VZCZCXRO8589
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHIN #3306 2680803
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 250803Z SEP 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2298
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5697
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S E C R E T TAIPEI 003306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026 
TAGS: ETTC UNSCR TW NKWG
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN RESPONDS, OUTLINES APPROACH 
 
REF: A. STATE 156220 
 
     ¶B. STATE 155015 
     ¶C. NEELY-HARDIMAN EMAIL 9/20/06 
 
Classified By: AIT Acting Deputy Director Daniel K. Moore, REASONS 1.4 
B/C 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: On September 21, AIT delivered to the Taiwan 
Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) Ref A talking points on 
outstanding export control "gameplan" issues.  BOFT's initial 
reaction was positive.  AIT took the opportunity to deliver 
Ref B comments on export license WA060811144915003.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) BOFT indicated that it thought the talking points 
described a practical approach that would allow progress 
towards the gameplan goals to be achieved in manageable 
stages.  BOFT Export Control Task Force Head Wally Su told 
AIT that he agreed with Ref A that a logical first step to 
controlling SCL items transiting/transshipped through Taiwan 
would be to start collecting detailed manifest data from any 
ships/cargoes in route to North Korea or Iran. 
 
Undeclared SCL Items Will Be Detained 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Su noted (as previously reported) Taiwan has already 
announced a requirement effective on September 15 that any 
item from Taiwan's Sensitive Commodities List (SCL), 
including the 433 items added since the gameplan was 
accepted, must have official approval to be shipped via 
Taiwan ports to North Korea or Iran.  In order to start 
enforcing this requirement, Su indicated that Customs will 
inspect ships bound for North Korea or Iran, and if any SCL 
item is found on the ship that was not declared on the ship's 
manifest, Customs will detain the cargo and fine the shipping 
company. 
 
Until Technical Problems Resolved 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) As part of an early stage of implementation of 
Taiwan's gameplan commitments, Su said, Taiwan could collect 
and compile information from the ship manifests on which 
companies were involved in trade with North Korea and the 
types of commodities being traded.  He thought that until the 
November 13-17 U.S.-Taiwan export control discussions resolve 
the outstanding technical issues related to the difficulty of 
giving 25-working days advance notice on 
transit/transshipment licenses, Taiwan authorities would 
decide after interagency consultation whether or not to allow 
any manifested SCL item to transit Taiwan and continue on to 
North Korea or Iran. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/North Korea and Iran 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5.  (S) AIT has scheduled a meeting with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Consular Affairs Bureau for the morning of 
September 28 to again deliver the ref A talking points and to 
further discuss how to handle applications for Taiwan visas 
from current or former DPRK or Iran nationals. 
 
Responses on Specific License Applications 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S) AIT took the opportunity to deliver Ref B comments on 
export license WA060811144915003.  BOFT also said it is still 
waiting for a response to its comments on case 
WCA060814101242006 relayed via unclass email (Ref C). 
WANG