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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001834 
 
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FROM AMBASSADOR BOLTON FOR U/S BURNS AND A/S SILVERBERG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL UNSC UN GT VE XM
SUBJECT: FINAL WEEKS OF THE GUATEMALA-VENEZUELA CONTEST FOR 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL: TIME TO REFINE OUR STRATEGY? 
 
REF: LONDON 6591 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Permanent Representative, for 
 reasons 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Summary.  The General Assembly vote to decide the 
contested Latin American seat on the Security Council for 
2007-2008 is less than a month away -- October 16.  As we 
gear up in New York for the final stages of this campaign, it 
is time to take stock of the approach and strategy most 
likely to block Venezuela's bid for a Security Council seat, 
a primary U.S. goal.  We believe that the time is right to 
use U.S. lobbying efforts to press for more active support 
from influential countries, rather than on continuing a 
broad, and perhaps counter-productive, campaign for 
Guatemala's election.  By lobbying supportive countries to do 
more to lobby for Guatemala, we reduce the U.S. profile and 
deny Venezuela the argument that they are really running 
against us.  End Summary. 
 
Get Guatemala to press the flesh... 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C/NF) As the October 16 vote for the elected Security 
Council seats approaches, Guatemala, Venezuela, and we 
continue to compile lists of likely voting preferences among 
the 192 delegations and apply pressure to those seen to be 
undecided or wavering.  We believe this approach is of 
increasingly marginal utility for us.  Available information 
seems clear: neither Guatemala nor Venezuela is in position 
to get the required two-thirds support in the first ballot. 
 
¶3. (C/NF) Continuing efforts to arrive at a solid vote count 
though blanket approaches in capitals may not be the most 
effective approach in the few remaining weeks.  The election 
is one in which, in any case, many New York-based 
representatives acting on their own could play a decisive 
role without capitals knowing how their votes were actually 
cast.  As in previous contests, some delegations will not 
receive voting instructions at all. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) In the final weeks, we should agree on a division 
of labor with the Guatemalans, who need to make a personal 
effort to approach every possible delegation in NY in the 
time remaining.  FM Gert Rosenthal will be in NY and has more 
than 60 bilaterals already scheduled.  He should not leave 
until he has paid a call on every available Perm Rep.  We 
know that a number of countries have complained that the 
Guatemalans have not "asked" for their vote.  These simple 
acts of courtesy will pay dividends, but must be done by 
Guatemala.  The U.S. cannot substitute. 
 
... while the U.S. raises the stakes with allies 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. (C/NF) The U.S. effort should be focused on gaining allies 
among influential countries who have a vested interest in 
preventing Venezuela's disruptive presence on the UNSC. 
Guatemalan representatives from the FM on down have come to 
believe firmly that their close identification with the U.S. 
is problematic, as Venezuela continues - and with growing 
success - to frame this contest as being between the U.S. and 
itself.  The Guatemalan PR has been quoted repeatedly and 
unhelpfully as saying that U.S. support is "the kiss of 
death."  The Guatemalans strongly believe - and we agree - 
that the contest now viewed as between a Venezuelan David and 
the American Goliath needs to be reframed as a Guatemalan 
David seeking to defeat the Venezuelan Goliath. 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Our allies and those countries with an interest in 
maintaining a responsible and effective Council have been 
slow to respond to either our or the Guatemalan approaches - 
when they have done so at all.  Key countries such as France 
are not only failing to campaign for Guatemala but also are 
even withholding the commitment their own presumably "safe" 
vote.  (We are heartened that the UK - per reftel - has 
agreed to join the debate.)  U.S. bilateral efforts should be 
sharply focused on our influential allies and key regional 
countries that have a vested interest in an effective UNSC. 
Our message should stress the danger to the credibility and 
effectiveness of the Council - and the UN as a whole - if it 
becomes a platform for Venezuelan rhetoric, emphasize the 
threat posed to the ability of the Council to act on issues 
of importance to our friends, and lobby them to do more to 
lobby on behalf of Guatemala.  This approach will encourage 
the Guatemalans to redouble their own efforts to line up 
influential supporters and more clearly avoid the appearance 
that they are simply a stalking horse for U.S. hostility to 
Venezuela. 
 
 
BOLTON