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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000793 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
STATE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: EU REPRESENTATIVE FOR SUDAN BRIEFS ON DARFUR 
DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 
Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On September 29, EU Special Representative 
for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto briefed the diplomatic community on 
recent developments in Darfur.  Haavisto highlighted the 
shifting alliances in Darfur and raised concerns over the 
role of Eritrea in Darfur politics and the creation of the 
National Redemption Front (NRF). In that regard, Post would 
welcome Washington guidance should Eritrea succeed in uniting 
the Darfur opposition under the NRF umbrella and then seek a 
leading role in renegotiating or amending the DPA.  Haavisto 
also spoke briefly spoke about the initialing of the Security 
Arrangement Protocol for eastern Sudan and concern over power 
sharing in the overall agreement.  End Summary. 
 
SHIFTING ALLIANCES... 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) EU Special Representative for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto 
returned to Asmara on September 27 to both meet with SLM and 
NRF Darfurians present in Asmara and to discuss with the 
Eastern Front leadership the general state of negotiations on 
eastern Sudan.  While interested in both regions, his focus 
during his briefing to the diplomatic community on September 
29 - just before departing for Khartoum - was focused on 
shifting alliances in Darfur and Eritrean support for them. 
 
¶3. (C) Haavisto began the briefing by explaining that SLM/A 
AbdulWahid Mohamed Ahmed Nur had finally broken down and 
aligned himself with the National Redemption Front (NRF) and 
had made amends with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 
particularly Khalil Ibrahim himself.  He said that the two 
had issued a communiqu stateing that the SLM/A and JEM will 
cooperate.  Haavisto acknowledged the irony in this  move 
given AbdulWahid,s tirades against Ibrahim in the past, but 
attributed it to AbdulWahid,s desire to make himself 
relevant again in the Darfur process.  He also admitted that 
he did not know what Ahmed Abdel Shafi,s opinion of these 
new alliances was, but felt he must be in a difficult place, 
being the only non-signatory who has not joined the NRF.  The 
French Ambassador, who met Abdel Shafi on October 1, said 
that Shafi had as his first priority the mending of the SLM 
splits.  Haavisto observed that while this new alliance might 
allow AbdulWahid to avoid dealing with Shafi directly about 
the SLM split, it did not really move the parties closer to 
resolving overall divisions within the Darfur opposition. 
Nor did it bring them closer to agreement on accepting the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), he said. 
 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS CAUSE CONCERN FOR GNU 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Within the GNU, the possibility of continued conflict 
in Darfur has given both the National Congress Party (NCP) 
and the Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) cause for 
concern.  The SPLM, he said, fears that continued fissures in 
the Darfur opposition and renewed fighting could put the SPLM 
in a very difficult situation.  He reported that both the NCP 
and SPLM want to see another mediation of sorts in Darfur, 
however they differ on how it should be dealt with and who 
should take the lead.  The NCP is looking to Egypt and other 
Arab nations in the region to take the lead, whereas the SPLM 
would like to host an internal mediation with Eritrea,s 
involvement. 
 
¶4. (C) Haavisto fears that the worst case scenario for 
Darfur, also seems the most likely outcome: that both sides 
reject the possibility of negotiations and look for a 
military solution.  He worries that the opposition movements, 
in particular the NRF, may continue fighting and gain further 
victories in Darfur thus making a negotiated settlement more 
elusive.  He also feared that intensified conflict could 
 
spark a public uprising that would target the government in 
the many camps in Darfur, especially around El Fasher. 
Haavisto stressed that the international community must work 
to avoid this worse case scenario at all costs, because he 
believes if the NRF succeeds in Darfur they will likely 
continue on to Kurdafan. 
 
WHAT EXACTLY IS ERITREA,S ROLE? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  Eritrea,s role in the Darfur process remains murky. 
Eritrea maintains that they are trying to get all the 
non-signatories under one umbrella to reach an enduring 
agreement to end the problems in Darfur.  Their interest, 
they maintain, is in regional stability and in recognizing 
the just concerns of all elements of Darfur society. 
Haavisto reported that  the various non-signatories are all 
en route to Asmara at the GSE,s request.  He noted that the 
GSE had similarly brought the Darfurian non-signatories 
together following the signing of the DPA in Abuja, leading 
among other things to the creation of the NRF. 
 
¶6. (C)  Haavisto believes, as do we, that the Eritreans are 
intent on playing a continuing role in Sudan.  The GSE, he 
said, seeks to play a key role  in any future Darfur 
negotiations ) negotiations which the GSE believes are 
essential for resolution of the problems in Darfur.  And, 
said Haavisto, the GSE by virtue of its links to the NRF and 
other non-signatories, as well as its ties to the SPLM, may 
emerge as a broker.  This is not, however, necessarily a good 
development for the AU, UN or the international community 
overall.  Eritrea continues to argue that neither the UN nor 
the AU need to be involved in Darfur and states that it is 
not the right time to blue hat the AU troops in Darfur. 
Moreover, the Eritreans now seem to have influenced 
AbdulWahid, the NRF and JEM into articulating this same line: 
¬ now for the UN in Darfur.8 
 
... AND THE EAST? 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Haavisto had met with the Eastern Front leadership 
while in Asmara, but had very little to offer on where he saw 
the agreement heading.  He confirmed that the security 
agreement had been finalized, but that the parties continued 
to work on the last two sticking points, the development fund 
and the issue of making one region of eastern Sudan (see 
septel).  He believed that an agreement would be finalized in 
the coming week.  He concluded that the NCP seemed focused on 
sidelining Eritrea following the conclusion of the agreement, 
but that Eritrea was similarly focused on ways to be 
essential in Sudan after negotiations on eastern Sudan 
concluded. 
 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Post has been unable to confirm the communiqu on 
AbdulWahid joining the NRF, but will work with contacts to 
obtain a copy.  If AbdulWahid has indeed joined the NRF, it 
will leave Shafi as the only holdout and put considerable 
pressure on him to also join ) especially from the Eritreans 
who seem determined to create a united Darfur opposition 
under the NRF umbrella.  Dirage returned to Asmara on 
September 27 and Khamis Abdalla Ababr and Khalil Ibrahim are 
expected back in Asmara in the coming days. We anticipate 
that Eritrea will make itself a player, one way or the other, 
and would welcome guidance from Washington on possible GSE 
efforts to encourage negotiations to alter/amend the DPA. 
 
DELISI