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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2259/01 2700653
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P 270653Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4475
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO), D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR/SCE (HOH, 
SAINZ, FOOKS), AND EUR/RPM, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, 
GREGORIAN, OSD FOR MARK JONES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TRAVEL HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S. 
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND EXPOSES SOME SHAKY 
FOUNDATIONS OF DEFENSE REFORM 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  To focus public attention on continued U.S. 
engagement in Bosnia after the announcement of the Eagle Base 
drawdown, Ambassador and emboffs traveled September 14-21 to 
headquarters of the BiH Armed Forces' (AFBiH) three new 
multi-ethnic brigades and the training center for the AFBiH 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit (EOD) unit.  Accompanied by 
BiH Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Podzic and 
Senior Military Representative, U.S. BG Weber, the 
substantial press attention highlighted the solid progress 
BiH has made in standing-up a single military force that is 
responsible for stability and security within the country's 
borders. The Ambassador's travels also laid bare several 
concerns that might undermine the long term success of reform 
efforts in the absence of a larger international security 
umbrella, such as Bosnian participation in the Partnership 
for Peace.  END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
HELO ROADSHOW HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S. ENGAGEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Traveling by U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, 
Ambassador and emboffs visited the headquarters of the three 
new AFBiH multi-ethnic brigades in Banja Luka, Tuzla and 
Capljina and the EOD unit in Glamoc on September 14, 18 and 
¶21.  Accompanied by BiH Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Gen. Sifet Podzic, the Ambassador's and BG Weber's presence 
sent a strong political and public message that the United 
States will remain deeply engaged in BiH despite the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Eagle Base and that the U.S. 
strongly supports Bosnia's integration into Euro-Atlantic 
institutions.  Both print and electronic media widely covered 
the visits, and largely focused on our intended message. 
 
------------------------- 
REAL, VISIBLE PROGRESS... 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  The visits also served to highlight the substantial 
progress BiH has made in implementing defense reform in the 
past year.  The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was entirely 
supportive of the agenda and used the opportunity to showcase 
the advances in creating a single, unified AFBiH.  Some of 
the lasting images of the trips would have been unthinkable 
18 months ago.  In Banja Luka, at the former headquarters of 
the Army of Republika Srpska, an honor guard, wearing the new 
uniforms of the AFBiH and presenting the Bosnian flag, warmly 
greeted Gen. Podzic, a Bosniak and former commander in the 
Federation Army.  At the new joint training facility at 
Manjaca, the site of a prison camp during the war as well as 
the notorious April 2005 incident in which Bosnian-Serb 
recruits refused to take an oath of allegiance to BiH and 
whistled during the BiH national anthem, Ambassador and 
General Podzic received a briefing on the new AFBiH joint 
training program that focused on increasing inter-operability 
with NATO forces. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense too has begun to implement 
real and important changes that can be seen on the ground. 
The deployment areas for the new army have been identified, 
and facilities are being readied to house them.  A unified 
chain of command is in place, and commanders affirmed their 
obligation to rely on the single, national MOD for any 
orders.  The EOD unit, which the U.S. trained and equipped, 
is multi-ethnic and will soon deploy its fourth rotation to 
support coalition efforts in Iraq. 
 
----------------------------- 
... WITH MUCH MORE TO BE DONE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  It is also clear, however, that defense reform is a 
process that will take substantial time to be fully realized. 
 The MOD has yet to make its key personnel decisions and 
appointments, running dangerously close to not meeting its 
October 1 deadline.  To meet the requirements of the new 
force structure plan, the MOD must cut approximately 2000 
soldiers from its ranks, and this has proven to be a 
particularly contentious process. This includes personnel 
decisions about multi-ethnic commands for the new brigades, 
the first step in integrating the units.  The down-sizing, 
coupled with open questions about recruitment in the new 
 
SARAJEVO 00002259  002 OF 002 
 
 
all-volunteer force, will effectively limit the ethnic 
integration of the new brigades in the short-term (Comment: 
Some experts believe the AFBiH may not be fully integrated 
for 20 years. End Comment). 
 
¶6. (C) Along with the remaining administrative and legal 
hurdles, such as harmonizing pay scales, questions of 
identity and loyalty linger.  Some Bosniak commanders also 
worry about the commitment of their Bosnian-Serb counterparts 
to the reform process.  General Podzic told the Ambassador 
that the MOD would use the requirement for downsizing to 
remove officers with questionable loyalties to the state 
structure.  Other visuals from the trips are illuminating in 
this regard.  In Banja Luka, our advance team had to cover a 
large "Army of the Republika Srpska" sign above the 
headquarters main door and scrubbed the brigade "museum" of 
items from the 1992-1995 war.  Portraits of famous historical 
Serbian military leaders and a large and particularly graphic 
mural depicting the 1389 Battle of Kosovo remained for the 
visit.  At the training facility in Manjaca, the Bosnian 
national flag was flying for the Ambassador's visit, with a 
second, adjacent flagpole temporarily empty.  In Capljina, 
army commanders had originally planned for the Ambassador to 
visit a monument to a Croatian unit that had fought in the 
Second World War as well as the Catholic chapel on the base. 
These episodes suggest Bosnian-Serbs and Croats remain 
somewhat conflicted about their loyalty to the state's new 
defense institutions. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: U.S. DEPARTURE LEAVES A VACUUM 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) A common theme running throughout the visits was the 
crucial role that the United States continues to play in BiH, 
especially in the defense reform process.  Albeit for 
different reasons, all parties in the defense reform process 
recognize that the United States' political power, military 
capabilities, and credibility in BiH were the glue that held 
the reform together.  On the Bosniak side in particular, a 
general anxiety exists regarding the impending U.S. departure 
from Eagle Base in Tuzla.  During the trips, we consistently 
focused on continued U.S. military cooperation and engagement 
with BiH and our retention of "over the horizon" 
capabilities.  Despite that, it is difficult to overcome the 
perception that the U.S. is "abandoning" Bosnia.  As a 
consequence, the drawdown from Eagle Base will leave a 
perceived security vacuum among Bosnians that could shake the 
unsettled foundations of the reform process. 
 
¶8. (C) While the European Union will retain a military force 
(EUFOR), it is beginning to draw down to as few as several 
thousand by the end of the year.  Largely as a result of the 
UNPROFOR experience during the war, Bosnians openly speak of 
their lack of confidence in the Europeans and do not see 
EUFOR as a real stabilizing force in the country.  It does 
not help that the Greeks, who are slated to backfill the 
Austrians in EUFOR's Tuzla deployment, are reportedly telling 
people here that they have no intention of taking over the 
EUFOR presence there.  Ideally, the new AFBiH should take a 
lead role in ensuring a secure environment, but it remains 
too early in the defense reform process for this to happen. 
To provide Bosnians with a more tangible political indication 
of our continued interest in their stability and security and 
with a mechanism that would act as a continued driver of a 
defense reform process, the U.S. should maintain its premier 
role in defense reform.  We note too in advance of the NATO 
Riga Summit that expectations here about Bosnia's PfP 
membership are rising. 
MCELHANEY