VZCZCXRO3155
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1220/01 2801122
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071122Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9064
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2952
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1066
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0658
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 021220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, IO, ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL MNUC CH KN KS JA RU
SUBJECT: DPRK NUCLEAR TEST THREAT: VIEWS OF CHINESE 
ACADEMIC AND MEDIA OBSERVERS 
 
REF: BEIJING 20988 
 
Classified By: 
Classified by Political Minister Counselor Daniel 
Shields.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S) Chinese academic and media observers are 
concerned about North Korea's threat to conduct a 
nuclear test and generally believe the DPRK will 
actually carry out its threat to test at some point. 
Some observers expressed skepticism that a test would 
come soon.  The official China Daily ran on October 7 
an AP report quoting Li Dunqiu of China's State 
Council Development Research Center as commenting that 
a North Korean nuclear test is ""unavoidable"" unless 
the United States eases tensions by removing 
""sanctions.""  Embassy contacts told us China is angry 
and frustrated with the DPRK, but ""unable"" to renounce 
its traditional friendly ties to the North.  Contacts 
who were willing to discuss possible Chinese reactions 
to a North Korean test said that China would work more 
closely with the United States in the aftermath of any 
such test.  One contact predicted tht China would not 
veto a post-test resolution calling for sanctions 
against the DPRK, but would abstain.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) Official Chinese media coverage of the DPRK's 
October 3 statement threatening a nuclear test focused 
on Beijing's efforts to urge restraint by Pyongyang, 
although at least two prominent Chinese DPRK scholars 
have been quoted as stating that the DPRK will 
actually implement at some point its decision to carry 
out a nuclear test.  Beijing's official English- 
language newspaper China Daily carried an AP article 
on October 7 quoting State Council Development 
Research Center scholar Li Dunqiu as stating that, 
""North Korea has already made a decision to carry out 
a test ... but if the United States removes 
sanctions...then tensions can be eased.  Otherwise 
launching a nuclear test is unavoidable for North 
Korea.""  Shanghai's Oriental Morning Post quoted 
Central Party School DPRK expert Zhang Liangui on 
October 4 as indicating that ""since the DPRK has made 
development of nuclear weapons its policy, a nuclear 
test is certain to happen and it is only a matter of 
time.""  Comment: Embassy contacts indicate that strict 
guidance has been issued to Chinese media outlets (see 
below) prohibiting reporting on the DPRK issue outside 
of official Xinhua agency releases.  Publication of 
comments by authoritative scholars outside of the 
Xinhua rubric is therefore significant.  End Comment. 
 
¶3.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(strictly protect) told poloff on October 7 that he 
believes it unlikely that the DPRK will conduct a 
nuclear test soon.  He acknowledged that he had heard 
speculation about a test being conducted on either 
October 8 or October 10, but said he thinks the North 
Korean statement of October 3 suggests that the test 
will not be conducted in the near future.  Kim Jong-Il 
might now wait to see whether the statement itself 
would bring any result before moving to a test, he 
said. 
 
¶4.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect) said he XXXXXXXXXXXX was not up to 
speed on the DPRK situation as of October 7.  He cited 
U.S. researcher Selig Harrison's statement at a 
September 28 lecture in Washington that the DPRK is 
looking for a ""package deal"" and commented that the 
DPRK is ""posturing.""  He said he would be attending 
official meetings on the issue in the next few days. 
 
¶5.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(strictly protect), just returned from XXXXXXXXXXXX 
said China is very concerned about 
a possible DPRK nuclear test and argued that the 
ramifications of a test are even worse for China than 
for the United States.  China is caught in a terrible 
bind, he said, unable to renounce its traditional 
friendly relations with North Korea and unable to 
influence the DPRK's actions. 
 
Focus on Abe 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect) 
told poloff on October 7 that the biggest event in the 
next few days, despite the DPRK's statement and the 
opening of the Party's 6th Plenum on October 8, would 
be the visit to China of Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe on October 8-9.  Many of XXXXXXXXXXXX's colleagues 
and friends in media and official circles regard the 
announcement of Abe's visit as quite sudden, but all 
see the visit as positive.  China will be Abe's first 
overseas visit as Premier, even before a visit to 
Washington, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed, and Beijing sees this as 
highly significant.  China's top leaders are well- 
disposed to Japan, regard the relationship as crucial 
to China's development and have been looking for a way 
to get around the history impasse and move forward, he 
said. 
 
¶7.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the Abe trip was put together 
before the DPRK's announced its intent to conduct a 
nuclear test and is not connected to the situation in 
the DPRK.  He said, however, that Chinese leaders and 
Abe would discuss the DPRK during their talks, 
particularly in light of the DPRK statement.  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
said that they would also discuss Iran, as both China 
and Japan have major economic interests in Iran. 
 
Test Will Push China to Cooperate 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) On the issue of potential reaction in China to 
a DPRK nuclear test, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had heard discussion 
that there could be a test on October 8.  In the event 
of a test, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he expects that China would move 
to cooperate more closely with the United States in 
the UN Security Council with regard to the DPRK issue. 
While he predicted that China would not cast a vote in 
support of sanctions against the DPRK, he judged that 
China would abstain.  This would be a ""major shift,"" 
XXXXXXXXXXXX stated.  Previously, China would certainly have 
vetoed any DPRK sanctions resolution, he stated. 
 
¶9.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed some frustration that China 
continues to feel obliged to support the DPRK out of 
""traditional ideological ties"" when China's interests 
""clearly dictate"" that it should be tougher on the 
DPRK than on Iran, for example.  ""The DPRK is a rogue 
state and everyone knows it,"" XXXXXXXXXXXX said.  ""But China 
is unable to renounce its special relationship with 
the DPRK."" 
 
¶10.  (S) Any North Korean nuclear test will prompt the 
Chinese government to work more closely with the 
United States on North Korea issues both bilaterally 
and at the United Nations, predicted XXXXXXXXXXXX.  XXXXXXXXXXXX  He 
related that in meetings, DPRK officials were ""almost 
impossible to communicate with.""  He was surprised, he 
recalled, at how much they complained about hina. 
China's vote in favor of UN Security Concil 
Resolution 1695, which condemned the Norh Korean 
missile launches on July 4-5, caused particular 
consternation, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. 
 
Media Restrictions Issued 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) The Propaganda Department has issued strict 
guidelines ordering all media outlets to publish only 
state-run Xinhua News Service wire copy, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX added that frustration reigns among scholars and 
think-tankers he has spoken with about the North Korea 
situation.  The July 4-5 missile launches and the 
October 3 announcement both came as surprises and gave 
""hard lessons"" to Chinese foreign policy 
practitioners, he said.  XXXXXXXXXXXX related that there is 
considerable official anger at the DPRK for 
undermining the Six-Party Talks process, on which 
China has staked its reputation.  In fact, XXXXXXXXXXXX said 
leading foreign policy scholars plan to hold an urgent 
meeting this week in Shanghai to discuss 
recommendations for China's leadership on how to 
handle the North Korea nuclear issue.  ""There is a 
feeling that we are at a crossroads,"" he said. 
 
Chinese Public Opinion Shifting on North Korea 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told poloff October 7 that 
support for North Korea as the country ""most friendly"" 
to China has slipped to 32 percent from over 50 
percent five years ago.  (Note: North Korea was 
nevertheless the number two friendliest country in 
2006 polls, following Russia.)  XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that 
most Chinese do not think much about North Korea, so 
polling results should be viewed cautiously.  However, 
he noted that 30 percent of those polled in 2006 said 
they viewed the DPRK as a threat to China and XXXXXXXXXXXX 
predicted that, if the DPRK conducts a nuclear test, 
this number would increase. 
 
¶13.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he has been monitoring 
Internet chat rooms and he has been struck by Chinese 
netizens' cool reaction to North Korea's test plans. 
A primary concern in Internet forums is where the test 
might take place, with many worrying that the site 
will be close to Chinese territory.  Although there is 
a strong emotional bond still exists between the two 
countries because of the Korean War, public sympathy 
toward North Korea is deteriorating.  ""People are all 
very disappointed,"" XXXXXXXXXXXX observed. 
SEDNEY