VZCZCXRO2094
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHEK #1516/01 3001100
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271100Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8407
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1759
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 1281
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0336
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2168
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1556
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0201

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BISHKEK 001516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KG KNNP PREL
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 25 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING OUTREACH TALKS IN 
BISHKEK 
 
BISHKEK 00001516  001.2 OF 007 
 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY.  On October 25, 2006, the Nuclear Smuggling 
Outreach Delegation met a Kyrgyz Republic delegation 
representing eight agencies and ministries to continue the 
discussions begun in May 2006 on improving the Kyrgyz 
Republic's capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling.  The two 
delegations reached provisional agreement on two documents ) 
a joint understanding of the priority needs to improve the 
Kyrgyz Republic's capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling, 
and a list of possible projects to address those needs.  The 
Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated it would need 
two-to-three months to get final government approval for the 
documents.  Once these documents are approved, the Nuclear 
Smuggling Outreach delegation will begin seeking 
international donors for the projects on the list, and the 
GOKG will begin implementing those steps in the priority 
needs document that it can implement without outside 
assistance. 
 
¶2.  (U) OUTLINE OF MEETING.  The U.S. side began by laying 
out its expectations for the meeting and highlighting some of 
the strengths in the Kyrgyz Republic's capabilities to combat 
nuclear smuggling.  The delegations reviewed the priority 
needs document, made several revisions, and reached 
provisional agreement on the text of this document.  See para 
5 for the provisionally agreed joint document.  The two 
delegations also reached general consensus on the content of 
the projects list.  The U.S. side noted it was not necessary 
to reach agreement on the text of this document as it would 
make the changes discussed during the meeting to the project 
list as it was fleshing it out into 1-page fact sheets for 
use with international donors.  The Kyrgyz Republic 
delegation indicated it would vet the project list throughout 
its relevant agencies and ministries and let the U.S. side 
know if it believed any significant changes were needed.  The 
un-amended version of the project list can be found in para 6 
with the changes to be made noted in para 7.  Full delegation 
lists of both sides can be found in para 8. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS AND REVISIONS TO THE 
PRIORITY NEEDS DOCUMENT.  The Kyrgyz Republic delegation 
concurred with the draft document with a few clarifications 
and revisions: 
 
--The Kyrgyz Republic delegation accepted a U.S. suggestion 
to include a list of the ministries and agencies responsible 
for the area described in each bullet point in the priority 
needs document and agreed to add this information to the 
document during its interagency review process. 
 
--The U.S. side agreed to designate a single point of contact 
at the U.S. Embassy for future correspondence between the 
GOKG and the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach team. 
 
--The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated that the Border 
Guard Service has responsibility for control of the border 
points of entry (POEs) and the green border areas between 
these POEs and has a unified approached to control of both 
areas. 
 
--The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated it was working on 
a law to criminalize nuclear smuggling scams in which a 
smuggler represents non-radioactive material as dangerous 
nuclear or radioactive material.  In response to a 
Kyrgyzstani question on U.S. experience in prosecuting such 
scams, the U.S. side provided excerpts from the U.S. report 
on compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
highlighting some of the legal authorities the U.S. uses to 
prosecute WMD smuggling and promised to provide additional 
information on U.S. authorities for prosecuting hoaxes and 
scams. 
 
--In response to questions the Kyrgyz Republic delegation 
posed in the previous meeting in May, the Department of 
 
BISHKEK 00001516  002.2 OF 007 
 
 
Homeland Security's Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) put 
together a presentation on nuclear smuggling trends and 
common concealment mechanisms, which the U.S. delegation 
passed to the Kyrgyz Republic delegation.  At the request of 
NAP, the U.S. delegation indicated that additional briefings 
may be arranged and asked the Kyrgyz Republic delegation if 
it would be interested in future meetings of nuclear 
smuggling experts to share knowledge on smuggling trends in 
the region.  The Kyrgyz Republic delegation expressed 
appreciation for the presentation and indicated it wanted to 
review the request for follow-up expert exchanges among the 
relevant ministries before replying to the U.S. proposal. 
 
--The Kyrgyz Republic delegation indicated that corruption 
was a significant problem, and argued that the discussion on 
solutions should focus not only on customs officials and 
border guards.  The U.S. side concurred with this approach. 
 
¶4.  (U) NEXT STEPS.  The sides agreed on the following next 
steps: 
 
a.    The U.S. side will incorporate the agreed changes into 
the priority needs document and provide new copies in English 
and Russian. 
 
b.    The GOKG will review the priority needs and projects 
documents and seek to reach final approval of these documents 
in two-to-three months. 
 
c.    The sides will resolve any remaining issues and sign 
the priority needs document. 
 
d.    The U.S. side will flesh out the project list into 
1-page fact sheets for use with international donors, 
incorporating changes suggested during this meeting and after 
the Kyrgyz Republic's interagency review. 
 
e.    Once the priority needs document and the fact sheets 
are finalized, the U.S. side will begin seeking international 
donors for the agreed priority projects, while the Kyrgyz 
Republic side will begin implementing those steps in the 
priority needs document it can do without outside assistance. 
 Both sides will keep each other regularly informed of their 
progress. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Begin Joint Document on Priority Needs as 
Provisionally Agreed: 
 
Joint Document of U.S. and Kyrgyz Republic Delegations on the 
Kyrgyz Republic's Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities 
to Combat Nuclear Smuggling 
October 25, 2006 
 
Delegations of the Governments of the United States of 
America and the Kyrgyz Republic met in Bishkek on October 25, 
2006, to continue their discussions on the capabilities of 
the Kyrgyz Republic to combat the smuggling of nuclear and 
radioactive materials.  As a result of these discussions, the 
delegations reached agreement on the following set of 
priority needs that should be addressed to most effectively 
improve the Kyrgyz Republic's anti-smuggling capabilities. 
 
PREVENTION 
 
Accounting and Control of Radioactive Sources 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Work with the IAEA to complete the registry of radioactive 
sources in accordance with IAEA standards. (Relevant 
Agencies: ) 
--Implement the Action Plan for improving control of 
radioactive sources developed in coordination with the IAEA. 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
BISHKEK 00001516  003.2 OF 007 
 
 
--Work with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to identify 
facilities and locations at a high risk for the presence of 
orphaned radioactive source materials, search these 
facilities, and secure any radioactive sources no longer in 
use. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Sustain physical security improvements at the National 
Radioactive Waste Repository and the National Center of 
Oncology made through the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) 
International Radiological Threat Reduction Program. 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Work with U.S. and other international partners to identify 
any facilities with vulnerable high-activity radioactive 
sources still in use, improve security at any identified 
facilities, and provide training to appropriate staff of 
relevant ministries and agencies, in particular trainers. 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Participate in the IAEA Model Project. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Strengthen the ministries and agencies responsible for 
drafting and enforcing nuclear-related laws and regulations 
by providing additional resources and personnel. (Relevant 
Agencies: ) 
 
DETECTION 
 
Export Control and Border Security 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Work with the U.S. Export Control and Related Border 
Security (EXBS) program to provide additional training for 
export control officials and Customs officers at points of 
entry to effectively implement recent improvements in the 
Kyrgyz Republic's export control laws.  A key focus of the 
provided training will be on the busiest border crossing 
points where EXBS is conducting refurbishing projects and 
providing various inspection and detection equipment. 
Additional training for the Kyrgyz Customs Service will 
include an Export Enforcement Workshop that will build on 
previously delivered training on the enforcement of export 
controls and nonproliferation. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Incorporate WMD detection and interdiction training from 
the EXBS program into the standard training curriculum for 
the Department of Customs Service and the Border Guard. 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Work with the EXBS Advisor and DOE's Second Line of Defense 
(SLD) Kyrgyz Republic Country Manager to prioritize locations 
for additional equipment for detecting illicit trafficking in 
radioactive materials and enforcing border controls. 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Conclude the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
U.S. government regarding the Department of Energy SLD 
program. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Deploy additional radiation detection and basic inspection 
equipment and conduct related training at airports and border 
crossings. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Enhance monitoring of green border areas between 
established points of entry through strengthened patrolling 
and additional technical equipment. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
RESPONSE 
 
Prosecution 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Arrest and prosecute nuclear smugglers to the full extent 
of the law. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Continue efforts to revise the legal code to punish nuclear 
smuggling scams when individuals try to sell non-radioactive 
materials while claiming these are dangerous nuclear or 
radioactive materials. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
BISHKEK 00001516  004.2 OF 007 
 
 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Review sentences for illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
radioactive materials to ensure they are adequate to deter 
such crimes. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Commit to follow the IAEA Model Action Plan for Nuclear 
Forensics contained in the new IAEA Nuclear Forensics Support 
Reference Manual (2006). (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Further develop the Kyrgyz Republic's nuclear forensics 
capabilities through consistent participation in the Nuclear 
Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG). 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
International Cooperation and Information Sharing 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Conduct a mutual exchange of information with the U.S. on 
nuclear smuggling trends and share experience combating such 
smuggling. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Improve reporting to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database 
Program. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Announce smuggling convictions in the press. (Relevant 
Agencies: ) 
--Share aggregate smuggling data with the U.S., including the 
total number of smuggling cases detected, the number of 
arrests, and the number of suspects convicted and jailed. 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
CORRUPTION 
 
Continue Existing Efforts: 
--Implement the October 2005 edict "On Urgent Measures to 
Fight Against Corruption." (Relevant Agencies: ) 
--Investigate and prosecute cases of corruption identified by 
the responsible ministries and agencies. (Relevant Agencies: ) 
 
Additional Efforts Needed: 
--Develop specific plans to combat potential corruption among 
customs officials and border guards, possibly including: 
(Relevant Agencies: ) 
-Incorporation of anti-corruption/integrity awareness 
training into the standard curriculum for all customs 
officials and border guards. 
-Coordination with the SLD Country Manager during 
installation of radiation monitors to identify resources and 
needs for future communications links and sustained training 
to enhance effective response and mitigate opportunities for 
corruption. 
-Increased pay for customs officials and border guards. 
--Develop plans to combat potential corruption among other 
ministries and agencies. 
 
(Signature block) 
 
End Priority Needs Document. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Begin Un-Amended Projects List: 
 
Possible Assistance Projects to Address the Kyrgyz Republic's 
Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear 
Smuggling 
 
PREVENTION 
 
Improving Control and Accounting of Radioactive Materials 
Need: 
The Kyrgyz Republic is currently working with the IAEA to 
develop a registry of radioactive sources and to revise its 
regulatory laws and regulations to improve control of these 
 
BISHKEK 00001516  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
sources.  These efforts have been slowed by limited resources 
and a shortage of trained personnel.  Until these efforts are 
completed, radioactive sources in the Kyrgyz Republic remain 
vulnerable to theft and illicit trafficking. 
 
Possible Project: 
A prospective donor could provide support for temporary 
personnel to help compile the registry of radioactive sources 
and to review current laws and make any needed revisions to 
bring these in line with IAEA standards.  A prospective donor 
should work closely with the IAEA on this project, as the 
IAEA has done several assessment missions and worked with the 
Kyrgyz Republic to develop an Action Plan for improving 
control of radioactive sources.  Outside technical expertise 
would be useful in implementing this Action Plan. 
Additionally, a prospective donor could encourage the Kyrgyz 
Republic to add permanent regulatory personnel by agreeing to 
provide training, computers, and inspection equipment for 
these new personnel. 
 
Improving Physical Security at Sites with Dangerous 
Radioactive Materials 
Need: 
The U.S. Department of Energy identified two facilities in 
the Kyrgyz Republic with high-activity radioactive sources, 
and completed physical security upgrades at these facilities. 
 Because the Kyrgyz Republic lacks a comprehensive registry 
of radioactive sources, additional facilities with 
high-activity radioactive sources may exist, which are 
vulnerable to theft and illicit trafficking. 
 
Possible Project: 
A prospective donor could provide support to conduct 
additional inspections of facilities likely to have 
high-activity radioactive sources.  If these searches 
revealed any facilities with vulnerable radioactive sources 
still in use, a donor could fund physical security upgrades 
at these facilities.  These security upgrades would likely 
include hardened doors and locks, cameras, alarm systems, 
motion sensors, and internal radiation monitors. 
 
DETECTION 
 
Improving Border Security at Points of Entry 
Need: 
The Kyrgyz Republic's international points of entry (POEs) do 
not have adequate radiation detection equipment, and its 
personnel do not have adequate training, to effectively 
detect illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive 
materials.  Some remote outposts lack basic equipment and 
cold weather gear. 
 
Possible Project: 
A prospective donor could provide additional equipment and 
training to equip Customs officials at airports and border 
crossings.  To effectively detect nuclear and radioactive 
materials, a typical border checkpoint should be equipped 
with one or more stationary radiation portal monitors, 
handheld radiation detection equipment for secondary 
inspections, and related communications equipment and 
training.  Portal monitors should be linked to a central 
alarm station to connect border personnel to technical 
experts if needed and to reduce the opportunities for 
corruption.  Some remote outposts need basic inspection tools 
and cold weather gear.  The donor should work with the Kyrgyz 
government, particularly the State Customs Service, and the 
U.S. government to determine specific equipment needs and 
priority sites and ensure compatibility with existing 
equipment.  Donors should also provide training on use and 
maintenance of the equipment and appropriate alarm response 
procedures. 
 
Improving Border Security at Green Borders 
 
BISHKEK 00001516  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
Need: 
Green borders, those areas between established points of 
entry, have little or no security, which presents a 
significant vulnerability that could be exploited by 
smugglers.  The Border Service has responsibility for 
monitoring the border, but suffers from lack of equipment and 
training.  The high elevation, rough terrain, and often harsh 
weather make many of these green border areas difficult to 
adequately patrol.  These vulnerabilities have been exploited 
by drug smugglers and terrorists from the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) in the past.  The borders with Tajikistan 
and China are a particular concern. 
 
Possible Project: 
A donor could provide additional vehicles, communications 
equipment, portable radiation detection equipment, remote 
sensing equipment, and training to help the Border Service 
better patrol these areas to prevent and detect smuggling. 
Snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) are needed in 
areas without adequate roads.  In some areas, horse patrols 
provide a more cost-effective option.  The State Department 
Aviation/Interdiction Project is providing aircraft and 
related support, but more such aircraft are needed.  In areas 
with poor or nonexistent roads, small aircraft patrolling the 
border areas and working with Border Service personnel on the 
ground can dramatically improve awareness of what is crossing 
the borders and force traffic toward established border 
crossings where detection of nuclear smuggling or other 
contraband would be more likely. 
 
RESPONSE 
 
Sponsoring International Cooperation in Nuclear Forensics 
Need: 
The international nuclear forensics and attribution community 
benefits from broad international participation.  The 
International Technical Working Group (ITWG) meets yearly, 
encourages forensic scientists and law enforcement bodies to 
participate, and conducts nuclear forensic exercises using 
actual material.  Kyrgyzstani officials have not previously 
participated in the ITWG.  Such participation would help 
Kyrgyzstani scientists develop relationships with the 
international forensics community and increase their forensic 
and attribution knowledge and capabilities, which is 
particularly useful when examining seized material of unknown 
origin.  Wider participation also increases the international 
knowledge base, which plays a critical factor in attribution 
during forensics testing of seized material.  Participation 
in the ITWG and international exercises can also help 
Kyrgyzstani technical experts develop procedures in line with 
the IAEA Model Action Plan on Nuclear Forensics. 
 
Possible Project: 
If resources are the primary issue regarding 
non-participation, we envision that a donor country or the 
IAEA could sponsor the time and travel for several 
Kyrgyzstani scientists and/or law enforcement personnel to 
participate in ITWG activities for the upcoming year.  This 
would include attendance at the next ITWG annual meeting, 
participation in the annual Exercise, and participation in 
ITWG working groups for one year.  Based on U.S. experience, 
this effort would cost approximately USD50K for one year. 
 
CORRUPTION 
 
Need: 
As in many parts of the world, corruption in the Kyrgyz 
Republic remains a serious problem, which could undermine 
Kyrgyzstani and international efforts to improve capabilities 
to combat nuclear smuggling.  The potential for corruption 
among Customs officials and border guards is a particular 
concern, since bribes could be paid to entice officials to 
overlook smuggling or to enable smugglers to avoid radiation 
 
BISHKEK 00001516  007.2 OF 007 
 
 
detection equipment.  In additional to facilitating 
smuggling, corruption often reduces the revenue collected by 
the Customs officials, which could be used for higher 
salaries for Customs officials or general improvements in 
border security. 
Possible Project: 
Projects to address potential corruption among Customs 
officials and border guards could include incorporation of 
anti-corruption/integrity awareness training into the 
standard curriculum for these agencies, help in developing 
standardized risk analysis models for determining what is 
searched, automatic monitoring technologies, like radiation 
monitors that report alarms to headquarters, and increased 
pay for border security personnel.  It would be particularly 
useful for a donor to help the Kyrgyz Republic integrate 
various anti-corruption efforts and develop a comprehensive 
plan to address corruption among Customs officials and border 
guards. 
 
End Project List. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) REVISIONS TO BE MADE TO THE LIST OF PROJECTS. 
Based on the discussion, the U.S. side indicated it would 
make several revisions to the projects as it fleshed them out 
into 1-page fact sheets for outreach to international donors. 
 These include indicating the possibility that donor support 
could address the personnel shortage in the Krygyz Republic's 
nuclear regulatory agencies, and that border security 
enforcement training at points of entry could be expanded to 
include border guards in addition to Customs officers.  The 
U.S. side also agreed to expand the scope of the corruption 
project to address corruption beyond the Customs service and 
border guards.  The Nuclear Smuggling Outreach team will also 
make a clarification to the border security project at points 
of entry, noting that donors interested in providing portal 
monitors in the Kyrgyz Republic will be encouraged to work 
through the Second Line of Defense Program or provide 
complementary equipment to what DOE is providing, such as 
inspection kits and cold weather gear.  The Kyrgyz Republic 
delegation indicated that it will review the project list as 
part of its interagency approval process, and forward any 
significant changes in the parameters, scope, or number of 
priority projects to the U.S. side for its review. 
 
¶8.    (U) DELEGATION LISTS. 
 
U.S. Delegation: 
Michael Stafford, Head of Delegation, Department of State 
Brent Eastman, Department of State 
Brendan Plapp, Department of State 
Pat Connors, Department of State 
Michelle Habegger, Department of State 
Erin Mark, Department of Energy 
 
Kyrgyz Republic Delegation: 
Dinara Zaripova, Head of Delegation, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Argen Toktogylov, Border Service 
Aibek Dyisheyev, Ministry of Justice 
Zhildiy Dyisheyeva, Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism 
Taalaybek Bektashev, Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism 
Sapar Asanaliev, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Zhanyshbek Toroev, Ministry of Defense 
Dastan Ulanbek, Ministry of Emergency Situations 
Kubanychbek Kulmatov, State Customs Service 
Bakytbek Alisherov, State Customs Service 
 
Interpreters: 
Elena Mikonova 
Jodat Mourataliev 
YOVANOVITCH