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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001506 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ OPPOSITION MOVING AHEAD WITH NOVEMBER 2 
 
REF: A. BISHKEK 1423 
     ¶B. BISHKEK 1333 
     ¶C. BISHKEK 1316 
     ¶D. BISHKEK 796 
     ¶E. BISHKEK 626 
 
BISHKEK 00001506  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Kyrgyz opposition, led by the "For 
Reforms" movement, is moving ahead with plans for a mass 
rally against the government in Bishkek on November 2. 
Opposition leaders say that they will protest in front of the 
Kyrgyz White House for an "indefinite" period, until 
President Bakiyev either accedes to their demands for reform 
or resigns.  Talks between the President and opposition on 
October 21 broke down in a dispute over logistics, though 
opposition leaders tell us there is still a (small) chance 
for compromise at a second effort to hold a meeting October 
¶27.  President Bakiyev will also speak in Parliament on 
October 30 about the current political situation and his 
proposal for constitutional reform.  But a week away from the 
planned rally, the rhetoric remains sharp, and neither side 
appears to be backing down.  Protest organizers have secured 
tents and other supplies, and the law enforcement agencies 
are planning for crowd control. 
 
¶2. (C) In the run-up to similar protests last April (Ref E) 
and May (Ref D), heated rhetoric and the fear of violence 
continued right up to the time of the rallies, both of which 
were brief and ended peacefully.  This time, however, 
organizers claim to be better prepared to continue their 
protest.  We are concerned that events could slip out of 
control if adequate preparations are not made to assure that 
the rally -- and the reaction to it -- remain non-violent. 
Again this time, we are reaching out to all parties -- 
government, opposition, and law enforcement -- to push for 
continued dialogue on needed reform, and to deliver a message 
that any protest should remain lawful and non-violent.  We 
are also coordinating with like-minded embassies in Bishkek 
to deliver a consistent message ahead of November 2.  Post 
will hold an EAC October 30 to assess the security risks. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) A week away from the opposition's planned November 2 
protest, we have been meeting with government officials, 
protest organizers, law enforcement and security officials, 
and other embassies to assess the situation.  We have heard a 
range of views about what may happen on November 2, and a 
range of estimates about how many protesters will show up 
(anywhere from 7000 to 35,000).  In meetings with DAS 
Feigenbaum October 17 and 18, protest organizers Almaz 
Atambayev and MP Omurbek Tekebayev blamed President Bakiyev 
for provoking the current crisis by monopolizing power and 
criminalizing the government, and said they thought the 
government might use force against the rally (septel). 
Ministry of Interior officials have said that they were 
prepared for the rally, but they would not order force 
against the protesters.  Everyone seems to agree that the 
situation is fluid. 
 
Prime Minster Kulov 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Prime Minister Kulov told the Ambassador October 25 
that the current political situation was unpredictable.  The 
Parliament and opposition politicians had been scared into 
action by the matryoshka scandal (Ref C), which they saw as a 
"shot across the bow" by the government, but they but they 
had articulated clear goals.  The real question was power. 
The opposition pushed for constitutional reform; he agreed, 
and that is why he had submitted a draft constitution for 
consideration.  The opposition also had wanted him to 
denounce President Bakiyev, and this he would not do.  He 
characterized For Reforms leaders MP Azimbek Beknazarov as 
 
BISHKEK 00001506  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
"dangerous," Almaz Atambayev as a "revolutionary," and MP 
Melis Eshimkanov as relatively "more sober."  Kulov said he 
told President Bakiyev that the north-south divide was the 
most serious issue facing the country, but the problem could 
be fixed through constitutional reform that limited 
concentration of power. 
 
¶5. (C) Asked whether he thought the demonstration would 
remain peaceful, Kulov said did not exclude the possibility 
of a "provocation," but was hopeful that it could be avoided. 
 While the protesters did not need permission to stage their 
rally, erecting tents and yurts on the main square without 
permission could create problems.  He said he had counseled 
the President and the Mayor of Bishkek not to organize any 
counter demonstrations ("anti-meeting").  He said he also 
warned the opposition that if November 2 led to "anarchy," 
the government might turn to the CSTO for consultations. 
Kulov was hopeful that the appearance of Bakiyev and the 
government at Parliament on October 30 could help defuse the 
situation. 
 
SNB Chairman Sutalinov 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) SNB Chairman Maj. Gen. Murat Sutalinov told the 
Ambassador October 26 said he was taking the November 2 
protest very seriously, and was concerned that there could be 
trouble.  He said that there "definitely" would be no 
permission granted to erect yurts and tents, and if the 
protesters did so, that would be reason for the police to 
move in.  He thought that up to 7000 protesters might show 
up, many of them paid to be there.  He also thought that the 
opposition might not be able to control the masses, and that 
those coming from outside Bishkek might start looting.  He 
was scathing about the opposition leaders ("brigands and 
agitators"), and he added that a "cycle of revolution" would 
not be good for the country.  That said, he pledged that his 
forces would not take "the first mis-step." 
 
Deputy Interior Minister Suvanaliyev 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Deputy Interior Minister Maj. Gen. Omurbek Suvanaliyev 
spoke frankly and was strongly supportive of the 
demonstrators, critical of Bakiyev, and expressed high hopes 
that PM Kulov would emerge as the arbiter of compromise.  He 
told the DCM October 26 that, following the Aksy events of 
2002 (in which six civilian protesters were killed, and 
low-level militia felt they were blamed), the militia would 
"never" fire on the public.  Suvanaliyev claimed there was a 
consensus "at the highest levels" not to use force against 
the demonstrators.  For example, Suvanaliyev said he 
personally will order that the militia not be armed.  Their 
job will be to maintain order and, he added, "to protect the 
protesters."  He downplayed the risk of a provocation by 
third parties, but he was concerned that after three or four 
days on the square, some protesters might try to storm the 
White House over the weekend of November 4-5.  In that event, 
he could not guarantee how the presidential security service 
and National Guard, who will be protecting the White House, 
might react.  He predicted the opposition could easily put 
30,000 people on the streets on November 2. 
 
MP Melis Eshimkanov 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Opposition MP and For Reforms leader Melis Eshimkanov 
told us October 25 that the situation was in deadlock, with 
the opposition and government speaking different languages. 
He said that Bakiyev had failed to fulfill his promises on 
reform, and that he had brought the country to the situation 
in which it was "without law."  The matryoshka scandal (Ref 
C) had exhausted the patience of the opposition, and Bakiyev 
had brushed off their efforts at negotiation.  Eshimkanov 
 
BISHKEK 00001506  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
estimated that 15,000 -- but maybe as many as 35,000 -- would 
turn out on November 2.  For Reforms had raised money to 
provide food and shelter, but people would be coming out of 
principle.  Eshimkanov said that rally would be lawful, and 
they would not storm the White House.  While they were 
prepared to carry on indefinitely, Eshimkanov thought that 
the situation would resolve itself within 2-3 days, as the 
opposition had two trump cards.  First, Prime Minister Kulov 
had promised that he would support the November 2 rally if 
the President did not make serious compromises.  Second, 
Eshimkanov estimated that up to 60 percent of the law 
enforcement, defense, and security personnel were "fed up" 
with the present government.  Eshimkanov said that For 
Reforms was discussing security arrangements with law 
enforcement officials and local business owners, but he 
worried that some "extremists" might take advantage of the 
situation to cause trouble.  Eshimkanov said that the 
opposition also planned to rally at the state television 
studios, demanding airtime to address the nation, and he 
thought that a clash there was possible. 
 
MP Temir Sariyev 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (C) For Reforms leader MP Temir Sariyev told us October 26 
that Bakiyev was not just stalling reforms, he was 
aggressively putting pressure on those who disagreed with 
him, including politicians and the media.  Sariyev urged the 
international community to speak out in favor of 
constitutional reform and media freedom.  Sariyev said that 
Bakiyev's appearance in Parliament on October 30 offered a 
chance to convince him to undertake reforms, but if it turned 
out to be just a "monologue," then the rally would go 
forward.  Sariyev predicted that up to 30,000 from different 
regions, but mainly the north, would turn out on November 2. 
For Reforms planned to ask for television time to convey 
their demands to the nation.  Sariyev said they were 
concerned about possible provocations and planned looting, 
but they were meeting with local business owners and were 
organizing security patrols to help maintain order during the 
rally.  Sariyev said that contrary to rumors being spread by 
the government, For Reforms had no plans to seize the White 
House and it would keep the protest peaceful. 
 
MP Alisher Sabirov 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Independent MP Alisher Sabirov predicted that each 
For Reforms leader would be able to turn out about 1000 
people from his district, for a total crowd of 8-10,000 on 
November 2.  He said the opposition was preparing for a 
drawn-out rally, as it has collected approximately 1000 
sleeping bags and a large number of tents.  He thought that 
people were getting worried about the demonstration (some, 
according to Sabirov, were arming themselves in case the 
demonstration got out of hand), but Sabirov was confident 
that nothing would happen on November 2.  Much like the run 
up to April 29, he believed that both sides would concede to 
some of each other's "demands," and move on from there. 
Unlike last spring, Sabirov thought that the preparations for 
November 2 were disorganized and lack the finances needed to 
"motivate" people to appear on Ala-too Square.  Sabirov said 
the authorities were doing what they could to ease the 
situation, such as trying to meet with opposition leaders. 
Sabirov said that the constant threat of removing the current 
government from power is destabilizing.  He thought that the 
country should focus more upon the economy and social welfare 
of the people. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Although the situation remains fluid in the run-up to 
November 2, it appears likely there will be several thousand 
 
BISHKEK 00001506  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
demonstrators from around the country who will stay through 
the weekend, hoping to at least force concessions on reform 
from Bakiyev.  The Ministry of Interior is not preparing the 
police for a violent confrontation; many in the opposition 
say the police are on their side.  While other security 
organizations more loyal to Bakiyev may be tempted to provoke 
violence, their options are limited in that they lack 
sufficient numbers to deal with large crowds.  Some 
demonstrators may also seek a confrontation, and there exists 
a risk that a small incident could spin out of control and 
lead to violence.  While we judge this risk to be small at 
this time, this is a country where the politics is anything 
but predictable. 
 
YOVANOVITCH