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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002307 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO), EUR/SCE, P (BAME); NSC FOR BRAUN; 
OSD FOR FLORY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA ON ELECTION EVE - EVOLUTION, REVOLUTION, 
AND CONFUSION 
 
REF: A. SARAJEVO 2280 
     ¶B. SARAJEVO 2279 
     ¶C. SARAJEVO 2277 
     ¶D. SARAJEVO 2160 
     ¶E. SARAJEVO 2060 
     ¶F. SARAJEVO 1962 
     ¶G. SARAJEVO 1916 
     ¶H. SARAJEVO 1891 
     ¶I. SARAJEVO 1852 
     ¶J. SARAJEVO 2305 
 
SARAJEVO 00002307  001.5 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney.  Reaons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is the final in a series of planned pre-election 
telegrams. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Bosnians go to the polls in two days, October 
1, to elect their national and entity governments (Ref E). 
International observers and Bosnian officials expect an 
orderly and fair election, though lingering concerns about 
fraud exist in parts of the country  (Ref A and C). 
Preliminary results will be available at midnight that 
evening, but in the past these have not always been reliable. 
 At noon on October 2, the Central Election Commission will 
release final vote tallies.  Going into election weekend, the 
race for the Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency, which has 
been marked by a shift in Bosniak politics to the right, is 
too close to call.  The final days of the campaign may have 
seen a shift of momentum in favor of the incumbent, Sulejman 
Tihic, however.  Among the Serbs, Milorad Dodik's Alliance of 
Independent Social Democrats appears poised for a big win 
that would sweep his opponents, the Serb Democratic Party, 
from power for the first time since 1991.  The Croat picture 
is confused.  Pro- and anti-constitutional reform parties are 
duking it out in what amounts to the first truly competitive 
contest among Croats since 1991.  Victories by more 
nationalist candidates among the Bosniaks and Croats will 
complicate our efforts to restart constitutional reform talks 
after the elections as well as our broader reform agenda over 
the longer-term.  An extended period of negotiations aimed at 
forming coalition governments may also dominate post-election 
politics.  Our immediate post election challenge may be 
keeping issues on an otherwise crowded political agenda in 
order to ensure that we are ready to press ahead once the 
dust settles.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Bosniaks: Moving to the Right 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Party for BiH (SBiH) leader and candidate for the 
Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidential Haris Silajdzic has 
staked his candidacy on opposition to the March package of 
constitutional amendments.  He has also skillfully exploited 
Serbian nationalist campaign rhetoric by Alliance of 
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) leader Milorad Dodik to 
raise doubts among Bosniak voters about the ability of his 
principal opponent, Party for Democratic Action (SDA) 
Sulejman Tihic, to protect their interests (Ref E and F). 
For much of the campaign, Reis Ceric, the leader of Bosnia's 
Islamic Community, and Dnevni Avaz, a leading Sarajevo-based 
daily, have tacitly supported Silajdzic and provided 
important momentum to his Presidential bid. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The anti-Tihic rhetoric from the Reis and Dnevi Avaz 
has cooled over the past week, however, after Bakir 
Izetbegovic, SDA Vice President and son of revered former 
President Alija Izetbegovic, broke an inexplicably long 
public silence and praised Tihic's work ethic and leadership. 
 And in recent days, Avaz has featured more favorable stories 
on Tihic, and on September 28, the paper published a 
full-page color ad for the Tihic campaign.  In the meantime, 
Tihic has sought to counter Silajdzic with his own 
nationalist rhetoric, notably his defense of former Bosnian 
Fifth Army Commander Dudakovic, who Serbs accuse of war 
crimes (Ref I).  Tihic has also campaigned tirelessly among 
ordinary Bosniak voters in an effort to exploit his image as 
a "man of the people" compared to the urbane and aloof 
Silajdzic.  The upshot: two days before the elections, most 
observers give Silajdzic a slight edge, but consider the race 
for the Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency too close to 
call. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Few people believe Silajdzic has long coattails, 
 
SARAJEVO 00002307  002.7 OF 003 
 
 
however.  As a consequence, most observers expect the 
relative balance of power between the SDA and SBiH in the 
State-level House of Representatives (10 seats to 6, 
respectively) to remain the same.  The Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) might pick up a seat in the HoR, but even so, it 
would remain the smallest of the three major Bosniak parties 
in parliament.  Nonetheless, the SDP would be large enough to 
be a potential oalition partner for the SDA.  The Bosniak 
political picture is less clear at the Federation and 
cantonal levels, where local issues and personalities may 
drive outcomes.  Rural voters and those from smaller Bosniak 
cities could stay with the SDA or embrace Bosniak nationalist 
pitches if the sum of their fears out weighs their 
traditional loyalties.  If the latter, this would impact the 
balance of forces among the Bosniak caucus in the State-level 
House of Peoples (Ref I). 
 
Serbs: All Hail the Conquering Hero 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Within the Republika Srpska (RS), pre-election 
prognostications are not focused on what party will win the 
most seats in the State-level HoR or the RS National Assembly 
(RSNA).  Everyone agrees that Dodik's SNSD will defeat 
current RS President Dragan Cavic's Serb Democratic Party 
(SDS).  The consuming political question is how big Dodik's 
victory will be.  According to a USAID-funded poll, the Serb 
electorate perceives Dodik as the man best positioned to 
secure the RS's future by battling crime and corruption and 
implementing economic reforms.  The same experts predict, 
paradoxically, that Dodik's command of the RS political stage 
and his party's growing lead over the SDS could drive SNSD 
turn out up (Note: Generally, experts predict an overall 
turnout comparable to 2002, approximately 55%. End Note). 
 
¶7. (SBU) During the final week of the campaign, Dodik's 
confidence has been almost palpable.  He has increasingly 
talked as if he expects to govern the RS, occasionally 
hinting that he might do so without coalition partners.  He 
has also stressed that SNSD expected to play a role in 
State-level government commensurate with its electoral 
success (i.e., as Chair of the Council of Ministers).  OHR 
HighRep Schwarz-Schilling's comments in Vienna that he may 
sanction Dodik if he plans an RS referendum rallied Serb 
voters to his side providing him with additional momentum 
going into the last week of the campaign.  Two days before 
the election, SNSD appears poised to grab the Serb member of 
the Tri-Presidency and put Cavic out of a job by winning the 
RS Presidency.  While winning an outright majority in the 
RSNA may be a bridge too far for SNSD, a revolution in RS 
politics appears to be in the offing. 
 
Croats: Man Versus Machine 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) If Bosniak politics is evolving and Serb politics 
are poised for a revolution, confusion reigns among the 
Croats.  Since 1991, the Croatian Democratic Union of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ-BiH) has dominated Croat politics, 
but the party split in March over constitutional reform.  At 
the time, the split did not appear fatal, but in September 
the new party, HDZ-1990, was openly endorsed by Croatian PM 
Sanader and tacitly endorsed by Cardinal Puljic (Ref B). 
Since then, HDZ-1990 and its anti-constitutional reform 
message have been picking up support in Herzegovina.  With 
Croat politics now in uncharted territory and a plethora of 
smaller political parties seeking to capitalize on the 
confusion and propel themselves into the first rank of Croat 
politics, few in Herzegovina are comfortable making 
predictions about the election's outcome. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Nonetheless, two days before the election, Ivo Miro 
Jovic and Bozo Ljubic, the HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990 candidates 
for the Croat member of the Tri-Presidency, are publicly 
perceived as running neck and neck, and many observers 
believe the two parties will split the traditional 5/6 Croat 
seats in the HoR among them.  If HDZ-1990 is relying on Croat 
nationalism and high-profile public endorsements to carry its 
cause, HDZ-BiH is hoping its well-established and efficient 
political machine will prevail in the end.  At the local 
level, in the races for the cantonal assemblies, this could 
be the case.  As with Bosniak politics, the outcome in the 
cantons will impact the composition of the Croat caucus in 
 
SARAJEVO 00002307  003.5 OF 003 
 
 
the House of Peoples, potentially cementing in place a 
nationalist blocking majority. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Another wild card in Croat politics is Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) Zeljko Komsic's candidacy for the 
Croat member of the Tri-Presidency (Ref B).  Anxiety is 
growing among Croat parties and voters that the SDP's 
traditionally loyal voters, coupled with multiple candidacies 
among the Croat parties themselves will propel Komsic to 
victory.  The Sarajevo-based Komsic does not need to win all 
110,000 to 140,000 projected SDP voters if Jovic and Ljubic 
split the approximately 150,000 to 180,000 Croat electorate 
among themselves.  This week, Zvonko Jurisic, Croat Party of 
Rights (HSP) Tri-Presidency candidate, also reportedly began 
a late surge, presumably at the expense of Jovic and Ljubic. 
His gains, if real, would further split the Croat vote. 
Efforts to rally Croat parties around a single candidate have 
predictably failed amid clashes of competing egos. 
 
Comment: What Does All This Mean 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Our immediate post-election priority remains 
constitutional reform agenda.  In that context, the most 
significant October 1 electoral races are those for the 
Bosniak and Croat members of the Tri-Presidency and the 
contest between HDZ and HDZ-1990 for the hearts and minds of 
Herzegovina. Silajdzic and Ljubic wins as well as a big 
nigh for HDZ-1990 would certainly complicate constitutinal 
reform.  Over the longer term, these resultswould also 
likely complicate the usual triangula negotiations required 
to reach consensus on othr issues, such as police reform. 
In any case, mixed results in the Federation coupled with a 
clear Dodik win might herald a longer period of post-election 
coalition building, which could consume politicians for weeks 
(Ref J).  Losses by the traditional "big three" of Bosnian 
politics -- the SDA, HDZ, and SDS -- could/could also result 
in leadership changes that further preoccupy the parties and 
have a significant impact on the tone of Bosnian politics. 
Imagine, for example, an SDA led by a more overtly 
nationalist figure than the moderate Tihic.  Our immediate 
post election challenge may be keeping issues on an otherwise 
crowded political agenda in order to ensure that we are ready 
to press ahead once the dust settles. 
 
MCELHANEY