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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5595
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
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RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BA POL HUMRIT REFORM
SUBJECT: SHIA EDITOR DISCUSSES DEMOCRATIC REFORM/ELECTIONS 
WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe.  Reasons: 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Prominent Shia Editor Mansour Al-Jamry told 
the Ambassador September 7 that the upcoming parliamentary 
elections, although flawed, would offer an opportunity for 
leading Shia opposition society Al-Wifaq to demonstrate that 
it can ably represent Shias and to build a psychological 
bridge to the King.  He expected election irregularities, 
including padding of electoral rolls and manipulation of 
e-voting, but predicted this would have marginal impact on 
the performance of Al-Wifaq, which should emerge as the 
largest parliamentary bloc with about 14 seats.  Al-Jamry was 
critical of U.S. policy towards the region, most notably 
regarding Lebanon and the Palestinians, and said that with 
our credibility low, any public criticism of the Government 
of Bahrain by the USG because of the departure of NDI would 
backfire.  End summary. 
 
2, (C) The Ambassador met September 7 with Mansour Al-Jamry, 
Editor-in-Chief of Al-Wasat, a leading Bahraini newspaper 
which reflects Shia opinion/concerns in the country. 
Al-Jamry is the son of a leading Shia opposition figure in 
the 1970s, and lived in exile in London for many years before 
returning to Bahrain five years ago when the King introduced 
his reform movement in Bahrain and invited back exiled 
opposition figures.  The meeting took place on the fourth 
anniversary of the initial publication of Al-Wasat. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador opened the discussion by congratulating 
Al-Jamry on the fourth anniversary of Al-Wasat, and the 
positive contribution that his newspaper has made to the 
development of freedom of the press in Bahrain.  In that 
context, the Ambassador asked for his assessment of the 
current situation in Bahrain and the region. Al-Jamry, a 
strong supporter of U.S. democratic reform programming in 
Bahrain who wrote several sharply critical editorials about 
U.S. policy during the Lebanon war, launched into a lengthy 
critique of U.S. policy towards the Middle East, in 
particular Israel/Palestine and Lebanon.  He said we should 
have recognized that there were moderate elements within 
Hamas and Hizbollah, and should have reached out to them. 
Nasrallah, he said, is someone we could have dealt with, and 
he is not religiously extreme.  He said that the attack on 
Lebanon was not looked at in the Gulf in Shia-Sunni terms, 
but rather as an attack on Moslems.  Any attack on Iran, he 
added, would be viewed the same way.  Saudi Arabia's 
reputation in the region has suffered because of its initial 
statement on Lebanon criticizing Hizbollah. 
 
¶4. (C) Domestically, Al-Jamry said he was resigned to a halt 
in the democratic reform process in Bahrain for now, and that 
the best-case prognosis was no further backsliding.  He said 
the upcoming elections would be flawed, although still a 
positive development.  He expressed concern that the 
government was making efforts to influence the outcome -- 
both by padding voter rolls through naturalization and 
issuance of passports to Saudis who do not live in Bahrain 
(an accusation made before the last parliamentary elections 
in 2002), and -- as necessary -- through manipulation of 
e-voting.  He said that these moves are not intended to 
change markedly the number of seats leading opposition 
society Al-Wifaq will win.  At worst, they may lose a couple 
of seats, but should take about 14, making Al-Wifaq the 
largest bloc in the National Assembly (that estimate is in 
line with most predictions).  He said the government's 
attentions are not focused on Shia districts, but rather on 
Sunni or mixed areas, where it hopes to have some influence 
on who will win.  He expected the election to proceed as 
planned, with one wildcard a flare-up over the Iran nuclear 
issue, which could have unknown consequences in Bahrain. 
 
¶5. (C) Al-Jamry said that hard-line Sunnis are afraid of a 
resurgent Shia community as a result of the election.  He 
said that the King at this point did not share this 
apprehension, but was under considerable pressure from the 
hard-line Sunnis. Recent reports of political naturalizations 
and warnings about Shia land purchases in traditionally Sunni 
neighborhoods in Muharraq are a reflection of hard-line Sunni 
maneuverings before the election. 
 
¶6. (C) Despite some of the negative atmospherics in the 
run-up to the election, Al-Jamry thought that the 
post-election period offered some important opportunities. 
As the largest bloc in the parliament, Al-Wifaq will face 
challenges.  Its first challenge will be to demonstrate to 
the Shia people that it is capable of serving their interests 
and representing them well.  This will be difficult, because 
Al-Wifaq is a large umbrella group comprised of a wide range 
of people and factions from clerics to business people to 
political hardliners.  But he recalled that his father had 
 
MANAMA 00001637  002 OF 002 
 
 
gained considerable stature in the community when he was 
elected as an MP in the 1970s, and Al-Wifaq MPs will now have 
a similar opportunity.  Al-Wifaq's second challenge will be 
to build a psychological bridge to the King.  There is so 
much distrust between Sunnis and Shia in Bahrain these days, 
he lamented.  Al-Wifaq will have an opportunity to break some 
of that down.  But the King, he added, will also have a 
responsibility to resist anti-Shia pressures among some 
Sunnis, and try to move forward. 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of NDI, our strong 
disappointment that it was forced to stop programming in 
Bahrain, and our desire to find a way to bring it back. 
Al-Jamry said that prospects for an early return were dim, as 
the government would not want NDI in the country around the 
election as it would surely pick up any irregularities.  In 
terms of what the USG could do, he advised against making any 
critical statement, as that would backfire.  The U.S., he 
said, has low credibility here now.  In looking at the U.S., 
people first think of Lebanon, and then Iran.  Democracy 
comes after that. 
 
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Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
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MONROE