VZCZCXRO6184
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #3164/01 2750714
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020714Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5854
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0379

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2026 
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM MOPS PGOV LE UK FR
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR COORDINATION:  PROCEEDING WITH 
INFORMAL CHANNELS 
 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S)  Summary:  Prime Minister Siniora, Deputy Prime and 
Defense Minister Murr, and French Ambassador Emie all agree: 
despite rumors to the contrary, Emie was not the cause of 
Siniora's rejection of a UK-led security sector reform and 
coordination unit in his office.  The three argue that the UK 
had unrealistic expectations as to what Siniora, under 
constant attack for allegedly handing away Lebanon's 
sovereignty, could accept.  While the PM was too polite to 
say no, he insists he never accepted the UK offer.  Siniora 
is equally determined to reject any EU coordination unit on 
security issues, and Emie reported that an upcoming ESDP team 
will strive only to improve coordination among EU member 
states on security cooperation.  In the place of the 
coordination unit, three informal channels on security sector 
coordination and reform are emerging.  First, the US, UK, and 
select other missions (but, notably, not France) are already 
meeting discreetly to compare notes, coordinate, and work on 
deconfliction, on both police and army issues.  Second, Murr 
told us that he will play an increasingly active gatekeeper 
and coordinator role, in support in particular of maintaining 
a predominately U.S.-origin equipment foundation base for the 
LAF.  Third, Emie agreed with our proposal that the US and 
French embassies meet quietly but regularly on security 
sector reform and coordination.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (S)  The Ambassador met with Emie on 9/28 to ask about 
his objections to the security sector reform and coordination 
unit proposed by UK General Andrew Mackay.  Expressing 
exasparation that he was being unfairly blamed, Emie denied 
that he was behind the death of the idea.  While Mackay's 
proposal looked sensible, Emie said, it was "completely 
unrealistic."  Can you imagine what the pro-Syrians would do, 
Emie asked, if there were foreign military advisors in the 
Grand Serail (seat of the premier)?  Already under attack for 
allegedly handing away Lebanon's sovereignty to western 
imperialists, Siniora could not afford such a unit 
politically.  Siniora has faced repeated charges that he 
fails to protect Lebanese sovereignty, and the Mackay mission 
would have added fuel to the fire. 
 
¶3.  (S)  Siniora, meeting with the Ambassador on 9/21 (with 
other topics covered septel), agreed that Emie had nothing to 
do with his rejection of an idea that the PM described as not 
feasible politically.  The Ambassador noted that the British 
had the impression after Tony Blair's visit that Siniora was 
comfortable with the approach, which would have maintained a 
Lebanese lead at all times.  Thus we found it curious that, 
subsequently, Siniora cooled to the idea.  The PM said that 
we, and the British, took politeness for acquiescence.  "Who 
can say no to Tony Blair's face?" Siniora said.  Asked about 
the upcoming European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
team, Siniora said that, if the team asked to help with a 
unit in thie Grand Serail, he would more explicitly say no. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Emie told the Ambassador that the ESDP team was 
never intended to replace the Mackay mission, as the U.S and 
UK have suspected.  The ESDP team will not propose assisting 
in establishing and staffing a GOL security sector reform and 
coordination unit.  Instead, the ESDP team will look at how 
to improve intra-EU security policy.  There is very little 
communication and coordination and much duplication between 
EU states in this area, Emie said, so the ESDP team will 
propose solutions.  The ESDP team will also look at where to 
put any EU funds toward security sector reform.  The ESDP 
team will definitely want to meet with the Americans, he said. 
 
¶5.  (S)  The Ambassador responded to Emie that, even if 
Siniora couldn't accept a coordination unit with foreign 
advisors for political reasons, the problem of coordination 
and setting priorities remains.  Emie agreed.  He proposed 
that our two embassies start sharing more information and 
ideas.  The Ambassador noted that such coordination would be 
welcome.  In fact, the Ambassador noted, we already have such 
relations with the UK Embassy, and the lack of the same 
relationship with the French had more to do with French 
attitudes than American attitudes.  Emie concurred on the 
need for "openness and transparency."  Joint U.S.-French 
understandings will help persuade the Lebanese to move in 
certain directions, he said.  But he emphasized that he 
opposed any kind of formal mechanism, even among donors 
without GOL involvement, for the unwelcome attention it would 
get locally.  "And don't forget," Emie said, "we now have 
2,000 troops on the ground."  Repeating his worries about the 
appearance of westerners dictating Lebanon's security policy, 
 
BEIRUT 00003164  002 OF 002 
 
 
Emie said that he did not want to give any pretext for 
attacks on the French UNIFIL contingent. 
 
¶6.  (S)  In a 9/29 meeting with the Ambassador, Defense 
Minister Murr shared Emie and Siniora's analysis, that it 
would be "political suicide" for Siniora to invite Mackay or 
the ESDP team to establish a unit in the Grand Serail.  Murr 
also said that he would not accept such a unit in the 
Ministry of Defense.  However, he would be happy to work with 
donors individually or collectively, as long the mechanism is 
discreet and informal, on coordination and reform.  In fact, 
Murr said, he will work to play a bigger gatekeeper and 
coordination role himself.  While he trusts his generals 
working with U.S. military experts from ODC and visitors from 
CENTCOM to make the right decisions, he knows that there must 
be some discipline regarding what is requested or accepted 
from others.  Murr said that his interest was maintaining the 
U.S.-origin foundation of the LAF, and he would not accept 
non-complementary donations of equipment from the French and 
others. 
 
¶7. (S)  Comment:  We suspect that there may be more to the 
dismissal of the Mackay proposals than what Siniora, Emie, 
and Murr told us.  But, nevertheless, with increased 
polarization of political rhetoric in Lebanon over the past 
two weeks, we agree that it is now politically unfeasible to 
proceed with an idea that looked so sensible only a month 
ago.  Such a unit would essentially give a political gift to 
those pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians, Hizballah, and General 
Aoun to increase their attacks on Siniora.  But the lack of a 
centralized security sector reform and coordination unit 
leaves those of us on the ground with an enormous gap to 
fill.  In fact, the U.S., UK, Germany, Canada, and others are 
already meeting informally to compare notes and coordinate 
our approaches on security sector assistance and reform, both 
to the police and the LAF.  The French are not part of this 
but could be brought in later.  We will also test the 
seriousness of Emie's offer to coordinate bilaterally.  As 
for Murr, we believe that he will best be brought in if and 
when we need a trouble-shooter.  In addition, our access to 
him is easy and good, so we will be able to help script him 
for a Gulf fundraising tour he plans for the post-Ramadan 
period.  End comment. 
FELTMAN