VZCZCXRO3257
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKO #5028/01 2441144
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011144Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5979
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 0383
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0212
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0116
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0015
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4018
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0157
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0365
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1584
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1216
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8103
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5012
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1975
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0191
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016 
TAGS: ECON ENRG PARM PHUM PREL ZK KZ UZ JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER VISITS KAZAKHSTAN AND 
UZBEKISTAN, PROMOTES ENERGY COOPERATION 
 
REF: TOKYO 4661 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Carol Reynolds for r 
easons 1.4(b),(d) 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  During an August 28-29 visit to Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, Prime Minister Koizumi focused primarily on 
promoting cooperation in developing energy resources, 
particularly uranium, according to MOFA Central Asia and 
Caucasus Division Deputy Director Uyama.  Koizumi urged 
Uzbekistan President Karimov to step up efforts to promote 
democratization, protect human rights and achieve a 
market-based economy.  He also announced that Japan will 
provide $2.8 million in education grants to permit 2,000 
students from the Central Asian states to study in Japan. 
Both Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev and Uzbekistan's Karimov 
reaffirmed their support for Japan's effort to obtain a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  Despite press 
speculation that one purpose of the visit was to compete for 
influence with Russia and China, one informed local observer 
believes Central Asia remains a relatively low priority for 
Japan, and that Tokyo has no intention of outwardly competing 
with either Russia or China.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
URANIUM DEAL, GOOD RELATIONS WITH KAZAKHSTAN 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's August 28 visit 
to Kazakhstan and August 29 stop in Uzbekistan comprised the 
first visit ever by a Japanese Prime Minister to Central 
Asia, MOFA Central Asia and Caucasus Division Deputy Director 
Hideki Uyama told Embassy Tokyo Political Officer on 
September 1 .Koizumi's delegation consisted of approximately 
70 officials and 40-50 members of the press.  During a August 
28 meeting at the Presidential Palace in Astana, Kazakh 
President Nazarbayev hailed the visit as "historic," and 
Koizumi said it signified Japan's desire to actively develop 
ties to Central Asia, and to Kazakhstan in particular.  He 
praised Kazakhstan's economic development and confirmed that 
Japan would continue to assist with its democratization and 
its development of a market economy. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Both leaders emphasized their desire to enhance the 
level of strategic cooperation in the field of energy 
resources, particularly uranium mines, Uyama reported. (NOTE: 
Kazakhstan is said to be the world's third leading producer 
of uranium.  Japanese firms Sumitomo Corp. and Kansai 
Electric Power Company have previously announced they would 
jointly develop a uranium mine with Kazakhstan's state-owned 
mining company to assure supplies for Japan's nuclear power 
plants, estimated to require approximately 8,000 tons a 
year.)  During the visit, the Japanese Ambassador and the 
Kazakh Minister of Energy Resources signed a memorandum for 
coordination in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear power. 
Under the agreement, Kazakhstan officials and Japanese 
private sector representatives will "promote dialogue" 
regarding the joint development of uranium mines and uranium 
processing.  The Japanese will, in turn, provide assistance 
to improve Kazakhstan's capabilities in the fields of nuclear 
nonproliferation, nuclear materials safeguards, and the 
protection and control of nuclear materials.  As Kazakh 
capabilities in these fields improve to meet Japanese 
expectations, the two countries will then begin to negotiate 
a bilateral agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
which will allow Japanese firms to participate in the 
development of nuclear energy in Kazakhstan. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The development of other energy resources, such as 
oil and natural gas, was discussed only in general terms, 
Uyama reported.  Nazarbayev expressed an interest in 
increased Japanese investments in sectors other than energy, 
including chemical manufacturing, metal processing, and 
electronics.  Responding in part to Nazarbayev's desire to 
increase the number of Kazakh students studying in Japan, 
Koizumi announced that over the next three years Japan will 
 
TOKYO 00005028  002 OF 003 
 
 
provide $2.8 million in education grants to permit 2,000 
students from Central Asian states to study in Japan.  He 
also pledged that Japan try to make it easier for more Kazakh 
students to study in Japan on an individual basis. 
 
¶5.  (C)  With regard to the DPRK, Uyama said that Nazarbayev 
shared Koizumi's concerns about missile launches, nuclear 
weapons development, and "humanitarian issues," i.e., 
abductions, and agreed to establish a framework for 
MOFA-level consultations on the situation in Asia, including 
the DPRK.  Finally, Nazarbayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan's 
support of Japan's quest to gain a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council. 
 
------------------------------- 
VISIT TO TASHKENT A BIT BUMPIER 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  According to Uyama, Koizumi's visit to Tashkent was 
more contentious then his stop in Astana  He was received by 
President Karimov on August 29, meeting privately with 
Karimov before joining a larger meeting with other delegation 
members.  Karimov (like Nazarbayev) initially hailed 
Koizumi's visit as an historic moment in Uzbek-Japanese 
relations and thanked him for Japan's generous ODA.  He said 
he hoped for increased levels of Japanese investment in his 
country.  Koizumi congratulated Karimov on the occasion of 
Uzbekistan's 15th anniversary of independence and underlined 
Japan's continued commitment to developing relations with the 
Central Asia states. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Uyama said that Koizumi "carefully" raised the 
subject of human rights, telling Karimov that improvements in 
Uzbekistan's record vis-a-vis human rights, democratization, 
and market economy development would bring increased 
stability, and that Japan was ready to support Uzbekistan's 
efforts in these fields.  Using an argument that Japan also 
uses with Iranians, Koizumi said that the Uzbeks should learn 
from Japan's history of what can happen to a country that 
isolates itself from the international community.  In the 
1930's, Japan ignored international concerns, confronted the 
United States, and suffered a terrible defeat in war.  Since 
the war, Japan has emphasized close cooperation and 
friendship with the United States, and this remains the basis 
of Japan's prosperity today.  Karimov agreed that this was an 
important lesson and that Uzbekistan would continue its 
efforts to improve in these fields. 
 
¶8.  (C)  In a later conversation over dinner, heard by only a 
very few people, Karimov told Koizumi that he suspected the 
United States was "involved" in the Andijan incident, Uyama 
confided.  Koizumi stressed to Karimov that good relations 
with the United States were in Uzbekistan's strong national 
interest.  Karimov replied that he believes U.S.-Uzbek 
relations will eventually improve. (NOTE: Uyama requested 
this exchange be strictly protected.) 
 
¶9.  (C)  Both leaders expressed a readiness for closer 
cooperation in the energy field, particularly with regard to 
uranium, Uyama said.   A number of Japanese companies are 
potentially interested in exploring possibilities in this 
field, he explained, but the Uzbeks have generally been 
unresponsive to their inquiries.  During this visit, however, 
it was the Uzbeks who expressed strong interest in developing 
joint ventures, and the two sides agreed to begin information 
exchanges between the Uzbek government and Japanese 
companies.  The next step will be for the Japanese Natural 
Resources Agency to contact its Uzbek counterpart.  Uyama 
said that Uzbekistan, which holds the world's tenth largest 
uranium reserves, is well behind Kazakhstan in developing 
this resource and wants to become more competitive.  Koizumi 
repeated the announcement he made in Kazakhstan regarding 
educational grants to Central Asian students. 
 
¶10. (C) Concerning the DPRK, Karimov was silent and did not 
respond when Koizumi explained to him Japan's concerns about 
 
TOKYO 00005028  003 OF 003 
 
 
that country's development of missile and nuclear weapons 
technology, as well as Japan's "humanitarian concerns." 
Karimov did, however, reaffirm Uzbekistan's commitment to 
support Japan's efforts to obtain a permanent seat on the 
Security Council. 
 
¶11. (C) Uyama said that Japan deliberately resisted issuing 
any type of signed documents during the Uzbekistan visit (as 
it had in Kazakhstan), a move that did not please the Uzbeks. 
 The Uzbeks then insisted upon a joint press statement, but 
refused to include language important to the Japanese 
concerning human rights, democratization, and the DPRK.  The 
Japanese refused to issue a joint press statement if it did 
not contain reference to these subjects and the Uzbeks only 
agreed to include the topics at the last minute, just hours 
before Koizumi's arrival.  As it was, the references to human 
rights and democratization were watered down, referring to 
these concepts in general terms, rather than 
Uzbekistan-specific.  On the subject of the DPRK, the Uzbeks 
initially refused to include it, using the excuse that there 
are over 200,000 "Koreans" in Uzbekistan and that the DPRK 
maintains an embassy in Tashkent.  The Japanese held firm for 
mention of the DPRK in any joint press statement, but 
eventually agreed to accept "humanitarian concerns" in place 
of their preferred word "abductions."  Uyama said the 
negotiations were very tough. 
 
-------------------- 
AN OBSERVER COMMENTS 
-------------------- 
 
¶12. (C)  In a separate September 1 discussion, Takeshi Yuasa, 
a Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for 
Defense Studies who specializes in Central Asia, told us the 
overall significance of Koizumi's trip is likely to be 
minimal.  He believes that despite recent attempts to enhance 
relations, Central Asia remains a relatively low diplomatic 
priority for Tokyo.  Notably, Koizumi's trip focused purely 
on bilateral relations and was not intended to directly 
advance the "Central Asia plus Japan" initiative, Yuasa 
claimed, despite statements to the contrary.  Nor, advised 
Yuasa, was it intended to provoke or compete with Russia or 
China, as was speculated by some Japanese media outlets. He 
pointed out that there is no way Japan can realistically hope 
to compete in Central Asia with Russia, still a formidable 
power which until recently exercised sovereignty over the 
area, or China, a superpower to the east.  In fact, Tokyo 
should be flattered if these countries consider Japan a 
threat to their interests in the region, he opined.  Yuasa 
added that Japan realizes that if it is to successfully 
exploit the resources of Central Asia, it would behoove it to 
maintain good relations with both China and Russia.  He 
labeled Japanese hopes to develop a southern resource 
transportation route through Afghanistan and Pakistan as 
premature, particularly as he is unaware of any Japanese 
efforts to coordinate such plans with U.S. policies and 
priorities in those countries. 
 
¶13. (C)  With regard to the advancement of human rights and 
democracy in Uzbekistan, Yuasa was also skeptical.  He opined 
that Karimov would have expected Koizumi to raise human 
rights and that Koizumi would have done so in a pro forma 
manner.  He believes that Japan is concerned above all else 
with maintaining stability in the region, and fears that if 
Karimov's government was to be precipitously forced from 
office, instability could spread beyond Uzbekistan's borders. 
 
DONOVAN