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DE RUEHKB #1433/01 2760541
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P 030541Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1363
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0007
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0181
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0485

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001433 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG PBTS AR AZ
SUBJECT: FINNISH AMBASSADOR TERHI HAKALA DISCUSSES THE EU'S 
RELATIONS WITH AZERBAIJAN 
 
REF: BAKU 01086 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Joan Polaschik for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Finnish Ambassador Terhi Hakala met with the 
Ambassador on September 22 to discuss Azerbaijan's European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan.  The EU Commission has 
approved the plan, and the EU Troika will visit Baku on 
October 3.  Hakala said negotiating the agreement was 
sometimes difficult because of Azerbaijan's ties with the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Baku's attempt to 
amend the agreement's text on Nagorno-Karabakh, and the 
disagreement over the need to make an explicit reference to 
this summer's fires in NK.  Hakala said that the GOAJ's 
negotiating behavior was driven by Baku's perception that its 
leverage with the EU is growing, a conspiratorial fear that 
EU states and Russia are predisposed to favor Armenia, a 
limited understanding of working with the EU, and failing to 
anticipate how their ties with the TRNC would impact their EU 
relations.  Hakala commented that the GOAJ has a "campaign" 
to find an alternative forum for resolving the NK conflict 
apart from the Minsk Group.  Hakala and the Ambassador 
affirmed the need for US-EU policy and aid coordination in 
Azerbaijan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
EU GREEN LIGHT ON ACTION PLAN 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Terhi Hakala, Finland's roving ambassador to the 
South Caucasus states, met with the Ambassador on September 
22 to discuss Azerbaijan's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
Action Plan.  Hakala said the European Commission approved 
Azerbaijan's Action Plan in July.  As Finland holds the EU's 
presidency, Hakala was in Baku to prepare for a potential 
Troika visit to Baku, Tblisi, and Yerevan during the week of 
October 2.  While several details need to be clarified before 
a Troika visit, Hakala was optimistic that the Troika would 
come to Baku on October 3 to announce an agreement on the 
Action Plan. 
 
¶3.  (C) After a Troika visit, the Action Plan would need to 
be signed during a meeting of the EU Cooperation Council. 
Hakala was hopeful that this would occur during the 
Cooperation Council's next meeting in November.  She added 
that President Aliyev has expressed his desire to come to 
Brussels for the signing ceremony.  The Action Plan would be 
made public after the signing. 
 
 
LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR THE ENERGY MOU 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Hakala downplayed the substantive importance of the 
Memorandum of Understanding on EU-Azerbaijani energy 
cooperation, which the EU wants to accompany Azerbaijan's 
Action plan.  Characterizing the MOU as "mostly political," 
Hakala said it had "no practical results."  She proceeded to 
explain that the agreement is largely intended as a political 
signal by the EU that it is engaged on the issue of Caspian 
energy. 
 
 
THE NEGOTIATIONS WEREN'T FREE OF OBSTACLES 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Hakala briefed the Ambassador on several challenges 
the EU faced in negotiating Azerbaijan's Action Plan.  First, 
the GOAJ's relations with the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) created a one year delay.  In particular, the 
GOAJ's willingness to permit the August 2005 charter flight 
between Baku and the TRNC created complications, with Nicosia 
trying to delay Azerbaijan's Action Plan. 
 
¶6.  (C) Second, the GOAJ and GOAM in April 2006 sought to 
incorporate language into their Action Plans that selectively 
cited UN and OSCE statements favoring their respective 
positions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Azerbaijan 
wanted to include language supporting the principle of 
territorial integrity, while Armenia sought to include 
language backing the right of self-determination. 
 
¶7.  (C) Third, in July 2006, the GOAJ sought to incorporate 
 
BAKU 00001433  002 OF 003 
 
 
language that characterized the summer fires in 
Nagorno-Karabakh as an environmental catastrophe.  The GOAJ 
wanted to link its efforts to put the fires on the UNGA 
agenda with its Action Plan.  Hakala said the EU plainly told 
the GOAJ that there was no link between the two issues and 
would not amend their   Action Plan.  The EU Commission in 
July approved the Action Plan. 
 
 
AZERBAIJANI NEGOTIATING TACTICS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Hakala cited four reasons for the GOAJ's attempt to 
introduce changes to the Action Plan.  First, Azerbaijan 
increasingly perceives itself to be in a stronger negotiating 
position with the EU because of the latter's desire for 
alternative gas sources.  Hakala noted that at one point, the 
GOAJ threatened to abandon the MOU on energy cooperation. 
Signaling some frustration, Hakala remarked that this tactic 
was the "typical" Azerbaijani negotiating style, specifically 
"to get something and then to ask for something more." 
Second, Azerbaijan holds a "conspiratorial" view that France, 
other unspecified European states, and Russia favor Armenia 
on a variety of issues, including a Nagorno-Karabakh 
settlement.  Third, the GOAJ has a limited understanding of 
how to work with the EU.  Hakala provided the example of the 
Azerbaijani ambassador to the EU, Arif Mammadarov, who she 
characterized as not having a "good grasp of how to deliver 
messages to the EU."  Finally, Azerbaijan did not initially 
understand how permitting flights to the TRNC would 
negatively impact progress on its Action Plan.  Hakala 
admitted, however, that she didn't completely understand why 
the GOAJ pushed so hard to make changes to the Action Plan, 
particularly in July.  (NOTE: UK Ambassador told the 
Ambassador in confidence that Azerbaijan had learned that the 
EU Commission representation negotiating the Armenian Action 
Plan had agreed to stronger language on self determination. 
As a result, the GOAJ pushed for changes in Azerbaijan's 
Action Plan.) 
 
 
AZERBAIJAN HINTING AT ALTERNATIVES TO MINSK GROUP 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9.  (C) Hakala commented that these four factors also have 
informed the GOAJ's evolving approach toward the Minsk Group 
process.  Hakala referred to an Azerbaijani "campaign" to 
seek an alternative forum for resolving the NK conflict apart 
from the OSCE Minsk Group.  This campaign includes publicly 
attacking OSCE representative Andrzej Kasprzyk and publicly 
threatening to give up on the Minsk process.  (Note: 
Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Araz Azimov have both recently supported the 
idea of discussing the NK conflict in other international 
organizations--including the UN--according to local press.) 
Hakala suggested that Azimov might be pushing Mammadyarov to 
seek a different forum for resolving the conflict. 
 
 
NOT LOOKING TO GEORGIA AS TEMPLATE FOR RESOLVING NK 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Turning to the resolution of frozen conflicts in the 
former Soviet space, Hakala commented that she does not think 
the GOAJ is looking to Georgia as an example for trying to 
get the EU to increase pressure on Russia.  She said that 
Baku considers Tbilisi's approach to be "too precipitous." 
Illham Aliyev and Mikhail Saakishvilli's relations are also 
problematic because of personality differences. 
Additionally, Baku "has great relations with Russia," 
relative to Tbilisi. 
 
 
US-EU COOPERATION INTEGRAL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The Ambassador and Hakala agreed on the confluence 
of US-EU goals in Azerbaijan.  Hakala noted that US-EU 
coordination is important so that the GOAJ is not able to 
exploit perceived differences between the two partners' 
policies or aid programs.  Hakala was open to the 
Ambassador's suggestion to brief the "Revenue Management 
Group"--a group of western embassies and the IFI's--on the 
EU's assistance programs for Azerbaijan. 
 
BAKU 00001433  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) Hakala opined that the EU "to some extent has failed 
to clarify its role in the south Caucasus."  She noted the 
European Commission office probably would not open until the 
end of 2007.  (Note: Per reftel, EU Special Representative to 
the South Caucasus Peter Semneby was hopeful that the 
Commission office would open in early 2007.  The Ambassador 
clarified this point with Hakala, who reiterated that the 
office's opening was delayed because of funding.) 
 
¶13.  (C) COMMENT: A potential EU Troika visit to Baku would 
be a clear signal to the GOAJ and surrounding countries that 
the EU is committed to deeper engagement with a region it has 
long neglected, and therefore a positive step forward in what 
has been an extended negotiation process over Azerbaijan's 
Action Plan.  A more robust EU presence in Azerbaijan would 
enhance US-EU cooperation in Baku and help advance our common 
interests. 
DERSE