VZCZCXRO8310
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHPB #0401/01 2680022
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 250022Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4634
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0898
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 2057

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT MORESBY 000401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EAP?ANP AND L/EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL PP
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SAREI VS. RIO TINTO 
 
REF: SEPT 21 E-MAIL FROM EAP/ANP 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Fitts, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Port 
Moresby, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The PNG government of the day has taken and 
communicated a decision to the Embassy that it does not want to 
be seen as standing in the way of the hearing of the subject 
case in California courts.  Accordingly, we must assess that 
there are no compelling foreign policy objections vis-a-vis PNG 
(and Bougainville.) In particular, we do not concur with the 
representations that an adverse decision on the case would creat 
a backlash against the GPNG.  This of course, does not speak to 
the broader foreign policy implications of the Alien Tort 
Statute.  We do note, however, that as long as the case goes on, 
the Autonomous Bougainville government will be tempted to avoid 
the difficult decisions and hard work of development in favor of 
waiting for pie in the sky via ATS. End Summary 
 
¶2. (U) Australia, whose mining companies are active around the 
world, understandably would like the Alien Torts Statute to be 
as limited in scope as possible.  In particular, the non-paper 
(ref) refers to the requirement that local remedies be exhausted 
prior to application of the ATS. That certainly has not been the 
case with Sarei. 
 
3.(U) In fact, PNG's statutes require as well that all 
litigation on natural resource projects be brought in PNG 
courts. In an earlier iteration of the case (2001 or so) PNG 
agreed that it would not charge the plaintiffs for violating 
that provision in order to pave the way for having the case 
transferred back here. 
 
4.(SBU) But the worm has turned.  I was officially informed by 
both the Minister for Bougainville Affairs and by the Prime 
Minister's Chief Secretary (the country's top civil servant 
although it is a political appointment) that the government did 
not want to be seen as standing in the way of Bougainville's 
claim.  They wanted the case to proceed.  [This had the air of, 
we hope the US courts will quickly dispose of this troublesome 
issue.  Alas, I had to remind them that the US courts were 
neither quick nor subject to this Embassy's influence.] In fact, 
they said that they were opposed to having the case in PNG 
courts as any setbacks to Bougainville's side would be seen 
there as a sign the PNG government was trying to keep them under 
PNG's thumb. 
 
5.(SBU) The Bougainville peace negotiations are largely over, 
though sensitivities are still very near the surface.  We are 
now in the lengthy run up to the proffered 2015-2020 plebisite 
on possible independence. The Bougainville Affairs Minister 
noted that his main job is making sure the Bougainville 
leadership sees the PNG government as helpful and supportive of 
its efforts to set the stage for that plebisite. 
 
6.(SBU) There is lots that is troubling about this case. 
Bougainvillians actually believe that, if the case proceeds, 
they will pocket $10 billion and become a rich province again. 
[Actually, if Bougainville and PNG history is any guide, most of 
that chimeral $10 billion would instead wind up in the Brisbane 
housing market in the name of individual Bougainville leaders.] 
While the case is ongoing, there is every incentive for the 
leadership to wait for its ship to come in and not make the 
responsible and hard decisions that are required. Also, there is 
no guarantee that a future PNG government - which could take 
office after the May 2007 elections, might not reverse course. 
This would be particularly true if lurid testimony was made 
public of the conduct of PNG forces during that troubled 
conflict. 
 
7.(U) But, the government of the day has taken the firm position 
that it does not want to stand in the way of the litigation. 
Therefore, this Embassy cannot argue that there are compelling 
foreign policy reasons for the case not to go forward.  [This is 
vis-a-vis PNG.  The Department and DOJ will have to weigh the 
world wide implications of ATS cases.] 
 
8.(C) In particular, the assertion made by the Australian 
Embassy rep that a loss by the plaintiffs would result in a 
backlash against the PNG government is unfounded. Such a 
backlash would come only if the PNG government had been opposing 
the case.  I checked with the Australian High Commission here 
and they share my assessment on this specific point.  [The GOA 
may be trying to limit ATS application and so marshalling every 
argument it can think of.  This one, though, does not hold 
water.] 
 
9.(C)Comment: The GPNG position is a bit strange if viewed from 
its own financial perspective.  As a 25% of BCL, it would 
 
PORT MORES 00000401  002 OF 002 
 
 
presumably have to front up its share of any award that was 
made. However, given the way things are done here, the general 
suspicion is that PM Somare has been given a financial incentive 
to reverse the previous government's position on the case. 
Certainly, it would be very typical of Melanesia if what the 
government saw as in its nation's interest also redownded to the 
individual benefit of its leadership. It is worthy of note that 
Paul Nero, a plaintiff and the current PNG CG in Brisbane, is 
very much a Somare man. 
FITTS