VZCZCXRO8627
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0213/01 2680901
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250901Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0605
INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CDR1STBN1STSFGA TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI
RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
RHMFISS/CG II MEF
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESOK/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0189
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHMBRA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0655
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVFO FAREAST YOKOSUKA JA
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0261
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0225
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0605
RHMFISS/USARPAC G5 FT SHAFTER HI
RHMFISS/USPACOM REP GUAM ISLAND GU
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAHA 000213 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: KEVIN K. MAHER, CONSUL GENERAL, AMERICAN 
CONSULATE GENERAL NAHA.  REASON: 1.4 (B), (D) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  UPON ABBROGATION OF US-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY 
TAGS: MARR PINS JA
SUBJECT: LDP SEEKING SILVER LINING IN PENDING GUBERNATORIAL RACE 
 
REF: NAHA 209 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin K. Maher, Consul General, U.S. Consulate 
General Naha, U.S. Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Conservative, pro-US/Japan alliance Okinawans 
selected the capable but not particularly popular Hirokazu 
NAKAIMA as their candidate for the November prefectural 
governor's election, then hoped the anti-alliance reformists 
would run two or more candidates and split the opposition vote. 
Those hopes were dashed when the reformists coalesced behind 
Keiko ITOKAZU, a female national diet member whose pacifist 
activities and glamour make her an attractive candidate in 
Okinawa.  Okinawa LDP leadership plans to capitalize on 
Nakaima's executive experience while underplaying his 
inclination to support the alliance transformation and 
realignment planned by the USG and GOJ.  With less than two 
months to go to the election, conservatives seem more actively 
engaged in hoping for reformist failure than pursuing 
conservative victory.  End Summary. 
 
Comparing the Candidates 
¶2.  (SBU) September 20 Hiroshi NAKAMATSU, Executive Director of 
LDP Okinawa, analyzed the gubernatorial race since House of 
Councilors member Keiko ITOKAZU has been named the unified 
reformist (anti-base) opponent to the LDP candidate, Okinawa 
Electric Power (Oki Den) Chairman Hirokazu NAKAIMA.  Nakamatsu 
was relaxed and smiling at the resolution of the LDP 
presidential election, with 69% of Okinawan LDP voters choosing 
Shinzo Abe, with the remainder roughly evenly split between the 
other two contenders.  Nakamatsu stopped smiling as he began 
discussing the pending gubernatorial race. 
 
¶3.  (U) Nakamatsu started with the positives, saying Nakaima was 
the most capable candidate for prefectural governor since former 
governor Junji Nishime.  After graduating Tokyo University, 
Nakaima entered the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI).  Following a career with MITI he moved to Okinawa to be 
an executive director of Oki Den.  In 1990, Nakaima was 
appointed as a vice governor under the reformist Ota 
administration.  Then he returned to Oki Den as a vice 
president.  He has served as a chairman of the Federation of 
Okinawa Prefecture Economic and Business organizations. 
 
¶4.  (C) Nakamatsu's only direct mention of Nakaima's negative 
points was his lack of contact with ordinary people.  Nakamatsu 
indirectly alluded to some other concerns, however.  He lamented 
that a man visibly showed signs of a drinking problem, 
especially once he reached a certain age.  A younger woman, in 
contrast, looked fresh and untainted.  Nakamatsu said he was 
 
NAHA 00000213  002 OF 003 
 
 
struggling with how to attract women to support Nakaima, and 
asked in apparent sincerity whether the pol-mil chief, as a 
woman, had any good ideas.  Note:  Numerous conversations with 
politically knowledgeble Okinawans over the past six months have 
drawn a darker picture of Nakaima.  He is directly and 
scathingly critical of others' failings, especially when he has 
been drinking.  Now widowed, he long had a reputation as a 
womanizer.  End note. 
 
¶5.  (C) Nakamatsu went into greater, and gloomier, detail about 
Nakaima's weakness as a candidate when compared to Itokazu. 
Politics had more to do with popular appeal than with ability, 
Nakamatsu said, and thus Itokazu would be a formidable opponent. 
 Compared with the 71 year-old Nakaima, 58 year-old Itokazu is 
quite attractive.  She is much closer to the common people 
because of her constituent outreach for 12 years as a 
prefectural assembly member and the past two years as a national 
diet member.  Itokazu's peace movement activities and human 
rights campaign were well-regarded, and all contributed to her 
high name recognition.  For more details on Itokazu, see reftel. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Nakamatsu groaned that every candidacy needed a bumper 
sticker, and he could think of none for Nakaima.  Itokazu, in 
contrast, was ripe for packaging and Nakamatsu rattled off three 
or four examples of snappy, four-character sayings playing on 
her name, popularity, and pacifist background. 
 
Comparing Platforms and Hoping for Reformist Implosion 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Nakamatsu noted it took reformists nearly six months 
to choose a unified candidate.  Heated arguments generated ill 
will between the parties, and restoring relations would be 
difficult.  In particular, former OPG treasurer Tokushin 
YAMAUCHI was unhappy about being pushed off the campaign stage 
by his own protigi, which ended the prospect of any future 
Yamauchi candidacy. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Since the three most leftist of the six reformist 
parties (the Japanese Communist Party, the Jiyu Rengo, and the 
Socialist Party) had been forced to give up on their preferred 
candidate, Nakamatsu predicted they would insist on a strongly 
anti-base platform.  Since the Democratic Party of Japan and 
independent National Diet Member Mikio SHIMOJI's Sozo Party 
would not, for example, support a platform that included 
abrogating the US-Japan Security Treaty, the platform fight was 
the next serious challenge to reformist unity.  Nakamatsu hoped 
the losers in the platform fight would detract from Itokazu's 
chances by withholding their active support.  Note:  September 
23-24 press reports indicated Nakamatsu's hopes may not be in 
vain.  Shimoji was quoted as saying he would not decide how Sozo 
would support Itokazu until after the reformist platform 
discussions are complete.  End note. 
 
NAHA 00000213  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Regardless of the platform's details, the reformist camp 
would try to make military base issues the center of the race. 
Social welfare, medical and educational issues would follow at 
some distance.  The reformists hoped to directly engage Nakaima 
on the issue--which Nakamatsu said would be death for his 
campaign.  No candidate could be elected governor of Okinawa, 
Nakamatsu claimed, without saying there were too many bases and 
the burden on Okinawa must be reduced.  Thus, Nakamatsu said 
Nakaima could not officially embrace the agreed Marine Corps Air 
Station Futenma Relocation Facility (FRF) during the campaign. 
 
¶10. (C) Current Governor Keiichi INAMINE has previously stressed 
this same point.  August 28 Inamine told us the acceptability of 
base-related initiatives depended on whether the Okinawan public 
perceived them as originating in Okinawa, or being pushed down 
from Tokyo.  The FRF had been conceived in Tokyo.  For Okinawa 
conservatives to embrace the FRF plan, Inamine insisted, would 
all but guarantee the reformists the governorship.  On September 
11, Nakaima told us he planned to follow Inamine's advice and 
maintain a vague stance in public on the question of U.S. base 
realignment in Okinawa, simply repeating that he would listen to 
all views before making a decision to support or not the 
realignment plan. 
 
¶11.  (C) Nakamatsu said the conservative side would place the 
highest priority on economic issues for the election, followed 
by social services and welfare.  Base issues would be listed 
below education and welfare.  This varied slightly from what 
Nakaima had told us, that he considered preserving and promoting 
Okinawan culture, environment, education and health issues his 
main focus.  Economic development would come second, because 
money is a necessary tool to achieve the primary goals.  Nakaima 
said base issues could not be avoided altogether, but he would 
stress that there are many other issues that must be dealt with 
if Okinawa is to move forward. 
 
¶12.  (C) Comment: Conservative Okinawans drew great comfort from 
the reformists' squabble over the gubernatorial candidate, and 
almost stunned by the arrival of the worst-case scenario: 
reformists united behind Itokazu.  The conservative strategy is, 
well, conservative: emphasizing Nakaima's credentials, creating 
an awareness of his love for things Okinawan, while masking his 
support for alliance transformation and realignment.  The 
conservatives will have to overcome their shock, and Nakaima 
activate his campaign, to defeat the reformist challenge.  At 
the moment, the LDP leadership in Okinawa continues to be 
unwilling to confront the reformists on the importance of U.S. 
bases for Japan's national security, nor is it willing to stand 
up and argue the benefits to Okinawa of the base realignment 
plan agreed to by the U.S. and Japanese governments.  Instead, 
the LDP hopes to avoid debating base issues in the campaign.  We 
very much doubt they will be able to do so.  End Comment. 
MAHER