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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1534
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BISHKEK 001450 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA DAS EVAN FEIGENBAUM 
DEPT ALSO FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KPAO KG
SUBJECT: BISHKEK SCENESETTER FOR SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM 
 
REF: A. BISHKEK 1423 
     ¶B. BISHKEK 1333 
     ¶C. BISHKEK 1316 
     ¶D. BISHKEK 1196 
     ¶E. BISHKEK 1195 
 
BISHKEK 00001450  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. SUMMARY:  Your visit offers an opportunity to move our 
democracy and civil society agenda forward.  Following the 
downturn in our relations this summer, and building on A/S 
Boucher's August visit, the Kyrgyz are now indicating they 
may have gone too far, and want to repair relations.  Moving 
ahead, however, will not be easy.  The current domestic 
political atmosphere is confrontational, with government 
reforms seemingly stalled and the opposition threatening to 
take to the streets.  And there are tensions in the south, 
where the government has been quick to use force against 
suspected extremists, and slow to address economic and social 
problems.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Overview:  At a Better Point, but . . . 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Embassy Bishkek warmly welcomes your October 17-21 
visit to Kyrgyzstan.  In early August, we were at a difficult 
point in our relationship with Kyrgyzstan.  After years of 
strong bilateral cooperation, Kyrgyz Government officials 
seemed to have developed a suspicion of the United States and 
our intentions here.  Official news outlets had run stories 
critical of the Embassy and USG programs.  The MFA had 
expelled two Embassy diplomats.  And the security services 
had detained and harassed Embassy local staff.  Much of this 
downturn in the relationship was attributable to false 
information being generated by the Kyrgyz National Security 
Service (SNB) (and, we suspect, being fed to them by the 
Russian Federal Security Service), and Kyrgyz officials -- 
even those who said they wanted a good relationship with the 
United States -- were at a loss to explain how to improve 
things. 
 
¶2. (C) The August 10-11 visit to Bishkek by Assistant 
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher 
 
SIPDIS 
helped to change the tone of the relationship and lay out a 
path forward.  In his meetings with President Bakiyev and 
other senior officials (Refs D and E), A/S Boucher urged the 
Kyrgyz to demonstrate commitment to a better relationship by 
taking the following immediate steps:  provide legal 
authority for the operation of the Embassy's Surveillance 
Detection Team; make clear the GOKG's support for the 
American University in Central Asia (AUCA) and reinstate the 
license for its law faculty; make a public show of support 
for the Coalition Air Base at Manas and for U.S.-Kyrgyz 
cooperation in the war on terrorism with a presidential visit 
to the Base for the September 11 memorial event; and move 
forward quickly with promised democratic reform, including 
specifying the process and timetable for adopting a new 
constitution. 
 
¶3. (C) Two months later, we are at a better point in the 
bilateral relationship.  We have made progress in getting the 
Surveillance Detection Team up and running again; the MOU 
that would regularize its operation is ready to be signed. 
President Bakiyev led a senior Kyrgyz Government delegation 
to the Manas Air Base for the September 11 ceremony and 
publicly re-affirmed Kyrgyzstan's commitment to the war on 
terrorism.  AUCA regained the license for its law faculty, 
although its long-term status remains uncertain.  President 
Bakiyev sent three drafts of a new constitution to the 
Parliament for hearings, although he has not set a clear 
process for adopting a new constitution.  There remain 
difficult bilateral issues, and the current political and 
security environment is uncertain.  But there are signs that 
 
BISHKEK 00001450  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
some in the Kyrgyz leadership realize that they may have gone 
too far last summer in straining the relationship and want 
now to repair the damage. 
 
¶4. (C) Your visit can capitalize on this GOKG reassessment, 
pushing forward on a number of key issues and setting out 
markers for future cooperation.  Among the important issues 
will be: 
 
Stalled Constitutional Reform 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The constitutional reform process has stalled, and 
there has been no clear process established for consideration 
of proposals or adoption of a new constitution.  One of 
President Bakiyev's 2005 campaign promises was that he would 
propose a new constitution, one that limited the authority of 
the executive and included better checks and balances between 
the branches of government.  Since that time, several drafts 
have been prepared.  A Constitutional Council produced a 
draft in June 2005.  Various political leaders, including MP 
Alisher Sabirov and recently Prime Minister Felix Kulov, have 
put forward drafts or suggested amendments.  In August 2006, 
a constitutional working group, appointed by the President 
and headed by opposition MP Azimbek Beknazarov, proposed 
three drafts for a presidential, parliamentary, and mixed 
form of government. 
 
¶6. (C) The three August 2006 drafts were reviewed in 
September by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, and 
while it found important improvements with respect to human 
rights and the independence of the judiciary, it concluded 
that none of the three was satisfactory in terms of balance 
and separation of powers.  President Bakiyev nevertheless has 
sent the three drafts to Parliament for consideration, and 
Parliament is scheduled to hold hearings beginning in early 
November.  Many in the political opposition, however, believe 
that sending the current unsatisfactory drafts to Parliament 
was a stalling tactic, and they have demanded that the 
President send the June 2005 draft to Parliament.  Parliament 
lacks the authority to change drafts submitted by the 
President, and Bakiyev, they say, does not want to go forward 
with any reform process that could end up weakening his 
authority. 
 
The Opposition's Planned Protest 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) After a relatively quiet summer, the political 
opposition seems re-energized.  Spurred on by recent events 
-- the scandal surrounding the planting of drugs on former 
Speaker and opposition MP Omurbek Tekebayev (Ref C); security 
crackdowns against alleged extremists in the south; and 
attacks on the press, including the physical attack on 
independent Piramida TV -- the opposition, led by the "For 
Reforms" movement, is planning to take to the streets in a 
mass demonstration on November 2.  They believe that the 
Bakiyev administration has had enough time to address the 
various demands put forward at rallies last spring, at the 
September 17 Kurultai (Ref B), and most recently in a 
resolution in Parliament, and they say they will demand that 
the tandem of President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Kulov 
resign if the government does not implement real reforms by 
the end of October. 
 
¶8. (C) Leaders of the opposition group "For Reforms," 
including former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev, have told us 
that they plan to negotiate with the government over the next 
month, but it is not clear that they have a strategy -- 
beyond mass demonstration -- that would force out Bakiyev and 
Kulov.  Many in the opposition sincerely believe that the 
current administration is repeating the excesses of the 
Akayev regime and that a change in leadership is warranted, 
 
BISHKEK 00001450  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
but are more cautious about the idea of yet another 
"revolution." 
 
AUCA:  A Short-term Solution 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The American University in Central Asia (AUCA) is a 
private institution in Bishkek that prides itself on its 
American-style curriculum, academic integrity, and quality of 
education.  Many courses are taught in English by Western 
academics, and the student body is drawn from throughout 
Central Asia.  For Kyrgyzstan, this university is a great 
experiment.  As a liberal arts institution, it is not 
designed to fit into the traditional Kyrgyz education model. 
 
¶10. (SBU) After its founding in 1998, AUCA benefited from 
political support from former President Akayev and his 
family.  However, after the March 2005 events, AUCA has found 
itself under increasing pressure.  In April 2006, the 
Ministry of Education declared during a countrywide 
re-evaluation of law and medical faculties that AUCA would be 
forbidden from enrolling new law students and would have its 
law program re-evaluated in a year.  Following strong Embassy 
support and much negotiating by AUCA, the law faculty was 
allowed to enroll its freshman class this fall.  However, as 
a result of this compromise, all AUCA faculties will be 
re-evaluated by the Ministry of Education in April 2007. 
AUCA President Hurwitz will be looking to you for promises of 
continued U.S. political support to the university.  While 
the short-term problem has been solved, and students are 
studying again, the larger issue of general accreditation for 
AUCA can be expected to become extremely contentious in the 
beginning of the coming year. 
 
Manas Air Base 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In August, we were concerned that, despite the 
successful conclusion of a new agreement for the Coalition 
Air Base at Manas, some in the government were trying to 
unravel the agreement or complicate Base operations.  Since 
that time, President Bakiyev led a Kyrgyz Government 
delegation to the September 11 ceremony at the Base, and 
there he publicly re-affirmed his government's commitment to 
the base and to the war on terrorism.  We have also seen 
excellent cooperation from the Ministry of Transport and from 
the airport authorities in the investigation of the causes of 
the collision of a U.S. fuel tanker with a Kyrgyz airliner. 
While negotiations last summer were often difficult, we 
believe that the agreement reached was fair to both sides, 
and the first payment under the new agreement of USD 4.35 
million will be made October 18 -- a move which will please 
the Kyrgyz.  The October 11 Federal Register Notice that the 
U.S. is allocating USD 2.05 million for helicopters for 
Kyrgyzstan received wide coverage.  While opposition to the 
Base has not disappeared, we believe that the Base is now on 
sounder footing with the government. 
 
MCA Threshold:  Eagerly Anticipated 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Kyrgyz officials, from President Bakiyev on down, are 
anxious for approval of Kyrgyzstan's Millennium Challenge 
Account Threshold Country Plan.  The Kyrgyz proposal's three 
components would target the effectiveness of the judicial 
system, corruption in the law enforcement agencies, and more 
effective criminal prosecutions.  While we expect the MCC 
Board to consider Kyrgyzstan's Plan in November, we remain 
concerned about the government's commitment to make needed 
reforms.  Kyrgyzstan can help generate a positive Board 
decision by taking concrete steps to demonstrate the will to 
fight corruption and improve the rule of law. 
 
 
BISHKEK 00001450  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
The South:  Potential Hot Spot 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Kyrgyz Government officials and other observers are 
concerned about the situation in the south.  Widespread 
poverty, ethnic rivalries, religious extremism, drug 
trafficking, armed incursions last spring, and a heavy-handed 
crackdown by the security services against perceived 
extremists have all contributed to tensions in the region. 
Government officials in the south say that the situation is 
under control at present, but they believe that resolving the 
region's many tensions will depend on continued economic 
development.  To date, the government has been quick to use 
force against suspected extremists, but has not put forward 
any long-term strategy to address social and economic issues. 
 
HIPC:  Unpopular and Misunderstood 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPC) would, in our assessment, result in a 
significant reduction of Kyrgyzstan's foreign debt burden, 
lowering average annual debt service payments by USD 20 
million according to the World Bank.  Despite these obvious 
benefits, many oppose participation, with the critics saying 
that they do not want Kyrgyzstan to be seen as an "African 
country," unable to pay its debts.  Foreign Minister 
Jekshenkulov continues publicly to oppose Kyrgyzstan's 
participation in the initiative, and the For Reforms movement 
came out strongly against HIPC at an October 12 forum. 
However, President Bakiyev has said that he would support 
Kyrgyzstan joining HIPC, as long as the terms were 
acceptable.  We understand that Bakiyev does not want to 
include energy, hydro, or mining within the conditionalities 
of a HIPC agreement, but such an exemption would be a 
non-starter for the IMF and World Bank. 
 
Suggested Points to Make 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (C) In your meetings with government, political, civil 
society representatives, and press in Bishkek and in Osh, you 
may wish to draw on the following points: 
 
--We are grateful for President Bakiyev's, and the 
government's, renewed commitment to Coalition Air Base at 
Manas and to the war on terrorism.  The first payment under 
the new agreement will be made shortly. 
 
--We urge that all parties work constructively on 
constitutional reform.  We urge that any new constitution 
provide for protection of human rights, the independence of 
the judiciary, and a separation and balance of powers between 
the president, prime minister, and parliament. 
 
--We urge the government and the political opposition to take 
constructive steps to implement needed reforms and 
anti-corruption measures.  Ultimatums and confrontation are 
not helpful to implement real reforms. 
 
--AUCA represents a great experiment that enhances 
Kyrgyzstan's reputation in education.  As a liberal arts 
institution, however, AUCA is not designed to fit into the 
traditional Kyrgyz education model.  We are concerned by 
those who are questioning AUCA, and we would look to the 
Kyrgyz Government -- including the Ministry of Education -- 
to support AUCA's status as a liberal arts university. 
 
--In our view, the HIPC Initiative would bring substantial 
benefits to Kyrgyzstan in terms of a reduced debt burden, 
allowing for increased spending on anti-poverty measures. 
While we are willing to assist in getting Kyrgyzstan into the 
program, it is ultimately Kyrgyzstan's decision whether or 
 
BISHKEK 00001450  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
not to join. 
 
--We are committed to supporting programs to improve the 
effectiveness of the judicial system, fighting corruption in 
the law enforcement agencies, and making more effective 
criminal prosecutions.  We expect a decision to be made on 
the Threshold Country Plan in early November, but Millennium 
Challenge Account financing is tied to the political will to 
improve governance.  The Kyrgyz Government can help generate 
a positive decision by taking steps now to fight corruption 
and support rule of law. 
 
--We are concerned by the security situation in the south of 
Kyrgyzstan.  We have provided substantial support to the 
Ministry of Defense, the Border Guards, and the Drug Control 
Agency.  However, addressing the social and economic needs of 
the people is also essential.  What initiatives is the 
government taking to address these issues? 
 
Conclusion 
---------- 
 
¶16. (C) The Kyrgyz appear to want to improve the bilateral 
relationship.  With the opposition threatening to take to the 
streets, and with the administration often paralyzed by its 
own mistakes, it is difficult for the government to move 
ahead on reforms in the current climate.  Your visit can help 
focus the government and opposition on the need to find a way 
to move forward, while reassuring those who doubt U.S. 
intentions that our interests lie in helping Kyrgyzstan 
develop a strong, independent, and stable society. 
LITZENBERGER