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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 001812 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2026 
TAGS: PREL PINS PTER MOPS EAID RP MY
SUBJECT: MALAYSIA SEES "DEADLOCK" IN GRP/MILF PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: KUALA LUMPUR 1525 
 
Classified By: DCM David B. Shear for reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S) Malaysia's Othman Abdul Razak, facilitator for the 
Philippines Government (GRP)/Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) peace process, told Polcouns September 26 that the 
talks had "deadlocked."  The previous round in early 
September had gone nowhere because GRP negotiators had failed 
to demonstrate flexibility on the issue of territory. 
Manila's requirements for legislative approval of a final 
agreement constituted a second stumbling block for the 
future.  Othman understood that the new offer being prepared 
in Manila also would be a non-starter and questioned the 
wisdom of holding another round of talks on this basis.  He 
commented that GRP approaches to individual commanders had 
not been successful but had damaged MILF confidence in the 
peace process.  Manila appeared to believe time was on the 
GRP's side and a "no peace, no war" situation remained 
acceptable, but MILF leaders could not keep hardliners in 
check indefinitely.  Othman called for creative solutions and 
greater political will from President Arroyo, while also 
describing her domestic political position as weak.  Othman 
expressed his hope that international and U.S. pressure might 
influence the GRP position.  Compared with his views in early 
August, Othman's outlook on the peace process was far more 
negative and more partisan in favor of the MILF negotiating 
position.  End Summary. 
 
The Failed September 6-7 Round 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (S) Polcouns called on Othman September 26 to gain his 
views on the 13th round of talks, held September 6-7 in Kuala 
Lumpur, and the prospects for a future round.  Othman, who 
had just returned from extended overseas travel (including 
Bosnia), described the 13th round as a failure.  The talks 
had "deadlocked" as the GRP had presented no compromise that 
would help resolve the issues surrounding the territorial 
boundaries of the prospective MILF entity on Mindanao, 
including the territorial contiguity for the 
Moro-administered area.  Given that the MILF had agreed to 
give up its goal of independence as part of a peace deal, and 
that the Moro-administered areas would remain part of the 
Republic of the Philippines, Othman judged Manila's position 
to be unreasonable.  Othman added that the GRP position that 
the future agreement be subject to legislative passage or 
referendum constituted a second major stumbling block for the 
future.  While acknowledging that he risked being labeled as 
partisan at this juncture, he placed the blame for the 
current "impasse" on the GRP. 
 
New GRP Offer Not Promising 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Polcouns asked about press reports noting that the 
GRP was preparing a new offer that it would shortly pass to 
the MILF through the Malaysian Government and raising the 
possibility of another round of talks in October.  Othman 
stated that his "intelligence sources" had informed him that 
Manila's new position also would be a non-starter as it 
lacked meaningful compromise and included reference to a 
referendum to determine territorial boundaries.  He 
questioned the utility of holding another negotiating round 
if there were no prospect of progress.  Othman implied that 
he anticipated traveling to Manila soon. 
 
¶4.  (S) Othman raised reported GRP efforts to negotiate 
separately with individual MILF commanders, approaches now 
privately acknowledged by the GRP. Othman stated these 
approaches did not meet with success in terms of splitting or 
weakening the MILF.  However, they had the negative effect of 
undermining MILF confidence in the integrity of the peace 
process. 
 
Status Quo OK for Manila, Not for MILF 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) The Malaysian facilitator stated he was under the 
impression that Manila believed time to be on its side.  The 
current situation of "no peace, no war" remained largely 
acceptable to the GRP.  Mindanao's situation had stabilized 
to the extent that the Philippines could attract more aid 
into the region from foreign donors, including the Japanese. 
Longer-term demographic shifts, produced by new non-Moro 
settlements, worked in Manila's favor.  However, the MILF 
 
KUALA LUMP 00001812  002 OF 002 
 
 
would not sit still for long if there were no prospects for 
progress in negotiations.  Hard-line MILF commanders and 
ulamas at a certain point would press for action and MILF 
retained significant weapons stockpiles. 
 
Creativity Needed... 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Othman called for President Arroyo to provide 
"creative solutions" to reach a negotiated settlement, citing 
the example of Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla's 
flexible approach to the Aceh peace talks in 2005.  Strict 
interpretations of constitutional requirements, in which 
legislative approval and referendums were a part, narrowed 
the options that the GRP presented.  Instead, Arroyo needed 
to "think outside the box."  Third-countries guarantees to 
the parties might be part of a new approach, Othman 
speculated. 
 
...and U.S. Pressure 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Othman continued that creative thinking and 
associated risk-taking required a position of political 
strength that Arroyo lacked.  He doubted GMA would take such 
risks absent pressure from the international community.  Even 
then, Othman said, Arroyo's domestic political standing might 
prevent a GRP compromise in the MILF negotiations. 
Nevertheless, Othman urged the U.S. to exert diplomatic 
pressure on Manila to offer more compromise on the issue of 
Moro-administered territory and to consider creative ways 
forward.  Polcouns stated that the U.S. strongly supported a 
negotiated solution to the GRP-MILF conflict and rejected a 
return to violence. 
 
¶8.  (S) Othman said Malaysia remained committed to 
involvement in the International Monitoring Team.  At a 
certain point, however, contributing countries including 
Malaysia would need to examine the costs and benefits of 
their deployments.  Othman inquired about possible U.S. 
assistance to the Bangsamoro leadership and management 
center, an issue he raised in our previous meeting (reftel). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Othman, by his own admission, was pessimistic on 
near-term prospects for the GRP-MILF peace process and more 
partisan in placing the blame for the current "impasse" on 
Arroyo's government, a change from his expressed views in 
early August.  However, he did not signal any plan for 
Malaysia to bow out of its facilitator role.  Othman clearly 
intended his comments to influence U.S. views in support of 
international pressure on Manila. 
LAFLEUR