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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN'S SEPTEMBER 17 ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 1421 
 
     ¶B. STOCKHOLM 952 
     ¶C. STOCKHOLM 913 
 
Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1.  (c) Swedes go to the polls September 17 to elect a new 
parliament that will decide their government for the next 
four years.  The race has been the tightest Sweden has seen 
in decades, with opinion polls see-sawing, but mostly giving 
a slight lead to the opposition "Alliance for Sweden" over 
the incumbent Social Democrat (SDP) minority government that 
is supported by the Left and Green parties.  The Alliance is 
a two-year-old coalition of the opposition Moderate, Liberal, 
Christian Democrat, and Center parties, created for the 
purposes of this election. The unprecedented unity of the 
opposition, along with the Alliance's pro-job policies and 
soft touch on the popular Swedish welfare state system, have 
provided a sustained boost in the opposition's campaign.  An 
opposition win, however, is far from assured.  Nearly all 
opinion polls put the -- most often Alliance -- lead within 
the statistical margin of error.  But the Social Democrats 
have governed Sweden for all but nine of the past 74 years, 
and are traditionally strong closers.  The race remains a 
dead heat. 
 
¶2.  (c) Preliminary election results will be available on the 
evening of September 17.  Final results will be announced on 
September 20.  If the race is very close, it may turn on the 
projected 30,000-40,000 mail-in ballots that will be 
announced September 20.  Parliament will open on October 3, 
and the government will be announced on an unspecified day 
before then.   If the opposition Alliance wins, Moderate 
Fredrik Reinfeldt will be appointed Prime Minister of a 
four-party non-socialist coalition, with other ministries 
being dealt out among the parties after election results are 
compared.  On the other hand, if incumbent Prime Minister 
Persson's SDP party makes a strong showing and seeks to form 
another minority government with Green and/or Left support, 
it is not clear what role those parties will take.  If 
neither the Alliance nor the SDP have or can attract a clear 
majority, other alternatives may be considered.  PM Persson 
has given indications he would consider working with one or 
more of the Alliance parties.  End Summary. 
 
The Calendar Countdown 
---------------------- 
¶3.  (u) The election will take place on September 17, but 
voting by mail started in mid-August and "early" voting at a 
limited number of polling stations began on August 31.  As of 
September 14, nearly 1,100,000 mail-in and early voting 
ballots had been received by the Election Authority.  The 
total number of eligible voters in this parliamentary 
election is 6,891,172.  Voter participation in the last 
general election (2002) was 80.1 percent.  From past 
experience, 25-35 percent of voters will vote early or by 
mail.  Votes from abroad and those sent in late locally will 
not be counted on election day, and will not be announced 
until September 20.  If the race ends up as close as opinion 
polls now show, these remaining ballots, which are expected 
to number 30,000-40,000, could decide the election. 
Preliminary election results will be announced late on 
September 17, but will only include numbers for the current 
seven parties in the Riksdag.  Only on September 20 will the 
results for the smaller parties be available.  None of the 
small parties is expected to reach the four percent 
threshold.  (Note:  The largest support among the small 
parties is going to the nationalistic, anti-immigration 
Sweden Democrats, who are currently registering 1.5-2.0 
percent in the opinion polls.) 
 
¶4.  (u) On September 21, the allocation of the 349 
parliamentary seats among the parties that reach the four 
percent threshold for parliamentary representation will be 
announced.  Parliament will open on October 3.  If the 
election results are such that a change in Government will 
occur, the new government will be announced as soon as 
possible, but there is no fixed time.  The last time there 
was a change in government following an election, in 1994, 
the new government was appointed within a week of the 
election.  The Speaker of Parliament (who would be new and 
selected October 2, if there is to be a change of government) 
first meets with party leaders, then presents a Prime 
Ministerial candidate to Parliament.  Unless a majority votes 
against the candidate, he or she becomes the new Prime 
Minister. 
 
¶5. (c) In the case of a straight-forward opposition Alliance 
victory, it is fairly clear that Moderate Party leader 
Fredrik Reinfeldt would be the Prime Minister of a four party 
coalition government, supported by ministers from each of 
 
STOCKHOLM 00001489  002 OF 002 
 
 
those parties.  On the other hand, if the combined SDP, 
Greens and the Left party have a majority of the votes (as is 
the case in the current parliament), the final outcome is 
less certain.  Current PM Persson would almost certainly head 
the government, but the respective roles of the Green and 
Left parties appear still to be under negotiation; the 
results will depend in large part on the election outcome. 
At issue is whether the Greens and/or Left would form part of 
and SDP-led government with ministerial representation, as 
the Greens (and to a lesser extent the Left) are stridently 
demanding, or will they remain non-participating support 
parties.  Although unlikely, the possibility of a failure by 
the SDP, Green, and Left potential majority to reach 
agreement cannot not be ruled out.  In this event, possible 
outcomes include the Greens siding with the Alliance parties 
or one or two SDP parties supporting a SDP-Green government 
that excludes the Left party (an outcome PM Persson has made 
tantalizing but vague allusions to). 
 
What is at Stake for the Swedes 
------------------------------- 
¶6.  (c) The election has turned almost entirely on domestic 
issues.  Moderate party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt, who will be 
the prime minister if the opposition wins, has focused on 
employment, while declaring the fundamentals  of the welfare 
state will not be tampered with.  The Alliance claims real 
unemployment is much higher than the official 4.6 percent 
figure (as of the end of August).  Reinfeldt says that if you 
take into account working age people who are early retirees, 
in job-training programs, and on long-term disability, the 
unemployment figure may be over 20 percent.  Reinfeldt's 
Moderate party has styled itself the "new workers' party," 
taking a jab at the SDP strong alliance with labor unions. 
He proposes to reduce unemployment benefits, decrease payroll 
taxes for low-income workers, and provide tax breaks to 
businesses that hire long-term unemployed.  Reinfeldt's 
approach has given the Moderates -- and the Alliance -- a 
boost among disillusioned job-seekers.  The SDP, on the other 
hand, has characterized the Alliance's proposals as the thin 
edge of a wedge attacking the welfare state.  For its part, 
the Alliance has pledged it will not undermine the 
fundamentals of the welfare state, and intends to focus on 
job creation. 
 
What is at Stake for the U.S. 
---------------------------- 
¶7. (c) Foreign affairs have been infrequently and never 
prominently mentioned in the campaign.  Both the SDP and the 
Alliance support Sweden's participation in NATO PfP and the 
EAPC, and agree there would have to be a national political 
consensus for Sweden to join NATO.  In the Alliance for 
Sweden, the Moderates and Liberals support NATO membership, 
but recognize the need for consensus, while the Christian 
Democrats are agnostic on the issue and the Center Party is 
skeptical, but says it is amenable if the SDP also joined 
consensus. 
 
¶8.  (c) If the Alliance wins, the fundamentals of bilateral 
relations could remain much the same in the short term, 
although the tone would likely become less critical of U.S. 
policy, and there would likely be a more open advocacy for 
NATO membership.  If the SDP returned to power with 
non-participatory Green and Left support, foreign policy 
would remain much as it is now.  If, on the other hand, the 
SDP had to cede ministerial seats to (not very likely) the 
Greens or (very unlikely) the Left in order to form a 
government, both the tone and the content of Swedish foreign 
policy would become more U.S. critical.  In Sweden's 
government, decisions on major issues are collective and 
taken by consensus of all ministers, including those whose 
portfolio does not relate to the issue at hand.  The Greens 
and especially Left parties are Euro-skeptic and have been 
highly critical of U.S. policy regarding human rights, rule 
of law, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and 
Palestinian issues. 
NOBLE