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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001958 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AMBASSADOR NULAND FROM AMBASSADOR ARNALL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ISAF NATO NL AF
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NATO:  SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR 
NULAND 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROLAND ARNALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B,D). 
reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
Ambassador Nuland: 
 
1, (C) My staff and I warmly welcome you to The Hague.  Our 
Dutch hosts, including Foreign Minister Bot, are looking 
forward to consulting on a wide range of NATO-related 
issues with you, and you will also have excellent 
opportunities to engage with Parliamentarians and the press 
during your visit.  The fact that you will be coming to The 
Hague directly from Afghanistan -- and Uruzgan in 
particular -- makes your visit especially timely. 
 
ELECTION POLITICS: 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  This is an election year, with all that that 
entails. The governing center-right coalition of Christian 
Democrats (CDA) and Liberals (VVD) face tough opposition 
from the center-left Labor Party (PvdA), but the results 
are far from certain.  At the moment, the PvdA -- led by 
the charismatic Wouter Bos -- have a 5-10 point lead in the 
polls over the next largest party (CDA), but a strong 
economy appears to be shifting support back to Prime 
Minister Balkenende and his political allies, the VVD.  No 
single party has enough support to win a majority, which 
ensures that the next government -- like all Dutch 
governments -- will be a coalition.  If CDA and VVD 
together win a majority, they could exclude PvdA from the 
next government, even if PvdA emerges as the largest party 
in Parliament.  Alternatively, PvdA may seek to form a 
coalition with either the CDA or VVD -- in either case, 
moderating the PvdA's more Euro-centric approach to foreign 
policy.  There is a remote chance that left-leaning parties 
-- PvdA, the Socialist Party (S/P), and GreenLeft (GL) -- 
could form a majority in Parliament, but long-standing 
differences between the parties would make the formation of 
a stable government extremely unlikely. If no natural 
majority emerges from the November 22 elections a few small 
parties -- such as the Protestant Christian Union (CU) -- 
could become kingmakers.  You will have a chance to meet 
representatives of all the key parties at lunch. 
 
¶3. (C) The good news is that nearly every possible 
government coalition will be positively inclined toward 
NATO and supportive, to one degree or another, of continued 
Dutch involvement in future NATO missions.  This reflects 
the deep transatlantic orientation pervading Dutch 
political culture.  Only a few weeks ago, the formerly 
Maoist Socialist Party (SP) formally renounced its 
decades-long opposition to Dutch NATO membership in a 
blatant effort to present itself as a "credible" coalition 
partner for the PvdA.  The PvdA, meanwhile, has been 
careful to draw a distinction between its opposition to 
many U.S. policies from its long-standing support for NATO; 
the PvdA, for example, opposed the deployment of 600 Dutch 
Special Forces to Afghanistan under OEF, but unanimously 
supported the deployment of 1,400 troops to Uruzgan as part 
of the ISAF mission. 
 
AFGHANISTAN: 
------------ 
 
¶4. (C)  Afghanistan remains the elephant in the room in 
this election. Having supported the Uruzgan mission, albeit 
with reservations, the PvdA leadership has no desire to 
reopen the deployment decision as a campaign issue.  That 
said, public support for the mission remains weak -- a 
recent poll indicates that 57 percent of the population is 
opposed to the mission -- and all parties remain sensitive 
to the potential impact of events on the ground on the 
electorate.  So far, the Dutch have been lucky not to have 
lost any personnel as the direct result of combat, but a 
dramatic incre Dutch casualties, a scandal involving 
detainees, or clear indications that "reconstruction" 
projects in Uruzgan will not be possible during the Dutch 
deployment could all increase public dissatisfaction with 
the mission while pushing the three largest parties into 
contrary positions.  At the same time, smaller parties such 
as the Progressive Liberals (D-66), Green Left, and the 
Socialists, will continue to exploit public concerns about 
the mission to steal votes from the larger parties. 
 
¶5. (C) In this tense environment, even relatively minor or 
technical questions -- such as the appropriate level of 
support Dutch troops should provide to ISAF forces in 
neighboring provinces -- will be exposed to intense media 
and parliamentary scrutiny.  So far, the Government has 
stood firm to every challenge, but your GONL counterparts 
will appreciate any reassurances to help stiffen its 
resolve to stay the course. 
 
ROAD TO RIGA: 
------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Regardless of the outcome of the November 22 
elections, Prime Minister Balkenende will come to Riga in a 
caretaker capacity -- forming a new Dutch government 
generally takes between three and six months -- and with 
his mind firmly focused on domestic politics.  Fortunately, 
the issues currently on the table for Riga are not likely 
to be contentious domestically or create divisions between 
us and the Dutch.  In recent weeks, the Dutch have dropped 
their opposition to granting Intensified Dialogue to 
Georgia and signed a Letter of Intent committing 500 hours 
worth of funding to the C-17 project for FY07.  On other issues -- 
NRF, Global Partnership, NTM-I, etc. -- the Dutch generally 
support our objectives and share our frustration over the 
unwillingness of other partners to move forward quickly or 
to deploy resources.  Over the long term, the Dutch are 
cautious about enlargement/expansion prospects and hope to 
engage in a "comprehensive" dialogue on the NATO's identity 
and future roles before extending new invitations -- a position 
determined as much by domestic skepticism about the EU's 
rapid expansion as by any NATO-specific concerns.  No doubt 
your interlocutors will look to you for clues regarding our 
long-term thinking about NATO to help formulate their 
positions for Riga and beyond. 
 
 
 
ARNALL