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RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0657
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 006365 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2011 
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KTIP IS EG
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN LIAISON CHIEF DISCUSSES BORDER GUARD 
FORCES AND SMUGGLING INTERDICTION 
 
Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
------ 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) Liaison 
Chief MG Nagy reported that Egypt has sought assistance from 
a petroleum company (NFI) to bolster its tunnel detection 
tactics on the border with Gaza.  Although Egypt and Israel 
began a tunnel detection discussion between engineers in 
early 2006, cooperation stalled.  Nagy said he has not yet 
received an indication that Israel would support Egypt's use 
of sensors for tunnel detection.  Smuggling and infiltration 
interdiction efforts south of Karem Shalom are less than 
satisfactory because Egypt relies on poorly trained and 
unprofessional Central Security Police to patrol that area. 
Egyptian-Israeli liaison exchanges are on track, Nagy said, 
but there has not been a high level Joint Military Committee 
meeting in some time.  Post is following up with petroleum 
sector contacts to try to confirm cooperation on border 
security, but Nagy's assertion that that Egypt would benefit 
from more professionally trained forces on the border also 
makes good sense.  As GOE officials note, like Israel, 
Egypt's own internal security is at risk when smuggling 
persists as it increases the likelihood of additional 
terrorist incidents in the Sinai.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Bolstering Tunnel detection 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.   (C)  DMI's Liaison Chief MG Nagy told poloff and DATT on 
October 11 that in early 2006, Egypt asked Israel for advice 
on tunnel detection techniques.  Nagy explained that he 
requested coordination meetings among Egyptian and Israeli 
engineers aimed at improving the Border Guard Forces' (BGF) 
ability to detect tunnels and thwart smuggling.  Israel 
Defense officials hosted Egyptian engineers on the Israeli 
side of the Karem Shalom crossing, but only showed the 
Egyptians trench digging equipment instead of sensors.  When 
the Egyptians asked to discuss the use of sensors, the 
Israelis declined and the exchange did not continue.  Nagy 
said he has not yet received an indication that Israel would 
support BGF use of sensors (or other technology).  In the 
meantime, Nagy said DMI is working with a petroleum company 
(NFI) to enhance Egypt's tunnel detection capability. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Police role in counter-smuggling 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Nagy said Egypt also hopes to deploy more BGF to the 
Gaza border to reduce the reliance on the interior ministry's 
Central Security Police (CSP) for counter-smuggling.  Nagy 
alleged that the police are poorly trained and not focused on 
the counter smuggling mission.  Nagy also faulted the lack of 
professionalism among Central Security Police for 
infiltration and smuggling problems in the area south of 
Karem Shalom.  The poorly paid police are not committed to 
the mission, sleep on the job, and even steal MoD-donated 
equipment such as binoculars, night vision goggles, and 
vehicles, Nagy said.  When poloff asked about the October 1 
Reuters report that some CSP assigned in the North Sinai town 
of Al Arish were arrested for involvement in a network to 
sell weapons and explosives to Palestinians and Bedouin, Nagy 
said the problem is "everywhere."  (Note:  Following the 
October 1 report, Post's Ministry of Interior contacts 
downplayed the arrest, asserting that the Al Arish network 
and arrests were an aberration involving very few 
individuals.  End note). 
 
------------------- 
The Bedouin Element 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  According to Nagy, some Bedouin are involved in both 
stealing and smuggling signal cables and ammunition shells 
because the copper is valuable.  He said the Bedouin also 
sell fuses from mortars to Palestinians for use in their 
homemade Kassem rockets.  While the Kassems are ineffective, 
they remain an irritant to Israel, Nagy noted. 
 
------------------------ 
Egyptian-Israeli Liaison 
 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Nagy, who heads the GOE's Liaison Agency with 
International Organizations (LAWIO), described liaison with 
Israeli counterparts as good, but said that his Israeli 
counterpart, General Dickel, is stretched thin because he 
also oversees strategic planning and the military attach 
section.  Nagy said that Dickel's claims to be available 
immediately "24/7," have not proven true.  Although Dickel 
has good intentions, he is occasionally slow to respond, Nagy 
said.   Nonetheless, working level liaison officers speak on 
the phone daily and meet weekly.  Egypt would like to 
schedule a Joint Military Committee meeting some time after 
Ramadan, Nagy observed, but lower level exchanges need to 
take place first in order to agree on an agenda and resolve 
minor points of contention. 
 
¶6.  (C)  In his role as Chief of LAWIO for the past several 
years, MG Nagy also led the GOE team that negotiated the 
agreement to deploy the Border Guard Forces on the Gaza 
border.  He also advises the Minister of Defense Field 
Marshal Tantawi and the Director of Military Intelligence on 
issues pertaining to liaison with Israel and the Border Guard 
Forces and coordinates with the Ministry of Interior to 
secure police support for the BGF in the North Sinai and, as 
needed, on the Gaza border. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Post is following up with petroleum industry 
contacts to verify GOE efforts to acquire enhanced tunnel 
detection equipment.  Ultimately, however, Nagy's claim that 
Egypt needs more professionally trained bodies on the job 
makes good sense.  Allegations in the Israeli press about the 
deficiencies in GOE counter-smuggling efforts anger GOE 
officials, who explain that smuggling interdiction has 
increased dramatically since the BGF deployed.  As DMI and 
Ministry of Defense contacts note, Egypt, like Israel, stands 
to lose when smuggling persists because it of the increased 
likelihood that additional terrorist incidents may occur in 
the Sinai -- a scenario that could also pose a threat to 
Egypt's vital tourism industry. 
JONES