry out the July 11 Mumbai bombings, Indian suspicion about 
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh is steadily 
increasing.  With Bangladesh's national election set for January 
2007, Dhaka Pol/Econ counselor repeatedly stressed that the U.S. 
saw the formation of a new government, regardless of who wins 
the election, as a target of opportunity for closer cooperation 
on security issues.  If the recent meetings were any indication, 
however, the GOI and local law enforcement have yet to decide if 
and how India could join in that effort. 
 
¶8.  (U)  This message was cleared by Pol/Econ Counselor 
McCullough. 
JARDINE