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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 001834 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON PTER MY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL ANWAR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David B. Shear for reasons 1.4 b 
 and d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Admiral Mohd Anwar Mohd Nor, Chief of Malaysian 
Defense Forces, will visit the U.S. from September 30 - 
October 12.  Admiral Anwar's visit provides us with an 
excellent opportunity to strengthen our efforts for mil-mil 
cooperation, influence Malaysia's military equipment 
acquisitions and strengthen our overall ties with a moderate 
Muslim nation and economic force in Southeast Asia. 
 
¶2.  (C) Malaysia has been a difficult partner in the past. 
Malaysians nurse strong anti-colonial sentiments and (among 
the Malay majority) resentment over perceived ill treatment 
of Islam by the West.  Former Prime Minister Mahathir played 
on these sentiments to generate political support for himself 
and his ambitious economic agenda.  When he relinquished his 
post in 2003, he left behind a new economic power but also 
strained relations with much of the West.  Today, however, 
Malaysia presents us with important transformational 
opportunities.  In terms of its economic development, 
educational achievement, public welfare, and political 
stability, Malaysia stands out among Muslim-majority nations. 
 The Malaysians project a moderate version of Islam, and, 
over the longer term, could lend additional support to 
democratic forces in the Middle East and Iraq.  We also share 
strong common East Asian regional interests in stability and 
prosperity.  Malaysian counter-terrorism cooperation is 
indispensable in defeating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the 
region.  Malaysia's economy is one of the most open, diverse 
and well-developed economies in the Islamic world and in 
ASEAN.  Malaysia is our tenth largest trading partner, and 
economic ties could strengthen 
further if ongoing free trade agreement talks succeed. 
 
Malaysia's Moderate Islam 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Malaysia, with its entrenched majority coalition, is 
hardly an ideal democracy, but it can still serve as a useful 
model for evolving Islamic societies elsewhere.  The Malay 
people, long known for their tolerance, have become more 
conservative in recent years, but Prime Minister Abdullah has 
enshrined the Malay political elite's continued preference 
for moderation in his "Islam Hadhari" or "Civilizational 
Islam" policy.  Abdullah's key message is that Islam can 
become a leading world civilization again only if it embraces 
economic development, education, innovation and tolerance. 
 
Malaysian Foreign Policy and US--A Mixed Bag 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Abdullah champions his vision--albeit with limited 
impact to date--within the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), which Malaysia currently chairs.  Malaysia 
supports Abbas, the Palestinian Authority, the MEPP roadmap, 
and Iraqi reconstruction. However, the Malaysian public 
remains highly critical of our Middle East policies, and the 
GOM is consistently critical of Israel, with which it has no 
diplomatic relations.  As chairman of the OIC, Malaysia 
recently volunteered 1,000 troops to participate in UNIFIL. 
After more than a month of lobbying, and apparently without 
the consent of Israel, UN SYG Annan agreed to allow Malaysia 
to send a force of 376 soldiers to support UNIFIL.  At the 
time of this writing, it is unclear how this issue will be 
resolved. 
 
¶5.  (S) In early September, Malaysia surrendered the 
chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement, and as past chair 
remains a member of the leadership troika.  During Malaysia's 
tenure it championed policies which supported the NAM stance 
on the Iranian nuclear program, and engaged, often on overly 
friendly terms, with such problematic international players 
as Zimbabwe, Cuba and Venezuela.  Abdullah hosted Hugo Chavez 
for a visit to Malaysia in August, and assured Venezuela of 
his support for election to the Latin American chair on the 
UN Security Council. 
 
¶6.  (C) As last year's ASEAN Chairman, Malaysia took great 
pride in hosting the first East Asia Summit last December. 
This summer Malaysia hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum and 
Ministerial Conference, attended by Secretary Rice and among 
others,  LTG Frazier of the office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The GOM backs the six-party DPRK nuclear talks and has 
criticized North Korea's truculence. The Malaysian government 
is publicly supportive of China's "peaceful rise",  welcoming 
in particular China's growing imports of Malaysian products, 
 
KUALA LUMP 00001834  002 OF 003 
 
 
despite lingering suspicions among some officials of China's 
long-term intentions. 
 
¶7.  (C) In Southeast Asia, Malaysia has played an important 
and constructive role. In August Malaysia completed its 
peacekeeping mission to East Timor following the armed 
uprising that led to deployment of Australian, Malaysian and 
Portuguese forces. The GOM has also taken the lead in the 
southern Philippines peace process, hosting negotiations and 
contributing observers to the International Monitoring Team 
in the southern Philippine.  The Malaysians have urged the 
Thai government to resolve peacefully the unrest in Southern 
Thailand and are hopeful that the new junta will take a more 
conciliatory role in calming their northern border. 
Malaysia's recent success initiating regional aerial 
monitoring of the Straits of Malacca (the "Eyes in the Sky" 
program), has helped reduce piracy in the Straits.  Malaysia 
is especially chagrined by Burma's intransigence because it 
championed Burma's entry into ASEAN.  Having publicly 
criticized the Burmese regime, though, FM Hamid appears to be 
at a loss as to what to do next. Since the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, Malaysia has generally taken a hands-off approach. 
 
Bilateral Ties--Improving the Substance 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) In our bilateral relations, the GOM has begun 
matching improvements in tone with improvements in substance. 
PM Abdullah has openly espoused improved relations with the 
U.S., and values the good rapport he established in his 
meetings with the President.  In late May, A/S Hill conducted 
our first-ever Senior-Level Dialogue with Foreign  Ministry 
Secretary General Rastam.  In July, Secretary Rice also met 
 
SIPDIS 
with PM Abdullah, FM Hamid, and most recently, President Bush 
met with PM  Abdullah on the sidelines of the UNGA in 
September. Last year the GOM acceded to our long-standing 
urging and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol; the 
Malaysians have also recently started sending observers to 
recent PSI exercises; and the GOM is preparing to implement 
an export control regime.  An opening round in the FTA talks 
in June went well, but the second round in Washington in July 
was not nearly as successful. The third round has been 
postponed, and we are waiting for more positive overtures 
from the newly installed Secretary General for the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry. It remains unclear if 
the two parties can meet the negotiation deadlines and agree 
to an FTA. 
 
¶9.  (C) Although they keep the details closely held, the GOM 
has been a key regional partner on counterterrorism. Early 
round-ups in 2001-2002 of scores of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
suspects helped ensure there have been no terrorist attacks 
here.  However, Malaysian extremists, as illustrated by a 
series of recent arrests in Malaysia's Borneo states, still 
have the capability to support JI operations elsewhere.  We 
and our colleagues in Manila, Jakarta and other  Southeast 
Asian posts have embarked on a regional effort to strengthen 
these countries' border controls.  In 2003, Malaysia 
established the Southeast Asia Regional Center for 
Counterterrorism (SEARCCT), which runs a full schedule of 
multilateral training courses, many conducted with U.S. 
support. 
 
PM Abdullah's Challenges 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Prime Minister Abdullah's main priorities are 
sustaining growth in Malaysia's increasingly developed 
economy, fighting corruption and encouraging more open, 
collegial government. No one doubts his sincerity but his 
mild-mannered and cautious approach has led critics to 
question his leadership. Now two and one-half years into his 
five-year term, Abdullah has appealed to the public for 
patience in delivering reform. 
 
¶11.  (C) PM Abdullah currently faces a new problem:  in 
April, former PM Mahathir began openly attacking his 
successor for failing to follow through with many of the 
former PM's initiatives.  These attacks continued throughout 
the summer and will likely not subside any time soon. 
Mahathir can no longer dictate policy (unlike Singapore's 
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew), but the old brawler continues 
to revel in public controversy.  Abdullah has so far 
maintained an "elegant silence" and tasked others in the 
Cabinet to explain his decisions.  At this point,  Abdullah's 
still high popularity and the economy's continued solid 
growth should help ensure Mahathir's campaign fails. However, 
 
KUALA LUMP 00001834  003 OF 003 
 
 
Mahathir's public insinuations that the PM and his supporters 
are "not Malay enough" may constrain the PM's public 
statements on foreign policy issues. 
 
¶12. (C) Another of many subjects on which Mahathir has 
criticized Abdullah is the growing mil-mil cooperation 
between the United States and Malaysia, particularly with 
regard to the greater frequency of high-visibility ship 
visits.  We have been pleased by the overwhelmingly positive 
media coverage our ship visits have received, in contrast to 
the quiet arrivals of past years.  The flip side to this is 
that our visits are getting increased attention from 
ideological foes on the Islamic right, and from Mahahtir,s 
opportunistic criticism. Deputy Prime Minister Najib has 
stoutly defended our cooperation before Parliament, and we do 
not see that our engagement is under threat.  However, we do 
need to be cognizant of our increased military visibility and 
sensitive to GOM concerns, particularly with high tensions in 
the Middle East. 
LAFLEUR