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DE RUEHMU #2160 2722244
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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7735
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T MANAGUA 002160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS, NSC FOR DAN FISK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: "EDUARDO WILL BE THE NEXT PRESIDENT, UNLESS FSLN 
FRAUD PREVENTS IT," PREDICTS MONTEALEGRE,S CAMPAIGN ADVISER 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Over lunch at the Presidency on 28 September, Eduardo 
Montealegre's campaign adviser Mario Elgarresta asserted to 
President Bolanos' chief of staff Nayo Somarriba, DCM, and 
polcouns that Ncaaguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) candidate 
Montealegre will be Nicaragua's next president -- unless 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) candidate Daniel 
Ortega steals the election on the first round.  Elgarresta 
listed the departments of Managua, Matagalpa, Leon, Granada, 
and Chinandega as the most vulnerable areas, as these are 
Nicaragua's most densely populated regions. 
 
¶2.  (C) Elgarresta noted that ALN polls show that Montealegre 
is closing in on the FSLN candidate, placing approximately 
two to three points below frontrunner Ortega, while Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate Jose Rizo trails 
Montealegre by about ten points.  According to Elgarresta, 
Montealegre leads by 14-15 points in Chinandega and Granada, 
while Ortega maintains a two-point lead over Montealegre in 
Leon.  Ortega enjoys a few points' lead over Rizo in 
Matagalpa, followed closely by Montealegre; however, he 
believes Montealegre can gain more support there.  Arguing 
that Ortega has reached his ceiling, but Montealegre has not, 
Elgarresta was confident that the bulk of independent and 
undecided voters, as well as some PLC supporters, will shift 
their support to Montealegre once they are convinced that he 
is the only candidate who can beat Ortega. 
 
¶3.  (S) Regarding Montealegre's campaign, Elgarresta noted 
that it is finally shaping up and campaign money flowing in 
-- but not soon enough.  (NOTE/COMMENT: According to 
Montealegre supporter Vilma Leon-York, who is assisting 
Eduardo Montealegre's fundraising efforts, Montealegre's wife 
Eliza will participate in fundraising events in Atlanta, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Miami over the next week. 
Eduardo will participate in a fundraising event in Miami on 
October 10, reportedly with the support of Mel Martinez, and 
an event in Washington DC on October 16, reportedly with the 
support of Jeanne Kirkpatrick.  We also hear that the 
Taiwanese will support Montealegre starting early October. 
END NOTE/COMMENT.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Elgarresta explained that he closely monitors the 
communications aspects of the campaign, which includes a 
substantial spike in radio and television spots during the 
month of October.  While many of the spots will focus on what 
Montealegre offers, some will attack Ortega, specifically 
warning voters that the forced conscription of the 1980s 
could return if the FSLN wins.  One spot will feature a woman 
who lost one of her son's in the 1980s.  Elgarresta noted 
that ALN will also play on Congressman Burton's recent 
warning that an Ortega victory could spell disaster for the 
some 800 million dollars or so in remittances expatriate 
Nicaraguans send home each year. 
 
¶5.  (C) Regarding how the U.S. can best help, Elgarresta 
listed ensuring a clean electoral process through massive, 
top-notch observation and our "encouragement" of private 
sector backing.  (COMMENT: Other recent polls also suggest 
that Montealegre is closing in on Ortega; however the 
possibility that Ortega will do his utmost to alter the 
election results to win on the first round is real.  In 
addition to manipulations through the use of vote challenges 
(impugnaciones), we are hearing from a number of contacts 
that the FSLN is planning targeted power and phone line 
outages in voting centers and tables (JRVs) where Ortega is 
weak to interrupt voting and tabulation as well as the faxing 
of results from these areas.  Informed observers, party poll 
watchers, and voters can help deter and minimize the fraud. 
END COMMENT.) 
TRIVELLI