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DE RUEHSP #1126/01 2652114
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 222114Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7395
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3610
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0415
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0437
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEBAAA/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0058

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT OF SPAIN 001126 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, EB/ESC/IEC/EPC 
DOE FOR OFFICE OF POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016 
TAGS: EPET UNSC PREL PGOV VE TD
SUBJECT: PM MANNING FRUSTRATED OVER CARICOM RESPONSE TO 
PETROCARIBE BUT SUPPORTS CARICOM "DECISION" TO SUPPORT 
VENEZUELA AT UNSC 
 
REF: PORT OF SPAIN 1040 
 
Classified By: DCM Eugene Sweeney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 8 meeting with DOE A/S Karen 
Harbert and WHA DAS Patrick Duddy, PM Manning voiced 
frustration with CARICOM colleagues over their stance on 
Petrocaribe but at the same time said he would go along with 
a "CARICOM decision" to support Venezuela's bid for a UNSC 
seat.  Outlining a greater T&T role in CARICOM, Manning 
repeated his proposal for the U.S. to pay the cost of T&T 
patrolling the Eastern Caribbean for drug traffickers, and he 
expressed confidence that his Caribbean neighbors' suspicions 
of T&T's regional energy objectives had subsided since T&T 
launched its CARICOM petroleum fund.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary of Energy Karen Harbert and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Duddy met with Prime 
Minister Manning on September 8 in Port of Spain.  Also 
attending were Embassy DCM and Econ Chief (notetaker) and 
from DOE Gary Ward and Sam Browne.  This message reports PM 
Manning's comments on Venezuela's Petrocaribe initiative, 
CARICOM views on the upcoming UN Security Council vote, and 
his thinking on how Trinidad and Tobago might play a larger 
role in CARICOM.  His comments on U.S.-T&T relations are 
reported septel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Frustration with CARICOM embrace of Petrocaribe 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (C) Harbert and Duddy welcomed Manning's recent public 
statements on the risk to regional energy security posed by 
Venezuela's Petrocaribe initiative.  In response, Manning 
voiced frustration with CARICOM colleagues' embrace of 
Petrocaribe, predicting that if they continue on their 
present course, they will effectively "shut the door" on T&T 
and its role as a guarantor of regional energy security.  If 
T&T in turn is forced to find new markets for its oil, he 
continued, it may not be easy to shift supply back to the 
region if/when his CARICOM neighbors face an energy crisis. 
They would have only themselves to blame, he suggested, as 
they were focusing solely on short term benefits and ignoring 
the long term negative implications for energy security and 
economic development.  Still, he allowed that some CARICOM 
members had declined to cede control of domestic storage to 
PDVSA, demonstrating they were sensitive to the risk. 
 
¶4. (C) Manning said that T&T wanted to maintain good 
relations with all of its neighbors, particularly one so 
large and so close as Venezuela, but this had been made 
difficult because Venezuela did not like T&T's response to 
Petrocaribe.  While hypothesizing that Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez might seek to visit T&T in the near future, 
Manning was not optimistic that a political agreement would 
be reached on joint development of gas deposits along their 
maritime border, even if technical discussions on gas 
unitization continue to make progress.  As such, Manning was 
"pretty certain" that T&T would not be in a position to act 
on plans to further expand its production capacity for 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the shorter term, because 
those plans were contingent on future supplies of Venezuelan 
gas. 
 
¶5. (C) Manning indicated that T&T would be happy to expand 
its current business refining a small volume of Venezuelan 
crude to sell to other Caribbean islands, but he doubted 
whether Venezuela's Caribbean strategy envisages such a role 
for T&T.  Nevertheless, he would continue seeking to improve 
relations with Venezuela.  Later in the conversation, Manning 
said pointedly that "T&T does not want to become collateral 
damage" in the U.S.-Venezuela relationship. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
CARICOM won't support Guatemala for UNSC seat 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Asked by DAS Duddy about the upcoming UNSC vote, 
Manning said T&T would abide by the "CARICOM decision" to 
support Venezuela.  Asked if CARICOM had really taken such a 
position, he responded yes, explaining that his CARICOM 
 
 
colleagues had agreed that they could not "turn their backs" 
on Belize by supporting Guatemala.  By contrast, Guyana had 
given a green light to support Caracas, maintaining that any 
friction in its relations with Venezuela should not stand the 
way of a CARICOM consensus.  Challenged on Chavez,s 
problematical role on the global stage, Manning dismissed 
Chavez,s activities as mostly rhetoric. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Seeking a bigger T&T role in CARICOM and beyond 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7. (C) Manning spoke of T&T's current rapid growth as 
conferring a responsibility toward the rest of CARICOM. 
Moreover, the Caribbean was T&T's largest market after the 
U.S., so anything that happens there has an impact on T&T. 
Drug trafficking is a key challenge for the region.  T&T is 
buying more boats and helicopters to patrol its own waters, 
but traffickers can - and already are - moving operations to 
other islands such as Grenada that have nowhere near T&T's 
interdiction capability. 
 
¶8. (C) Manning then repeated his previous offer to use T&T 
assets to patrol the eastern Caribbean if the U.S. would pay 
for the additional cost.  Politically it would be much easier 
for T&T boats to enter other Caribbean nations' territorial 
waters, he commented, because no one thinks T&T has hegemonic 
objectives in the region.  (See septel for further comments 
by Manning on Caribbean drug trade and U.S. engagement in 
regional drug interdiction.) 
 
¶9. (C) A/S Harbert raised the CARICOM Energy Task Force. 
Manning ascribed the slow initial progress of the Task Force 
to suspicions among other members over T&T's prominent role 
in launching it.  Such a reaction was predictable and not 
unreasonable, he added, but he was confident that the 
suspicions had now subsided, particularly after T&T had set 
up a CARICOM petroleum fund. 
 
¶10. (C) Manning stressed that T&T was determined to avoid the 
path of other resource-rich developing countries that have 
failed to translate export income into tangible benefits for 
ordinary people.  He previewed a soon-to-be launched 
initiative with seven African oil producing countries, from 
Nigeria to Angola, aimed at sharing T&T's experience and 
offering technical assistance in areas such as managing oil 
wealth and commercializing flared natural gas. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT:  Manning's comments on Petrocaribe made 
clear that he does not trust Venezuela's motives and that he 
agrees with us on the dangers of Petrocaribe.  Moreover, his 
public approach to Petrocaribe has paralleled our own, 
stating in a factual and low-key way the clear economic and 
security implications.  Nevertheless, his concerns about 
Venezuela do not appear to outweigh his interest in 
associating T&T with the rest of CARICOM, as he seeks to 
build credibility with his CARICOM colleagues.  He also 
believes he cannot afford to burn bridges with Venezuela. 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (U) A/S Harbert did not clear this message. 
AUSTIN