VZCZCXRO3357
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2140/01 2571546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141546Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4389
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, P (BAME); OSD FOR FLORY; NSC FOR 
BRAUN; PRISTINA PLEASE PASS TO EUR/DAS DICARLO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BK EU
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - KEEPING THE OHR HORSE IN THE BARN ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
REF: SARAJEVO 1980 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney.  Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with OHR High 
Representative Schwartz-Schilling on September 13 at the 
HighRep's request to discuss constitutional reform, police 
reform, and the transition from his position as High 
Representative to the EU Special Representative.  On 
constitutional reform, Schwartz-Schilling proposed moving 
quickly to phase II talks under EUSR lead, if the U.S. could 
not revive the March reform package after Bosnia's October 
elections.  The Ambassador questioned Schwartz-Schilling's 
strategy and timeline, stressing as well that the U.S. 
expected to continue to play a leading role on constitutional 
reform.  On police reform, Schwartz-Schilling urged the U.S. 
to convince Dodik to be more flexible, noting U.S. influence 
over Dodik was greater than the EU's and OHR's.  The 
Ambassador responded that progress required the EU to set 
clear bottom lines and get tough on the issue.  Finally, 
Schwartz-Schilling said that if he was to accomplish all that 
was required to keep Bosnia on the Euro-Atlantic path and was 
to stay on in Bosnia through 2008 as he intended, then he 
needed to retain Bonn Powers as EUSR.  To the Embassy 
Schwartz-Schilling's proposals on constitutional reform loks 
like an attempt to secure a personal mandate prior to the 
February PIC that helps him secure his future beyond summer 
2007 when OHR closes down.  Regardless, we worry that 
Schwartz-Schilling's "discrete" activity on constitutional 
reform is increasingly indiscrete and that it risks 
undercutting the prospects for reviving the March package. 
It may be time for a frank exchange with Brussels on its 
policy to determine if the EU has indeed signed up to 
Schwartz Schilling's approach, as he implied, and if so to 
make its dangers clear.  END SUMMARY 
 
Constitutional Reform: "We Must Move Quickly to Phase II" 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Schwartz-Shilling opened the meeting by underscoring 
his interest in coordinating his approach on constitutional 
reform closely with the U.S.  With that in mind, he outlined 
his plans for moving constitutional reform forward.  He was, 
he said, prepared to support U.S. efforts to push the 
U.S.-brokered March package of constitutional amendments 
through the next parliament "as far as possible."  He 
suggested that the parties should not be allowed to open up 
what was already agreed, but then added that slight 
adjustments and/or technical fixes might be appropriate in 
some areas such as human rights.  Regardless, 
Schwartz-Schilling said, a quick decision after elections 
about the prospects for the March package was critical.  If 
it was impossible, for whatever reason, to secure its 
passage, then the international community should move 
directly to phase II talks under his lead, as EUSR. 
Schwartz-Schilling argued that this approach would ensure 
"clarity" on constitutional reform before the February 2007 
PIC, which needed to make a decision about OHR's mandate. 
 
¶3. (C) Schwartz-Schilling explained that he had already 
formed an "informal" advisory group, which included Jim 
O'Brien and Thomas Maekert (among others), to discuss phase 
II, and that the groups had met twice already (outside 
Bosnia).  He told the Ambassador that the group would meet 
again in Vienna on September 25, and he asked whether a State 
Legal Office representative could participate. 
Schwartz-Schilling said his preliminary thinking, based on 
exchanges with the advisory group and OHR staff work, was 
that phase II needed to address two key issues: 1) entity 
voting within the State-level House of Representatives 
(something he said Haris Silajdzic had stressed in an 
exchange with him), and 2) clarification of the division of 
competencies between the State and entity levels of 
government.  Language on competencies must not undermine the 
"EU clause" in the March package that provides the State the 
responsibility to negotiate with the EU and adopt and 
implement all measures necessary for implementation of GBiH 
commitments to the European Union, he added. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador responded that the U.S. intended to 
continue to exercise a leadership role on constitutional 
 
SARAJEVO 00002140  002 OF 003 
 
 
reform.  This included making a post-election effort to 
revive the March package.  He stressed that OHR/EUSR signals 
that it planned to launch phase II talks early would 
undermine the prospects for the March package.  The 
Ambassador expressed concern that Schwartz-Schilling was 
already having conversations with Bosnian political leaders 
about phase II, as he recently admitted.  The best thing to 
do right now was to keep quiet and avoid providing political 
leaders with an excuse to jettison the hard fought 
compromises contained in the March package.  The Ambassador 
also questioned Schwartz-Schilling's assertion that the fate 
of the March agreement and a decision to move to phase II had 
to be decided shortly after the election, noting that Bosnia 
might not have a government until early 2007.  The Ambassador 
stressed that the U.S. had not made any decisions about how 
to proceed with phase II talks.  This included how to 
structure the talks and who should lead them.  He wondered 
how U.S. interest in playing a leadership role could be 
squared with an EU-led process that took direction solely 
from Brussels.  Finally, with regard to a State Legal 
representative, the Ambassador noted that it would be 
difficult for a USG employee to serve on an informal advisory 
group to the HighRep at this point. 
 
Police Reform: "The U.S. Must Make Dodik Agree" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to police reform, Schwartz-Schilling 
underscored his intention to begin political talks 
immediately after the elections even while the Police 
Directorate continued its "professional assessment" regarding 
a new policing structure for Bosnia (reftel).  He asserted 
that he had sent several of his advisors to Brussels to 
hammer out an agreed approach on police reform with the 
Council and the Commission.  These exchanges convinced him 
that the EU was finally uniting around a common strategy on 
police reform, he said.  It was important that the U.S. play 
a more active role on police reform, he added, arguing that 
the U.S. had to use its "special relationship with (Republika 
Srpska PM) Dodik" to persuade Dodik that there would be 
"serious consequences" unless he compromised on police reform. 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador responded by noting that he regularly 
discussed police reform with Dodik, reminding him that the RS 
had failed to present serious proposals to the Police 
Directorate and that Dodik needed to engage constructively. 
That said, from the American perspective, the EU, and by 
extension OHR, had failed to come up with clear bottom-lines 
on police reform.  Nor was it at all clear what sanction, 
beyond delaying the Stabilization and Association Agreement, 
the EU plans, if Dodik continues to block  police reform. 
Dodik was hearing conflicting messages from Brussels and 
Sarajevo on this issue, the Ambassador noted, adding that the 
U.S. could not argue EU conditionality more forcefully than 
the Europeans themselves.  Brussels and the HighRep needed to 
play a more active role on police reform and deliver clearer, 
and tougher, messages itself, he concluded. 
 
From OHR to EUSR: "Give Me Bonn Powers" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In a brief one-on-one exchange at the conclusion of 
the meeting, Schwartz-Schilling told the Ambassador that the 
summer 2007 transition from OHR to EUSR was crucial as a sign 
to Bosnians that Europe was their future.  The Commission, he 
claimed, was concerned about whether Bosnia was ready to 
function without OHR supervision, adding that he believed 
this was possible provided the PIC found some way to maintain 
the Bonn Powers after summer 2007.  These might be vested in 
him by allowing him to keep his OHR hat and a very small 
office of "OHR staff" funded by the EU.  This arrangement 
would provide the U.S. with a greater voice in his day-to-day 
work than it might otherwise have under a purely EUSR 
operation, he stressed, adding that he was prepared to stay 
on until 2008 to see this work, particularly constitutional 
reform, through to the end.  He closed by stressing that he 
was not asking for formal U.S. views on this proposal, but 
suggested it might be discussed on the margins of the October 
19-20 PIC. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
SARAJEVO 00002140  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Schwartz-Schilling increasingly sees himself as 
leading, on behalf of the EU, Bosnia's constitutional reform 
process, and he appears prepared to take what we judge to be 
poorly calculated political risks to secure that leadership 
position.  His willingness to raise constitutional reform 
with Bosnian politicians now, despite earlier promises that 
he would not do so, could derail U.S. efforts to revive 
constitutional reform post-election without achieving the 
grand bargain on more sweeping reforms Schwartz-Schilling 
claims he seeks.  Throughout Schwartz Schilling implied that 
he had Brussels imprimatur for his constitutional reform 
strategy.  Frankly, we doubt it, just as we doubt -- given 
Schwartz Schilling's plea to us on Dodik -- that Brussels has 
settled on a clear strategy for advancing police reform.  We 
have heard rumors that Brussels is actually unhappy with 
Schwartz-Schilling's performance (for good reason), and his 
approach to constitutional reform and suggestion that he keep 
Bonn Powers may be part of a larger strategy to lock himself 
into job for him for the next two years.  Regardless, we 
believe it would be worthwhile for senior U.S. officials to 
approach Solana and his staff to determine just what Brussels 
is thinking about the way ahead in Bosnia and to make clear 
that the March package of constitutional amendments should 
not be blithely risked in high stakes gamble to launch phase 
II talks before it is appropriate and without U.S. 
participation. 
MCELHANEY