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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 003162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2026 
TAGS: PREL KCRM PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: CHANGING GOL VIEW ON CHRONOLOGY FOR INTRODUCTING 
HARIRI TRIBUNAL 
 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  In separate one-on-one meetings with the 
Ambassador on 9/30, Prime Minister Siniora and Minister of 
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh both acknowledged that 
their positions, and those of March 14 politicians more 
generally, have evolved on when to engage Lebanon's cabinet 
on trying to approve draft statute for the special tribunal 
to try suspects in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. 
Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, speaking to the Ambassador 
by phone on 9/30, also acknowledged the shift in chronology, 
although he questioned whether it would work. 
 
¶2.  (C/NF)  Under the previous scenario, Siniora planned to 
put the draft statute that would create the tribunal on the 
cabinet agenda only after UNSC members had, through informal 
consultations with UN/OLA chief Nicolas Michel (the primary 
UN negotiator of the statute), expressed satisfaction with 
the text.  This way, the cabinet would work with a text that 
the UNSC members considered final, after Michel took the UNSC 
comments into account.  According to the previous scenario, 
that UNSC blessing, even if not in the form of a resolution 
(which we understand is not required), would help March 14 
cabinet ministers win cabinet and then parliament approval. 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  Now, however, Siniora and Hamadeh fear that, by 
early or mid-November, the March 14-dominated cabinet might 
be in a full-fledged battle for survival, as Hizballah and 
Aoun forces work to topple or expand the cabinet in favor of 
a national unity government, precisely in order to block 
approval of the tribunal.  It will be relatively harder at 
that point to pass the statute in the cabinet, they 
calculate.  Instead, the March 14 politicians want cabinet 
approval "in principle" now, even ahead of the UNSC 
consultations on the text.  Then, with the approval "in 
principle" in their pockets, and with the National Dialogue 
on March having already given its blessing to the tribunal, 
Siniora and Hamadeh calculate that it will be (in Hamadeh's 
words) "next to impossible" for the cabinet to refuse to give 
a final approval after the UNSC consultative process, even if 
there are changes in the text.  Moreover, Hamadeh notes, such 
a chronology "keeps the tribunal in the headlines" for a 
longer period of time, which is useful in order to keep Syria 
slightly off balance.  (Parliamentary ratification is 
considered -- we hope rightly -- to be less of a problem, if 
the cabinet approves the statute and sends it to the chamber 
with a recommendation for its adoption into law.) 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  The exact timing of the cabinet approval "in 
principle" is up in the air.  Rizk, Siniora, and UN envoy 
Geir Pedersen (also speaking by phone) all told the 
Ambassador that Michel needs at least another week before he 
can provide the current text to the Lebanese.  Hamadeh, 
citing "UN sources" (presumably Terje Roed-Larsen or his aide 
Fabrice Aidan), insists that Lebanon will have the new 
version of the text as early as Monday, 10/2.  If so, the 
cabinet debate could occur as early as the regular session on 
Thursday.  (Constitutionally, cabinet agendas must be drawn 
up 48 hours in advance.  Anything needing shorter notice 
requires the approval of the President to be place on the 
agenda.) 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  Comment:  This is an interesting switch in 
tactics and reveals the worry the March 14 crowd has 
regarding how far Aoun and Hizballah will go in November in 
changing the cabinet.  But the chronology for approving the 
draft statute has always has been a chicken-or-egg issue. 
Whichever side approves the draft statute first -- UNSC 
membership or Lebanon's cabinet -- might face having to look 
at the text again, if the other side makes changes (as is 
likely, even if just of a dog-and-fire-hydrant type).  The 
Hamadeh-Siniora approach of having the cabinet approve the 
text "in principle," if it works, has the advantage of 
keeping potentially recalcitrant members of the UNSC on 
board:  if Lebanon's cabinet accepts the draft in principle, 
then UNSC members might be less inclined to oppose it.  We 
doubt, however, that this is the last word on tactics for 
moving the draft statute forward.  End comment. 
FELTMAN