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Brooke F Adams  09/05/2006 08:57:11 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  ECPO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00459

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, VCI, PM, G 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/31/2016 
TAGS: CMGT OVIP PARM KNNP LY
SUBJECT: LIBYANS DISCUSS NON-PROLIFERATION WITH AMB. SCHULTE - WHERE 
ARE THE REWARDS? 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison 
Office, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)    SUMMARY.  Ambassador Schulte conducted extensive 
discussions on non-proliferation with Libyan officials and the 
Jamahiriya press August 28-30.   The Libyans agreed with our 
assessment that Iran was working on a weapons program and that 
it should comply with the IAEA, while stressing that 
confrontation and deadlines would set back negotiating efforts. 
Libya anticipates the Iran will use the NAM Summit in Havana to 
politicize the IAEA report due August 31.  Libyans also vented 
their frustration that there wasn't a "Libya Model" for other 
countries to follow, based on Libyan perceptions that they have 
not received tangible rewards for deciding to comply with 
international norms.  If pressed, interlocutors either 
acknowledge or dismiss our observations of the many advantages 
that have accrued to Libya since its December 2003 decision to 
end its WMD programs.   Ambassador Schulte met with Secretary of 
the General People's Committee for Manpower, Training and 
Employment (GPCMET) Matouq Matouq and Secretary for European 
Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison 
and International Cooperation Abdulati Obeidi, and academics 
from Al-Fateh University.  Ambassador Schulte also held a 
roundtable discussion with Libyan-based journalists that 
highlighted U.S. support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and 
international concerns over Iran's lack of cooperation with the 
IAEA.   END SUMMARY. 
 
 
LIBYANS CLAIM LIBYA MODEL DOES NOT OFFER ANY REWARDS 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  In a 75 minute meeting with Matouq Matouq and his 
science advisors -- Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the National 
Bureau for Research and Development (NBRD) and Dr. Mohammed 
Enami of the NBRD -- Ambassador Schulte heard the Libyan's 
standard opening gambit, " the Libyan case is not a good model 
for the rest of the world because Libya received no benefits 
from its decision to give up WMD programs."  Matouq oversaw the 
Libyan WMD program before heading the GPCMET, and in his current 
position he oversees the related scientific activities under his 
very broad "employment" mandate.  Matouq said, "I know we tell 
all the Americans the same thing in every meeting, but it is a 
basic fact that affects everything else we are trying to do." 
He told Schulte the Iranians "scorned" Libya for giving up 
something for nothing, and that within Libya, and especially the 
scientific community, there was an "internal feeling of 
resentment."   He also described Libyan opposition groups in the 
U.S. and the UK that criticized the Libyan government for its 
decision to give up the WMD without negotiating for any concrete 
rewards.  Schulte reminded Matouq that Libya reaped major 
benefits as sanctions were lifted, trade and investment 
opportunities flowed to Libya, Libya was offered WTO accession, 
and world leaders began to consult with Libya on matters of 
mutual interest. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Asked for his assessment of the U.S.-Libyan cooperative 
activities up until this point, including the conversion of the 
Tajoura facility, Matouq said that the conversion was complete 
and successful.  He hoped it would be fully operational by the 
end of September with even better performance than before.  He 
was generally pleased with the on-going scientific engagement 
program focused on biological life sciences, environmental 
issues, water management, and mechanical engineering, but he and 
his colleagues were frustrated that there weren't any 
"deliverables" to show the Libyan people.  While admittedly the 
Libyan priorities are technology transfer and training, they 
hoped for some specific, large projects that they could show the 
Libyan public as the "reward."  They wanted the U.S. to build 
Libya a nuclear powered plant to desalinate water or generate 
electricity, or they wanted the U.S. to build a radioactive 
isotope production facility at Tripoli Medical Center to support 
cancer research throughout Africa.   Matouq's team has also 
asked for water management assistance, microsatellites for the 
Remote Sensing Center to work on environmental monitoring, solar 
energy technology for power generation or water desalination, 
and desertification prevention assistance. 
 
¶4.  (C)  When Schulte reviewed the U.S. Global Energy 
Partnership framework, Matouq responded, "there can't be a 
double standard; technologies should be disseminated equally to 
all countries through the IAEA.  The UNSC should engage in more 
outreach to identify and limit WMD capabilities of all 
countries, while at the same time encouraging more use of 
nuclear power as a clean and efficient fuel."  Matouq, noting 
Libya's full compliance with IAEA inspections, called for 
universal, regular inspections by IAEA officials since human 
interaction was a critical component of building confidence and 
"cameras can be adjusted."  Matouq said he would attend the IAEA 
General Conference and would press his views in that forum. 
IRANIAN INTERNAL POLITICS AND PRESTIGE OF WMD PROGRAMS ARE 
MOTIVATION 
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--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)   Matouq's primary concern regarding proliferation was 
the potential diversion of nuclear material rather than 
enrichment activities by Iran or other countries.  He said, 
"political assurances are not enough given the regular changes 
in government leadership."   In his view, Iran was determined to 
"use nuclear to its end," whatever that meant -- the end of its 
fuel cycle, the end of its destructive power?   Matouq, while 
his science advisors nodded their concurrence, said that in 
Libya's opinion the Iranian actions added up to weapons program 
development.  He believed that the Ayatollah originated the WMD 
program in the 1980s, following on whatever research programs 
might have been underway while the Shah ruled Iran.  The WMD 
program was initially deemed critically important to counter 
Iraq, but now had taken on even greater significance. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ambassador Schulte pressed for Libya to make the point 
forcefully to Iran that moving forward with its WMD program 
would only lead to isolation and a lack of prestige.  Matouq 
replied that Iranian internal politics were driving its 
decisions.  Iranian dignity is now invested in its nuclear 
capability.  He broadened the discussion to argue that the 
conflict in Gaza and the war between Israel and Lebanon only 
encouraged Iranian fanatics, made it easier for the Muslim 
Brotherhood to recruit members, and fostered the spread of 
Wahabi radicalism.  Matouq said, "continued Israeli killings 
inflame public opinion; you must not underestimate how this 
enrages Muslims."  Using graphic language, he continued, 
"Libyans see Israelis hunting human meat using high-tech U.S. 
weapons and we can not accept this."  Ambassador Schulte replied 
that the leadership in Tehran was encouraging violence.  He also 
recounted the striking coincidence that the Hezbollah kidnapping 
of Israeli soldiers and missile attacks on Israel happened 
directly after Iran rebuffed Solana and the negotiating 
proposals on non-proliferation.  When Matouq countered that "if 
the Israel and Palestinian problems were resolved, Iran would 
have less room to maneuver," Schulte agreed and added, " we also 
need to reframe the issue beyond a U.S-Iran debate and reflect 
the concern of the entire international community. 
 
¶7.  (C)  In a subsequent session with Libya's IAEA Governor and 
Secretary for European Affairs at the General People's Committee 
 
SIPDIS 
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Abdulati 
Obeidi, Secretary for American Affairs at the General People's 
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation 
Ahmed Fatouri, Acting Americas Director Mohammed Hassan Ayaab of 
the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and 
International Cooperation and five academics from Al-Fateh 
University.  As Libya's representative to the IAEA, Obeidi 
highlighted that Libya took the initiative to end its WMD 
program and had worked closely with the U.S. and UK since 
December 2003 to resolve any outstanding concerns. 
 
HOW TO ENGAGE WITH IRAN - DEADLINES AND CONFRONTATION WON'T WORK 
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--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶8. (C)  Obeidi's message was that Libya is in full agreement 
that the international community must prevent the spread of WMD. 
 It wants to show that differences can be solved through 
peaceful negotiation.  However, Obeidi advised, UNSC resolutions 
would not lead Iran to give up its program.  Pressure, 
confrontation and challenge only make the Iranians more likely 
to take a defiant stand in Obeidi's assessment.  He believed 
that Iran would try to avert straightforward compliance requests 
by converting issues into a political debate about national 
rights in the NAM and other public fora.  "Political groups like 
the NAM will support the Iranians' position without fully 
comprehending the technical aspects of the case," Obeidi 
continued. 
 
¶9.  (C)  "We agree the Iranians are playing for time," Obeidi 
said, "but you are helping them; why can there be no discussions 
on enrichment?"  Obeidi said that more realistic positions with 
specific next steps could gain support, whereas setting a date 
for sanctions implementation would only strengthen the Iranian 
defiance.  He said Libya was ready to work closely with the U.S. 
and others at the General Conference and at the NAM to keep Iran 
moving in the right direction, but that deadlines would not 
help. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Ambassador Schulte emphasized to Obeidi and the other 
participants that Iran was trying to shift the debate from 
substantive points to a "denial of rights" whereas nuclear power 
encompassed not only rights but also obligations.  Anticipating 
that Iran would try to highjack the NAM summit in Havana, it was 
important for other countries to convince them that security, 
respect and prestige are assured through international 
cooperation.  The U.S. looked to Libya and others to make that 
point, especially since Iran continued to delay access by IAEA 
inspectors.  Obeidi said that he looked forward to working with 
Ambassador Schulte in Vienna. 
 
LIBYANS FRUSTRATED AT DIFFICULTY OBTAINING U.S. VISAS 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Although the Libyans did not grant the Embassy 
permission to conduct public diplomacy at Al-Fateh University, 
the Americas Desk did arrange for five chemistry and engineering 
professors to sit in on the Obeidi meeting and then host 
Ambassador Schulte for lunch.  The professors were not 
interested in discussing policy, but did make clear their desire 
for U.S. funded projects in the fields of science and 
technology.  All but one of the professors studied in the U.S. 
during the 1960s and hoped that they would be able to visit 
there again and send more students for graduate work. They noted 
the extreme difficulty to obtain U.S. visas since most Libyans 
are unwilling to travel to Tunisia for interviews at the 
consulate.  The academics also acknowledged that most younger 
Libyans had limited English language skills and might not pass 
the TOEFL requirements to enter a graduate program.  Schulte's 
carefully crafted presentation resonated with the Libyan 
interlocutors, even the Al-Fateh University science professors 
who professed to have no interest in policy. 
 
PRESS QUESTIONS U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)   Twenty Libya-based journalists and photographers 
attended a press roundtable with Ambassador Schulte for an 
hour-long session on nonproliferation issues.  There were also 
many questions about U.S. policy in the Middle East and the U.S. 
role in the recent violence in Israel and Lebanon.  One reporter 
queried, "why would Libya give up its relatively good 
relationship with Iran to align with the U.S. on this issue?" 
and Ambassador Schulte pointed out that it was not a U.S.-Iran 
issue, but a matter of grave concern to the international 
community.  The IAEA had a clear position that reflected over 
three years of review.  Several questions focused on the Israeli 
WMD program and questioned why the U.S. was not emphasizing the 
need for action against Israel -- with the response that the 
U.S. would support a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and 
that progress on the Middle East peace process was an important 
next step, along with the U.S. vision of two states living side 
by side in peace.  As long as the leadership in Tehran opposes 
that vision and actively works against peace by trying to spark 
violence, it is deflecting attention from its lack of compliance 
with international obligations.   Members of the Libyan press 
contacted Embassy staff after the roundtable to express their 
appreciation for the Ambassador's outreach efforts, commenting 
on his effective and thoughtful commentary. 
 
¶13.  (U) Ambassador Schulte did not have an opportunity to clear 
this message before his departure. 
BERRY