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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN:  DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETINGS WITH 
OPPOSITION LEADERS 
 
BISHKEK 00001517  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum and Ambassador 
Yovanovitch met former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev and MP 
Omurbek Tekebayev October 17 to discuss their plans for a 
mass protest against the government on November 2.  Atambayev 
and Tekebayev, leaders of the "For Reforms" opposition 
movement, accused President Bakiyev of creating the current 
crisis by monopolizing power and criminalizing the 
government.  They said they would try to persuade the 
government to make concessions on reform over the next two 
weeks, but failing that, the goal of the protest would be to 
force Bakiyev and his government from office.  In a separate 
meeting on October 18, former Ambassador to the U.S. Roza 
Otunbayeva characterized November 2 as the "second part" of 
the country's revolution.  Unfortunately, the country got the 
"wrong leader" in 2005, and it was now necessary to force him 
to compromise or resign, but Otunbayeva also worried that the 
protest could exacerbate north-south splits in the country. 
In both meetings, DAS Feigenbaum urged that any protest 
action be non-violent, that protest and response be legal and 
constitutional, and that any reform process must be open, 
transparent, and accepted by the people.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Making a Case against Bakiyev 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) DAS Feigenbaum and Ambassador Yovanovitch met October 
17 with former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev and former 
Speaker and current MP Omurbek Tekebayev.  Atambayev and 
Tekebayev are leaders of the opposition "For Reforms" 
movement, which is organizing a mass anti-government protest 
on November 2.  Tekebayev said the current crisis had brought 
the country to a historical moment, ready for the "next 
stage" of its development.  The concentration of political 
power in the hands of President Bakiyev had led to a 
usurpation of the role of parliament, as well as to abuses by 
those surrounding the president, resulting in a monopoly of 
economic power, corruption, and a merger of criminal and 
government authority.  Tekebayev said the key to solving the 
current crisis was to allow free and equal competition in 
politics, economics, and the mass media.  If the opposition 
could force the government to make concessions on 
constitutional reform, Tekebayev said, then the country would 
move to a parliamentary form of government ("more suitable to 
our current stage of development"), which would prevent any 
group from having a monopoly on power. 
 
¶3. (C) Asked if the current dispute was over policy 
differences or simply was an intra-elite struggle for power, 
Atambayev averred that the November 2 protest was not a 
struggle for office.  Atambayev claimed that Bakiyev earlier 
had offered him the post of prime minister, but he had not 
wanted to work for a "government of bandits."  Bakiyev's 
family had embezzled the property stolen by (former 
President) Akayev's family, rather than returning it to the 
state, and Bakiyev's brother Janesh was behind the planting 
of heroin in Tekebayev's luggage in September -- an act which 
the President continued to cover up, according to Atambayev. 
Bakiyev's policies were producing a north-south split in the 
country, as well as heightening ethnic tensions between 
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.  Bakiyev had reneged on his promises of 
reform and was ready "to commit any crime" to stay in power. 
Tekebayev added that law had lost its meaning under Bakiyev. 
Atambayev said that merely changing presidents would not be 
enough; the opposition, therefore, wanted a new constitution 
that would protect from authoritarian rule. 
 
Planning for November 2 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Atambayev said that the opposition had decided to go 
forward with the mass protest on November 2 because no one 
 
BISHKEK 00001517  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
trusted Bakiyev's written or spoken pledges.  The protest was 
a "last chance" for the country that would force Bakiyev 
either to reform or to resign.  If the opposition delayed 
action until the spring, Atambayev feared that the government 
would use the time to put the opposition leaders "behind 
bars, one by one." 
 
¶5. (C) Asked what would happen on November 2, Atambayev 
acknowledged that there could be bloodshed.  He claimed that 
Bakiyev's son, Maxim, had delivered threats to MPs from the 
south, and that Janesh Bakiyev had opened an office in 
Bishkek to direct the MVD and SNB in using force against the 
rally.  Atambayev also predicted, however, that a large 
number of law enforcement personnel would join the protesters 
in demanding that the government resign.  DAS Feigenbaum 
registered his concerns that there be no violence at the 
protest, and that protest and response be conducted legally 
and constitutionally. 
 
¶6. (C) DAS Feigenbaum asked why the opposition expected 
Bakiyev to resign in the face of a protest, and Atambayev 
replied that it was clear that Bakiyev would have to reform 
or resign.  Atambayev said he had spoken to the President's 
Chief of Staff Abdyldayev, and there was still some chance of 
compromise.  Atambayev claimed Bakiyev had said that he would 
agree to constitutional reform, as long as Kulov were not 
Prime Minister, and he added that Kulov hoped for reform 
without Bakiyev as President.  But if Bakiyev refused to 
accede to the opposition's demands, then he would "have" to 
resign, because he had lost support throughout the country. 
Atambayev added that Prime Minister Kulov would also have to 
resign, having "missed his time," unless he took 
"extraordinary steps" within the week. 
 
And Then What? 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Atambayev said that once Bakiyev and Kulov were driven 
from power, the parliament would adopt within a few days a 
new constitution based on the June 2005 draft.  DAS 
Feigenbaum asked whether there was a difference between the 
current impasse and the March 2005 protests that drove an 
elected president from office by extra-constitutional means, 
and Atambayev said that putting Bakiyev in power had been a 
mistake.  Tekebayev said that, unfortunately, they would have 
to violate the constitution a second time to save the 
country, but this time they would not make the mistake of 
waiting to enact reforms.  DAS Feigenbaum said that who runs 
the country and what type of constitution are matters for the 
Kyrgyz to decide, but we were concerned that any process be 
lawful, open, transparent, non-violent, and accepted by the 
Kyrgyz people. 
 
Otunbayeva:  Nothing Has Changed 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In an October 18 meeting, former Ambassador to the 
United States and "For Reforms" supporter Roza Otunbayeva 
told DAS Feigenbaum and the Ambassador that November 2 would 
be the "second part" of Kyrgyzstan's revolution.  The country 
got the "wrong leader" in March 2005, and nothing changed. 
As with Akayev, all of the big industries -- vodka, 
cigarettes, cell phones -- were in Bakiyev's hands or the 
hands of his close associates.  Bakiyev had no interest in 
changing the constitution, she said, because he liked 
"Akayev's mandate."  If certain reforms were undertaken -- 
transferring the SNB, tax, and customs from the President to 
the government; calling back Bakiyev's brothers from 
diplomatic service; finishing the Aksy investigation; and 
properly sending a draft constitution to Parliament -- then 
there would be no need for the November 2 protest.  But there 
was no sign of compromise from the President, just the offer 
of jobs to buy off the opposition's leadership. 
 
BISHKEK 00001517  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Asked why she had decided to support "For Reforms," 
Otunbayeva said she realized that "there was no other way." 
Otunbayeva accused Bakiyev of completely mismanaging the 
government, creating tensions in the law enforcement agencies 
by filling the high jobs with the "southern cadres," and 
provoking religious fundamentalism by addressing "our 
believers" with guns.  Otunbayeva added that there was a 
"poor design" of presidential power, as Bakiyev had poor 
relations with Prime Minister Kulov, State Secretary 
Madumarov, and Chief of Staff Abdyldayev.  In any event, the 
opposition had to act, because the people blamed them for 
bringing Bakiyev to power ("It was Beknazarov's fault," she 
said), and she would use her constitutional right to "go to 
the street and protest."  November 2 would be the "second 
stage" of the revolution. 
 
¶10. (C) DAS Feigenbaum asked how broad was For Reforms' 
following, and Otunbayeva replied that movement included few 
or no ethnic Russians, and she raised concerns that 
southerners might resent the push to remove Bakiyev -- the 
first southerner to lead Kyrgyzstan.  The Ambassador asked 
how long For Reforms was prepared to carry on the protest, 
and Otunbayeva said they were committed to stay, that they 
had bought tents, flashlights, and other supplies, and that 
they were working on the scenario for round-the-clock 
protests.  Otunbayeva said that whether the event would be 
peaceful depended on the government, and there were troubling 
signs:  the head of the state railroad was preparing 
detention facilities, and pro-government employees from the 
electric company were being organized.  Otunbayeva also 
worried that some groups might use the protest to settle 
other scores, such as Chui Oblast residents going against 
"squatters" from the south.  Again, DAS Feigenbaum stressed 
that any protest be lawful, constitutional, and non-violent. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Atambayev, Tekebayev, and Otunbayeva were very clear 
as they detailed their criticisms of President Bakiyev and 
his administration, and as they made the case for urgent 
reforms.  They could not explain as clearly why Bakiyev, 
having been elected last year, would resign in the face of 
the opposition's protests, and they had little idea what they 
would do if he did.  The talk of possible violence was 
disturbing, and we will continue to urge government and 
opposition interlocutors that both sides act with restraint, 
and that any protest action be lawful and non-violent.  END 
COMMENT. 
YOVANOVITCH