VZCZCXRO4853
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #1244/01 3040820
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 310820Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6371
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0295
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001244 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PGOV ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG AND GOM OFFICIALS PROVIDE DETAILS ON GSPC 
ATTACK AND ACCORDS 
 
REF: BAMAKO 1112 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(S)  Summary:  On October 26 Acherif ag Mohammed, a 
presidential advisor on Tuareg affairs, provided the Embassy 
with further details regarding the October 23 battle between 
the Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) and the GSPC. 
Acherif remains in close contact via telephone with ADC 
leaders Iyad ag Ghali, Ahmada ag Bibi and others.  Acherif 
described the October 23 battle that left at least 7 ADC 
fighters dead as an "accident" with "extremely worrisome" 
consequences.  Also on October 26, a key official within the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration who is also reportedly 
close to President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) candidly told 
the Embassy that the GSPC's recent vow to eliminate the ADC's 
leadership worked to the GOM's advantage, stating that "the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend."  While this latter view 
reflects widespread anger in southern Mali toward the Tuareg 
rebels, it does not have great currency within the senior 
Malian leadeship.  Minister of Territorial Administraion Kone 
told the Ambassador recently that the GSPC must be eliminated 
from northern Mali by the Malian army, and President Toure 
has said that the GSPC is a problem that must be addressed by 
security forces from the sub-region.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
An "Accident" with Serious Consequences 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.(S)  Acherif ag Mohammed, presidential advisor and 
confidant of Tuareg rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali, described the 
October 23 battle between the ADC and GSPC as an "accident." 
According to Acherif, the ADC patrol that has tracked the 
GSPC since the first skirmish on September 19 was "looking 
but not looking" for the GSPC.  In other words, ag Ghali had 
ordered the patrol to follow the GSPC but avoid contact.  The 
patrol was also apparently instructed not to travel beyond 
the zone of Kidal and into region of Timbuktu which is 
controlled by Arab/Berabich smugglers.  On the morning of 
October 23, however, the ADC patrol unexpectedly came across 
recent GSPC tire tracks leading into the Timbuktu zone. 
After a brief argument, two vehicles comprised of, in Acherif 
words, "undisciplined" ADC elements, sped off into the region 
of Timbuktu in search of the GSPC.  A few minutes later the 
two ADC vehicles crested a ridge and unexpectedly drove into 
the GSPC camp, with disastrous results.  Hearing the gun-fire 
and possible RPG explosions, the rest of the ADC contingent 
quickly traversed the Kidal-Timbuktu frontier to support the 
two vehicles already engaged.  ADC fighters reported that the 
GSPC had 8 to 10 vehicles.  It appears that the ADC has 
recovered the body of at least one of the two Tuaregs taken 
prisoner by the GSPC during the fight. 
 
3.(S)  By entering the Berabich controlled zone of Timbuktu 
to engage and pursue the GSPC, the ADC violated what appears 
to have been a long-standing informal understanding between 
Tuareg and Berabich groups to steer clear of each other's 
territory.  Acherif said that he could not predict the 
Berabich response to this incursion.  Echoing the statement 
posted to the ADC's web site following the October 23 attack, 
Acherif said some Berabich living in and around the town of 
Timbuktu were known GSPC supporters.  When asked if he found 
the apparent widening of the conflict in the north worrisome, 
Acherif said it was "more than a little worrisome. It is 
extremely worrisome." 
 
4.(S)  Acherif reported that ATT dispatched the president of 
the Algiers Accords oversight committee, Mamadou Diagouraga, 
and the Governor of Kidal to meet with Iyad ag Ghali nearly 
three weeks ago.  Ag Ghali told the delegation that until the 
Algiers Accords were implemented, he had no interest in 
talking with ATT.  Acherif also reported that there were many 
rumors regarding the "presence of American forces in 
Taoudenni," (sic) in the northernmost portion of the region 
of Timbuktu.  He said that many in northern Mali believed 
that the ADC was receiving aid from the U.S. in addition to 
the military hardware provided by Algeria.  (Note:  Although 
a JCET exercise is ongoing in Mali, there are no U.S. forces 
north of Timbuktu.  A planned Defense Attache visit to 
Taoudenni via U.S. military aircraft in late September was 
canceled at the request of Malian military leadership in 
Timbuktu, on grounds of insufficient time to implement 
appropriate security.  End note.) 
 
----------- 
Role of GOM 
----------- 
 
BAMAKO 00001244  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5.(S)  The GOM has neither taken an official position on the 
ADC-GSPC fighting in the north, nor publicly commented on 
Algeria's role in supporting the ADC, apparently undercutting 
the portion of the Algiers Accords requiring the rebels to 
turn back their arms to the GOM.  On October 26 a key 
official and ATT confidant in the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration (which is charged, under the leadership of 
Minister Kafougouna Kone, with implementing the Algiers 
Accords) told the Embassy that hostilities between the GSPC 
and the ADC worked to the GOM's advantage.  The GSPC, said 
the official, vowed to eliminate all of the ADC's leadership. 
 "The enemy of my enemy is my friend," said the individual, 
and he did not respond further when asked if this meant the 
GOM was favoring the GSPC. While this latter view reflects 
widespread anger in southern Mali toward the Tuareg rebels, 
it does not have great currency within the senior Malian 
leadeship.  Minister of Territorial Administraion Kone told 
the Ambassador recently that the GSPC must be eliminated from 
northern Mali by the Malian army, and President Toure has 
said that the GSPC is a problem that must be addressed by 
security forces from the sub-region. 
 
--------------------------- 
Comment: Saving the Accords 
--------------------------- 
 
6.(S)  The heavy losses suffered by the ADC on October 23, 
their incursion into what was previously regarded as Berabich 
territory, and vows of revenge by the GSPC have significantly 
weakened the Algiers Accords implementation process, and the 
cantonment of the rebels set for October 28 did not take 
place as planned.  The hostilities between the ADC and GSPC, 
and Algeria's role in supporting the ADC, have likely 
rendered the Accords' provision regarding rebel disarmament 
problematic.  The comment by the Territorial Administration 
Official crediting the GSPC's actions against the ADC as a 
helpful contribution to Mali's Tuareg rebel problem is 
jarring.  It also contrasts sharply with Minister Kone's 
recent remarks to the Ambassador (reftel) that Mali is 
impatient with Algeria's choice of the ADC vice the Malian 
military in fighting the GSPC.  The dichotomy of views 
between two Presidential insiders gives insight into the torn 
sentiments at senior GOM levels, based in lingering mistrust 
of the Tuaregs, and frustration over GOM ability to control 
its territory.  Whether the GOM is secretly content to let 
the ADC keep arms to weaken the GSPC, or the ADC is 
emboldened by Algerian support to refrain from disarming, 
neither tendency is promising for the disarmament piece of 
the Algiers Accords.  The deteriorating security situation 
also makes the repositioning of Malian military forces around 
and within Kidal increasingly unlikely.  For Acherif, the 
only way to save the accords is to skip the provisions on 
disarmament and military repositioning and proceed directly 
to the creation of "all-nomad" military units.  Were the GOM 
able to grandfather the ADC into the military as 
"specialized" units, it would convert the ADC from an 
Algerian proxy force into an arm of the Malian military. 
Such a course would reassure a variety of GOM concerns in the 
north. 
McCulley