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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 001081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015 
TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KPAO MR
SUBJECT: PRDR: RE-BRANDED, BUT STILL AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
(C-AL6-01339) 
 
REF: A. 2005NOUAKCHOTT 1267 
     ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 993 
 
Classified By: CDA Steven Koutsis, Reasons 1.4(b)(d) 
 
----------- 
(C) Summary 
----------- 
 
-- Despite significant and continuing challenges, the PRDR 
(Taya's former political party) remains a top contender for 
municipal, legislative, and presidential elections. 
 
-- PRDR's greatest strengths are its organizational and 
funding superiority over all other parties, and the fact that 
it remains the most recognized political party, with most 
voters knowing little about the other 34 contenders. 
 
-- If the PRDR leadership is to be believed, all the Taya 
loyalists "who could not accept change" have left the party, 
leaving pro-democracy reformers at the helm. 
 
-- However, regardless of its re-branding efforts, nearly all 
Mauritanians still perceive the PRDR as Taya's party, and 
this may hurt PRDR candidates attempting to separate 
themselves from the former regime. 
 
------------ 
(C) Comments 
------------ 
 
-- The PRDR has been fairly silent since the coup, while 
other parties have been grabbing headlines and attracting new 
candidates and voters (ref B). 
 
-- The municipal and legislative elections will be the real 
test for the future of the PRDR.  There are three possible 
outcomes: 
 
      1 - The PRDR wins an absolute majority.  The party 
would then likely make power-sharing deals with other leading 
parties in exchange for support for PRDR's presidential 
candidate. 
 
      2 - The PRDR performs well, but does not gain a 
majority.  The party would likely look towards a coalition 
with other strong parties in the race to the presidency. 
 
      3 - The PRDR's candidates are snubbed by voters.  This 
would force the party underground, where it would look for 
ways to secretly influence the presidential outcome, such as 
through financing an independent candidate. 
 
End Summary and Comments. 
 
¶1. (C) Following the August 2005 coup, former president 
Taya's political party (The Democratic and Social Republican 
Party - PRDS) lost a significant amount of members, power, 
and influence (ref A).  Parliament, which PRDS dominated, was 
dissolved, and the new transitional government took several 
steps, including the temporary freezing of party assets, to 
limit the influence of this body of potential Taya 
supporters.  Meanwhile, the party struggled with infighting 
and an effort to redefine itself, eventually changing their 
name to the Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal (PRDR) 
(ref A).  Despite these challenges, the party remains 
extremely strong, and is considered by many to be a top 
contender for the municipal, legislative, and presidential 
elections. 
 
---------------- 
PRDR'S STRENGTHS 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) PRDR's greatest strengths remain its organizational 
and funding superiority over all other political parties. 
PRDR has offices in each of Mauritania's 13 regions, as well 
as in most of the heavily populated towns; while a vast 
majority of other parties have only one or two offices. 
Estimates of PRDR's assets vary, however, most political 
observers agree that they have significantly more resources 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00001081  002 OF 003 
 
 
than do all other parties combined.  These advantages were 
amassed during PRDS' long reign in power, when Taya used his 
position to enrich himself, and the party he controlled. 
 
¶3. (C) Another clear advantage is PRDR's name recognition and 
experience.  Even with their name change, PRDR remains the 
most recognized political party in Mauritania, with most 
voters knowing little about the other 34 parties.  PRDR 
candidates dominated nearly all municipal councils and both 
houses of Parliament under Taya.  Even with the high rate of 
PRDR defections (ref A), most candidates with political 
experience were, or still are, PRDR members.  In a recent 
meeting with the Charge, the political party Union for 
Democracy and Progress president Naha Mint Mouknass explained 
that "people will vote for the PRDR because they don't know 
anything else," adding that "the majority of the country is 
still living under the old reality of Taya and the PRDR." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
PRDR'S WEAKNESS - AND ITS STRUGGLE TO ADDRESS IT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (C) PRDR's name recognition is also its greatest weakness. 
 Regardless of its re-branding efforts, for nearly all 
Mauritanians, PRDR remains Taya's party.  This association is 
likely to hurt PRDR candidates attempting to separate 
themselves from the old regime. 
 
¶5. (C) The new PRDR leadership is well aware of this 
weakness, and takes every opportunity to draw a distinction 
between the old PRDS and the new PRDR.  "This is a completely 
different party," PRDR Secretary General Ikrin Ould Mohamed 
Vall told Charge in a September 5 meeting.  "The old party 
was about one man, while the new party is about all 
Mauritanians," Mohamed Vall said, adding that "everything has 
changed, from our new leadership, to our party policies, to 
our platform and principles." 
 
¶6. (C) Mohamed Vall explained that following PRDR's October 
2005 party congress (ref A), "those who wanted to keep the 
old party, those who were opposed to our new plan, left the 
party and began criticizing us...but they were criticizing 
the old PRDR, not the new party we have today."  Mohamed Vall 
added that "while several parties have formed a coalition 
(The Coalition of Forces for Democratic Change) to oppose the 
PRDR in the coming elections...the coalition is not strong 
and many of its members are talking with us about 
partnerships." 
 
¶7. (C) The true impact of PRDR's association with Taya will 
not be known until after the municipal and legislative 
elections.  If PRDR candidates do well, the party will likely 
have significant strength heading towards presidential 
elections in March.  If on the other hand PRDR's candidates 
are rejected by voters, the PRDR will likely look for 
alternative means to influence the presidential elections. 
 
¶8. (C) While Mohamed Vall works hard to give the impression 
of a new and unified PRDR, continued infighting and 
defections pose a constant threat to the political viability 
of party. 
 
------------------- 
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) At present it is difficult to know how PRDR's 
candidates will do in municipal and legislative elections. 
More will be known after candidate lists are formally 
submitted between September 20 and 30 for municipal 
elections, and October 3 to the 18 for legislative elections. 
 As for presidential prospects, the municipal and legislative 
elections will likely indicate whether PRDR's significant 
advantages outweigh the voters' distaste for Taya. 
 
¶10. (C) Mohamed Vall assured Charge that the PRDR would be 
running its own presidential candidate, saying that the 
nomination would occur during PRDR's party congress in 
December.  However, independent presidential hopeful Dahane 
Ould Ahmed Mahmoud told Charge that even if PRDR polls well 
in municipal and legislative elections, that "there 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00001081  003 OF 003 
 
 
association with Taya will make them unlikely to win the 
presidency."  Dahane explained that "there is an air of 
change throughout Mauritania, and the people do not want 
another Taya."  He said that instead, the PRDR would look to 
support an independent candidate, such as himself. 
 
¶11. (C) However, if PRDR candidates are poorly received in 
November, the party could consider forming a coalition or 
look towards some other tactic to influence the elections. 
Koutsis