VZCZCXRO6106
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0880/01 2611334
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181334Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5167
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2057
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000880 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: GOM LEADERSHIP ON NATO MEMBERSHIP, 
KOSOVO STATUS, NAME ISSUE, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In separate calls on PM Gruevski and FM 
Milososki September 15, the Ambassador urged the GOM to move 
quickly to implement NATO membership reforms, show concrete 
anti-corruption results, and restart political dialogue with 
the ethnic Albanian opposition.  She restated the USG 
position on including resolution of the border demarcation 
issue in a Kosovo final status settlement, and urged the GOM 
to take a constructive approach on the name dispute with 
Greece.  The Ambassador also pushed Gruevski for a more 
liberal religious freedom law, and cautioned against 
wholesale changes in the ranks of public administration 
professionals. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary continued.  Gruevski said he would lead 
interagency coordination on Macedonia's NATO membership bid, 
while Milososki underscored the GOM's commitment to showing 
concrete results in the fight against corruption.  Both 
blamed ethnic Albanian opposition party DUI for the current 
political impasse, but Milososki said the government would 
work to build "bridges of cooperation" with DUI.  On Kosovo, 
Gruevski said he would meet with PM Ceku September 19 to 
strengthen ties with Pristina, and Milososki reiterated the 
government's stance that border demarcation is a technical 
issue.  Both said the government would stick to its policy of 
no further public statements on the name dispute, while 
Milososki highlighted close business and municipal 
cooperation ties with Greece.  Gruevski indicated he would 
hold off on submitting to parliament a draft law on religious 
communities until his staff had studied EU standards for 
religious freedom, but noted strong pressure from the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church and Islamic Community to pass the 
existing draft law, which would restrict registration of 
other religious groups. End Summary. 
 
INITIAL COURTESY CALLS ON PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
¶3. (U) Ambassador made separate initial courtesy calls on PM 
Gruevski and FM Milososki September 15.  PM Gruevski was 
accompanied by his Chief of Cabinet, Martin Protogjer. 
Milososki was joined by State Secretary Igor Ilievski, Chief 
of Cabinet Cornelia Utevska, and State Counselor Milan 
Spirodonovski.  DCM and P/E Chief (notetaker) accompanied 
Ambassador. 
 
NATO MEMBERSHIP -- TIME IS SHORT, GET TO WORK! 
 
¶4. (U) Ambassador told both Gruevski and Milososki that a 
successful bid to present the strongest possible candidacy 
for NATO membership in 2008 also would send a positive signal 
regarding Macedonia's EU prospects.  There was much work to 
be done and time was of the essence.  The GOM had about a 
year to demonstrate it was in a strong position to be 
considered for NATO membership. 
 
¶5. (SBU) PM Gruevski reaffirmed his commitment to leading the 
NATO membership effort.  He would head an interagency team 
comprised of the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and the 
NATO Membership Coordinator.  Other members would include the 
Finance Minister, Minister of Interior, and others as 
required. 
 
¶6. (C) FM Milososki underscored the importance of showing 
results in the fight against corruption as one of Macedonia's 
NATO membership requirements.  The GOM wanted to "show more 
than a rhetorical commitment" to combating corruption, with a 
public prosecutor's office capable of tackling tough, 
high-profile cases.  The government would not engage in 
"revanchisme" against the previous government in pursuing 
corruption cases. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Regarding the upcoming Riga Summit, Milososki said 
the GOM hoped for an encouraging message in the final summit 
communiqu that would not differentiate among the A-3 
(Adriatic Charter) countries.  He reiterated the GOM's 
commitment to continuing its support for peace operations in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Ambassador 
responded that the A-3 countries would be assessed for 
membership individually, and on the basis of performance. 
 
REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO RESTART POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH ALBANIAN 
 
SKOPJE 00000880  002 OF 003 
 
 
OPPOSITION 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted concerns in Washington and 
Brussels, which we shared, regarding the poor state of the 
government's relations with the major ethnic Albanian 
opposition party, DUI.  The GOM needed to demonstrate 
generosity, understanding, and flexibility in trying to 
re-engage DUI in political dialogue.  The Embassy was willing 
to facilitate and support that process.  It was important for 
the government to succeed in that effort, and to limit 
communications with DUI to private channels. 
 
¶9. (C) Gruevski complained that he had been able to meet with 
all the opposition parties except DUI to discuss their 
concerns.  He noted that he had first tried to establish 
contact with DUI leader Ali Ahmeti through private channels. 
When Ahmeti did not respond, he had publicly called for a 
one-on-one meeting.  Ahmeti had countered with a public 
proposal for the two to meet in Sipkovica, once the site 
during the 2001 conflict of the HQs of the National 
Liberation Army, which Ahmeti had led.  That venue was 
politically untenable, Gruevski said.  He had countered with 
a public offer to meet in Skopje, which Ahmeti had refused. 
 
¶10. (C) Milososki said Gruevski had tried early on to bring 
DUI into government, together with the smaller ethnic 
Albanian party DPA.  He asserted that DUI's insistence on 
keeping DPA out of the government, however, and its 
"unrealistic" political demands, "rhetorical blackmail," and 
image as a party involved in corrupt activities, made that 
attempt a "mission impossible."  Nevertheless, the government 
wanted to build "bridges of cooperation" with  DUI, 
especially through the Ministry of Local Self-Government's 
work with DUI-controlled municipalities. 
 
KOSOVO STATUS -- KEEPING DEMARCATION OFF THE FRONT BURNER 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Ambassador restated our position on border 
demarcation and said we would push for including resolution 
of the matter in any Kosovo final status agreement.  In the 
meantime, it would be useful for the GOM to continue previous 
efforts to strengthen ties with Pristina. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Gruevski agreed, noting that he planned to meet PM 
Ceku in Skopje on September 19.  He also was trying to 
arrange meetings with Albanian leaders and other leaders in 
neighboring countries to strengthen regional ties.  He hoped 
to visit the U.S. next year.  In his meeting, Milososki said 
that the GOM wanted to keep demarcation "a technical issue," 
and to keep it off the front burner as a Macedonian policy 
priority. 
 
NAME ISSUE -- MACEDONIA COMMITTED TO UN PROCESS 
 
¶13. (C) Ambassador told Gruevski that, with Greek local 
elections approaching, it was unlikely there would be any 
movement soon in the UN talks on the name dispute.  In the 
meantime, it would be prudent to avoid provocative 
statements. 
 
¶14. (C) Gruevski acknowledged that, shortly after he assumed 
office, Macedonian journalists had tried to pin him down on 
the name issue, even though they already knew his position on 
the matter.  He initially had responded, but quickly decided 
there was no further need to discuss the dispute in public. 
 
¶15. (C) Milososki said the GOM had decided to restate 
Macedonia's position on the name, and to then avoid further 
public discussion of the matter.  The government would try to 
find a compromise solution through the UN negotiations 
process, but resolving the issue was likely to take time.  He 
noted Macedonia's excellent bilateral trade and commercial 
ties with Greece, as well as extensive cross-border 
cooperation between Macedonian and Greek municipalities. 
 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM -- PUSH FOR BROADER LIBERTIES 
 
¶16. (U) The Ambassador noted the September 15 release of the 
annual International Religious Freedom report.  She urged the 
GOM to continue efforts to resolve the status of an Orthodox 
priest recognized by the Serb Orthodox Church as Bishop Jovan 
of Ohrid, but considered a schismatic by the Macedonian 
 
SKOPJE 00000880  003 OF 003 
 
 
Orthodox Church (MOC).  Citing strong US congressional 
interest, the Ambassador said it also was important to ensure 
the draft law on religious communities and groups allowed the 
broadest possible religious freedoms, including the right of 
more than one group per confession to register. 
 
¶17. (C) Gruevski said he recently had met with the 
representatives of Macedonia's five established religious 
communities (MOC, Islamic Community/ICM, Catholic Church, 
Jewish Community, and Methodist Church) and they fully 
supported the draft law.  They had indicated they would fight 
amendments to the law making it easier for other groups to 
register.  Citing the MOC's high poll ratings, and the ICM's 
argument that liberalizing registration criteria would allow 
"Islamic radicals" to enter Macedonia, Gruevski said it would 
be difficult to oppose those communities.  He asked whether 
he should try to move the current draft law forward. 
 
¶18. (C) The Ambassador advised against trying to pass the 
draft law in its current form.  She noted that the ICM 
argument failed to account for the fact that Islamic radical 
groups already could, and did, enter Macedonia simply by 
registering as NGOs. 
 
¶19. (C) Gruevski agreed, and said he would ask his staff to 
analyze religious freedom laws from other EU countries for 
applicable lessons.  Milososki said he understood the US 
approach to religious freedom, having seen the diversity of 
religious institutions in the U.S. while visiting his 
brother, who lives in Chicago.  However, churches in the 
Balkans had long served as "cradles of nationalism."  Any 
approach to changing Balkan religious freedom standards had 
to take that fact into account. 
 
AVOIDING WHOLESALE CHANGES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
¶20. (SBU) The Ambassador also expressed concerns over reports 
that public administration professionals, including some who 
had been trained at USG expense, were being moved around or 
demoted in the Ministry of Interior and other ministries. 
That did not bode well for efforts to professionalize the 
public administration; the USG strongly opposed wholesale 
changes in the administration at the mid and working levels 
in particular.  Gruevski tried to defend the reassignments by 
arguing that, even when professionals were moved out of their 
previous positions, those slots were subsequently filled with 
trained professionals. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶21. (C) Gruevski and Milososki understand the need to move 
quickly to fulfill NATO membership requirements, including 
the need to show results in the fight against corruption. 
They will be hampered in that effort, however, if they fail 
to muster the creativity and leadership needed to resolve the 
festering dispute with the opposition, leaving it to absorb 
the leadership's time and energy and casting Macedonia in a 
negative light abroad. 
 
¶22. (C) The GOM has taken adopted constructive stances on 
Kosovo border demarcation and the name dispute, recognizing 
the need to keep both issues off the front burner and out of 
the media.  On Kosovo, it will be important for the USG to 
ensure the Contact Group includes resolution of the 
demarcation issue in a final status settlement. 
MILOVANOVIC