VZCZCXRO0586
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #1154/01 2891650
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161650Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6252
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001154 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PARM ML
SUBJECT: EXCLUDED FROM ELECTORAL COMMISSION, IBK'S 
POLITICAL ISOLATION DEEPENS 
 
REF: BAMAKO 001031 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(C)  Summary:  With the 2007 presidential elections now 
less than six months away, President Amadou Toumani Toure's 
(ATT) allies in the National Assembly and the National 
Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) have maneuvered to 
further isolate National Assembly leader and presumed 
presidential challenger Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK).  On 
October 5 a broad coalition of political parties entitled 
"Friends of ATT" ignored IBK's plea to avoid the "demons of 
division" and excluded IBK's Rally for Mali (RPM) for the 
second year in a row from the National Assembly's 18 rotating 
leadership positions, leaving IBK with just the Presidency of 
the National Assembly - a five year position that was not up 
for renewal.  This followed the RPM's September 27 exclusion 
from the CENI due to a dispute with two parties, the Movement 
for Renewal (MPR) and the National Committee for Democratic 
Initiatives (CNID), formerly allied with IBK but now 
supporting ATT.  Although the RPM has attributed the setbacks 
in the Assembly and the CENI to illegal actions by ATT and 
his allies, IBK appears to be more a victim of shrewd 
politics and his own inability to forge political alliances. 
End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
National Assembly Moves to Further Isolate IBK 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2.(U)  During an unexpectedly conciliatory speech to open the 
new National Assembly session on October 2, National Assembly 
President IBK urged his fellow Deputies to overcome the 
"demons of division" and elect new Assembly officers based on 
consensus rather than partisan politics.  In October 2005 the 
RPM refused to accept two officer posts in place of the four 
it had demanded, thereby ending up with no positions in last 
year's Assembly executive office.  This year, members of a 
new coalition of Deputies known as the "Friends of ATT" 
didn't even bother to consult with their RPM colleagues. 
Mustering an overwhelming majority, the Friends of ATT simply 
renewed, for the first time in Assembly history, the annual 
mandates of the outgoing 18 officers.  As a result, once 
again none of the Assembly's 8 vice-presidents, 8 secretaries 
and 2 administrative officer posts were allocated to the RPM. 
 
 
3.(U)  Although the RPM holds more seats than any other party 
in the 147 seat Assembly, without any significant political 
alliances the 41 RPM Deputies could do nothing more than 
stage a ceremonial boycott of the vote.  Outside the Assembly 
building an RPM spokesman read a statement condemning rival 
Deputies for failing to even inform the RPM of their 
intentions.  "Voting to return the outgoing executive 
office," declared the RPM's statement, "defied all of the 
Assembly's democratic procedures" and violated internal 
regulations stipulating that the Assembly's office "reflect 
the configuration of parliament." 
 
4.(C)  IBK's remarkably moderate October 2 speech to open the 
new Assembly session appeared to many as an attempt to 
re-build political bridges.  Judging from the allocation of 
Assembly officers, IBK's speech failed to yield any new 
alliances and his political capital within the Assembly may 
have reached an all-time low.  With colleagues from rival 
parties eager to show their support for ATT, IBK may have 
succeeded only in deflating many of his own supporters who 
had anticipated a full-blown campaign speech attacking ATT. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
RPM Challenges Exclusion From Electoral Commission 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5.(C)  In another setback for IBK, the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration left the RPM off of the 15 member 
National Independent Electoral Commission announced September 
¶27.  The RPM immediately challenged the decision, declaring 
that Minister of Territorial Administration Kafougouna Kone's 
failure to include the RPM was not "an isolated act" and 
"revealed a clearly expressed willingness to exclude certain 
actors from the electoral process."  According to the RPM, 
Minister Kone's decision "placed in doubt the sincerity and 
transparency of the coming elections and endangered the 
stability of the country." 
 
6.(C)  Normally the CENI is composed of 5 members of the 
majority party, 5 members of the political opposition and 5 
representatives from civil society.  Since there is no 
official opposition party in Mali and alliances between major 
 
BAMAKO 00001154  002 OF 002 
 
 
parties remain in flux, political leaders agreed to base the 
composition of this year's CENI on the political alliances 
that existed during the 2002 presidential election.  The new 
CENI consequently consists of 2 representatives from each of 
the three main political coalitions circa 2002, plus 2 spots 
for political independents, one space for the Union for the 
Republic and Democracy (URD), one space for a largely 
insignificant group that styles itself as an "opposition" 
party, and 5 seats for civil society. 
 
7.(C)  Although IBK and the RPM agreed to this structure, the 
coalition known as "Hope 2002" to which they belonged five 
years ago has since disintegrated.  As Hope 2002's former 
president, IBK apparently assumed he would be able to ensure 
that the coalition selected two individuals from the RPM as 
its CENI nominees.  But Hope 2002's two other key members, 
the MPR and CNID, refused to play along.  The MPR is led by 
ATT's Minister of Trade Choguel Maiga.  The CNID's president 
is Mountaga Tall, the 1st vice-president of the National 
Assembly.  Maiga and Tall have endorsed ATT's 2006 
re-election bid.  With both the RPM and the MPR-CNID claiming 
to represent Hope 2002, each faction submitted its own list 
of nominees for the coalition's two seats on the CENI. 
Rather than split the difference and take one from each list, 
Minister of Territorial Administration Kone discarded the 
RPM's nominations and named the MPR-CNID nominees to the 
electoral commission. 
 
8.(C)  In response, on October 10 the RPM asked the Malian 
Supreme Court to strike down the presidential decree naming 
the members of the Independent Electoral Commission. 
Convinced that Minister Kone violated Mali's electoral law by 
discarding the list of nominees submitted by IBK in his role 
as president of Hope 2002, the RPM's communications director 
stated: "We are going to challenge and obtain the CENI's 
annulment."  "An incomplete CENI," explained another RPM 
leader, "is worthless.  It is not Kafougouna Kone's place to 
delve into the management of political coalitions.  That he 
did this constitutes a misuse of excessive power.  He 
overstepped his authority." 
 
9.(C)  A few hours after the RPM lodged its complaint with 
the Supreme Court, the leaders of the MPR and CNID released a 
lengthy statement commending Minister Kone's management of 
the situation and condemning IBK for "posing once again as a 
victim."  After accusing IBK of trying to set the stage for 
an eventual protest of the 2007 electoral results, the 
statement concluded by offering the MPR-CNID's two CENI seats 
to the RPM in order to "preserve" peace and stability.  It 
remains unclear whether the RPM will accept the two CENI 
positions apparently vacated by the MPR-CNID or pursue the 
annulment of the entire CENI before the Supreme Court.  On 
October 15 the RPM's communication's director linked the 
events surrounding the composition of the CENI to the officer 
elections within the National Assembly and said the RPM would 
not drop its case before the Supreme Court.  "We are 
attacking a decree," said RPM communications director and 
National Assembly Deputy Boubacar Traore.  "If this decree is 
annulled, there is no CENI.  There will then be a new decree 
that will create and designate new CENI representatives." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.(C)  By closing the RPM out of both the National 
Assembly's executive bureau and the CENI, ATT further 
increased IBK's political isolation.  IBK's complaint that 
the electoral deck is stacked against him has some credence, 
but is largely attributable, not to misdeeds by ATT, but 
shrewd presidential politics and IBK's own miscalculations. 
With only 41 out of 147 seats in the National Assembly and 
its previous political alliances crumbling, the RPM's failure 
to win leadership posts within the Assembly is unsurprising. 
ATT, on the other hand, has proved remarkably adept at lining 
up coalitions of diverse political groupings to out-flank IBK 
at nearly every turn.  IBK's assumption that the members of 
the long defunct Hope 2002 alliance would support his chosen 
nominees for the CENI is particularly hard to fathom given 
that the political sentiments of MPR and CNID leaders Choguel 
Maiga and Mountaga Tall were well known in advance.  By 
submitting their own list of CENI nominees, Maiga and Tall 
succeeded in throwing IBK further off balance.  The 
MPR-CNID's allegations that the RPM is trolling for a legal 
justification to support claims of electoral malfeasance 
should be taken seriously, however.  As reported previously 
(reftel), it appears increasingly likely that IBK will play 
the fraud card, whether warranted or not, should the 2007 
election not go his way. 
LEONARD