VZCZCXRO1620
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2268/01 2701045
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271045Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4480
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DICARLO, EUR/SCE; NSC FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR 
FLORY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK HR YI
SUBJECT: BOSNIA:  CROATIAN, SERBIAN ENVOYS DOWNPLAY 
BELGRADE, ZAGREB ROLE IN POLITICS HERE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In separate meetings, the Croatian and 
Serbian ambassadors to Bosnia and Herzegovina September 22 
discussed the upcoming Bosnian elections.  On recent 
activities of Croatian and Serbian politicians with respect 
to Bosnia, both emphasized their countries' desire to see 
Bosnia progress quickly on its path to Euro-Atlantic 
integration, and said that the actions of their governments 
had not contributed to the nationalist rhetoric prevalent in 
the electoral campaign. The two also said they were confident 
that the harsh pre-election rhetoric would soften after the 
elections, and would not hamper talks on formation of a 
Bosnian government.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador met separately September 22 with Croatian 
Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina Josip Vrbosic and 
Serbian Ambassador Grujica Spasovic to discuss the upcoming 
elections in Bosnia, as well as recent activities by Croatian 
and Serbian political leaders relevant to Bosnia.  Both 
Ambassadors were keen to emphasize their nations, interest 
in Bosnia progressing on its path to Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  Vrbosic noted Croatian PM Sanader had endorsed 
the "Croat Togetherness" coalition (HDZ-1990 and four small 
Croat parties) because it presented the best hope to fix 
"broken" Croat politics in Bosnia.  He said that HDZ-BiH, 
under the "illegitimate" leadership of Dragan Covic (who won 
the most recent party election for president by what was 
widely perceived as a rigged vote) was not an effective 
advocate for Croat interests and could not be seen as an 
equal partner with parties representing other ethnic groups 
in the governing of Bosnia. 
 
¶3. (C) The Serb Spasovic had a similar message, noting that 
Serbia,s recent announcement of a "special ties" agreement 
with the Republika Srpska (RS) was merely a technical update 
of a similar agreement signed with Serbia and Montenegro in 
¶2001.  He did, however, acknowledge that the timing likely 
was chosen to boost the standing of Serbs in the upcoming 
elections in Bosnia and the Kosovo status talks. 
 
¶4.  (C) Both ambassadors agreed that the overwhelmingly 
negative election rhetoric in Bosnia was a problem, but 
neither seemed particularly concerned that it would continue 
after the election.  When asked about the role of Croatian 
and Serbian politicians in the Bosnia election campaign, both 
ambassadors asserted their governments were not contributing 
to the nationalist rhetoric.  Croatian Ambassador Vrbosic 
said that the leaders of HDZ-1990 are not nationalists, and 
would be constructive after the elections.  He agreed with 
Ambassador McElhaney that there would be continuing debate 
about the path of constitutional reform, particularly 
regarding tensions between individual and group rights, and 
suggested that constitutional negotiations should restart 
within the state parliament instead of among political 
leaders.  Vrbosic said "new faces" were needed to improve the 
state of Bosnian politics.  The Ambassador responded that 
until the constitutional structure is changed, there was 
little hope that new leaders would emerge. 
 
¶5.  (C) Spasovic claimed that although RS PM Dodik recently 
had been using nationalist rhetoric, he was merely tacking 
right.  His real political orientation was center-left.  The 
Ambassador responded that in doing so, Dodik was calling into 
question his willingness to contribute to practical solutions 
for BiH, as well as destabilizing the political climate here 
during the election period.  Spasovic agreed, but said that, 
due to "nervousness" in Belgrade over Kosovo, Serbian 
politicians were trying to generate some positive news with 
respect to Bosnia.  That included the "special agreement" on 
largely economic issues to be signed Spetember 26 between 
Banja Luka and Belgrade.  He said he was optimistic that 
political rhetoric would moderate after the elections, and 
the debate could turn to concrete issues. 
 
¶6.  (C) COMMENT:  Both Ambassadors were keen to emphasize 
that neither of their governments had any intention to 
contribute to the radicalization of the political situation 
in Bosnia.  They denied that Sanader's open support for the 
highly-nationalist HDZ-1990, as well as Belgrade's highly 
visible efforts to demonstrate their close relations with 
Serb front-runner Milorad Dodik were doing so.  We made clear 
that under the Dayton Agreement Serbia and Croatia must 
protect the stability of BiH, not exacerbate tensions among 
 
SARAJEVO 00002268  002 OF 002 
 
 
the three "peoples," particularly during the election 
campaign.  Their messages were very similar -- that 
membership for Bosnia in Euro-Atlantic structures was in the 
interests of their countries.  Both agreed that 
constitutional change must occur before Bosnia can join the 
EU, but neither offered any constructive suggestions on how 
to realize reforms.  END SUMMARY. 
MCELHANEY